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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation examines how the US policy of detaining noncitizen families 
emerged at the intersection of three processes: (1) increasing connections between 
geopolitical and homeland security policies and immigration enforcement practices; (2) 
expanding legal categories of detainable and deportable noncitizens; and (3) the state’s 
regulation of noncitizen families.1
                                                 
1 A Note on Terminology: Mainstream media, advocates, and policy-makers most commonly refer to 
“immigrant family detention,” but this phrase gives me pause for a few reasons.  First, it erases the fact that 
many people migrate to the US with no intention of establishing permanent residency or citizenship.  
Referring to noncitizens as immigrants presumes that all noncitizens seek to stay in the US, which both 
ignores migrants’ intent to return and emphasizes a swelling noncitizen population.  Second, for families in 
particular, “immigrant” obscures the fact that most families at Hutto and Berks seek protection by filing 
asylum claims.  US and international law differentiates between economic or labor migration (which is 
supposedly “by choice”) and socio-political persecution, which isthought to be without choice.  Many 
question the boundary between political and economic refugee status, in order to emphasize how neoliberal 
economic reforms have created life-or-death situations for migrants that do not conform to post-World War 
II norms of political persecution.  These distinctions are critical for how people navigate the US admissions 
process, but from the perspective of exclusion, noncitizenship  defines migrants’ relationship to border and 
immigration enforcement agencies.  Since I focus on the process of physical containment and banishment, I 
use the term noncitizen.  Where I discuss the asylum-process in particular, I use the term “asylum-seeker.” 
In situations where I am paraphrasing others, I retain their terminology. 
 Implemented in March of 2001, but expanded sixfold 
in 2006, family detention’s evolution reflect wider changes in the immigration 
enforcement system. Family detention provides, therefore, a discrete case study through 
which to trace emerging trends in the policing of citizenship and migration status.  Border 
enforcement and boundary-making have been enduring foci for political geographers, 
who critically analyze the role of il/licit border-crossing in the production of political 
boundaries, the ways in which borders and border-crossings are contested, and the forms 
of border enforcement that emerge from these framings of territorial bordering, political 
membership, and national identity (Burridge and Loyd 2007; Dunn 1996, 2010; Nevins 
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2002; Nevins and Aizeki 2009; Sundberg 2008; Varsanyi 2008).  Immigration 
enforcement policies cannot be explained, however, solely by examining border 
enforcement policies, debates, or “boots-on-the-border” practices (Coleman 2008b). 
Distinct legal and governmental arrangements authorize a series of spatial strategies: 
interior policing, detention, deportation, and the discretionary decisions about noncitizens 
between “apprehension” and “removal.”  Beginning with the selective detention of 
families at the Berks County Family Shelter Care center in 2001, expanding to the 
mandatory of detention of families in 2005, and then receding to Berks once again in 
2009, noncitizen families’ shifting “detainability” provides a window onto changing 
detention policies.  This dissertation traces these changes in order to understand, first, the 
range of laws, policies, and informal practices that led noncitizens to become the US’ 
fastest growing incarcerated group, and second, the spatial practices through which 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), counties, and contractors produce this 
detention landscape in relation to, but irreducible to, border enforcement.2
 Family detention is not strictly a “post-9/11” development, though popular media 
representations recount its history as such.   The Berks County Family Shelter Care 
Center near Reading, Pennsylvania, opened in March of 2001 with 84 beds (Figure 1.1).  
Prior to Berks’ opening, the Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) released 
family groups identified as “illegal aliens” with “Notices to Appear” before an 
immigration judge.  For families arriving without documents and no immediate contacts  
  
                                                 
2 Until the 2003 Homeland Security Act reorganized immigration and border agencies, Immigration and 
Nationalization Services (INS) was responsible for policing immigration violations and administrating 
admission.  The Act  delegated immigration enforcement to the new Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) while the new Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) handled admissions and 
administration.   Whilethe INSdetained and adjudicated unaccompanied children’s cases, the conflict of 
interests between caregiving and the adversarial legal process led  unaccompanied minors’ custody to be 
transferred to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) (see Women’s Commission 2002). When 
describing pre-2003 immigration enforcement, I refer to the INS.   
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Figure 1.1: Berks County Family Shelter Care Center. 
 
(Source: Author, December 2008.) 
in the United States, the INS could not verify their identities, making release problematic 
from an immigration enforcement perspective.  Housed at Berks Heim, an elderly care 
home built in the 1950s, the Berks family shelter stood on a large campus of county 
services and next door to an INS juvenile detention facility for unaccompanied children. 
According to INS officials, the site was contracted specifically because Berks County 
staff were familiar with children’s specific legal frameworks and services. Berks staff 
saw family detention as an extension of juvenile detention, and subject to the same ‘non-
penal’ custodial models and operating standards applied to the detention of 
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unaccompanied children under 18 years of age (Herman 2001).  As a child welfare 
facility, family detention at Berks unfolded out of a set of institutional practices aimed at 
attenuating the effects of detention and state custody children.   
 A ten-year long legal battle, fought by child advocates in California’s federal 
district court (9th), Flores v. Meese was ultimately settled in the Federal Court’s Ninth 
Circuit in 1997.  Until this ruling, the INS was charged with holding, processing, and 
either releasing or deporting unaccompanied non-citizen children found to be out of 
status.  The INS was in charge of age determination, which was widely found to be 
inaccurate, resulting in the detention of minors in adult facilities (Women’s Commission 
2002).  The INS also ran juvenile detention centers, so that the same officials charged 
with proving unaccompanied minors were in violation of immigration law were also 
charged with their daily care, recreation, education, and discipline.  Immigration and 
asylum interviews were held under the same “adversarial” practices as used for adults, a 
situation that required that children of all ages narrate their cases with the same 
evidenciary demands as adults.  These practices disregarded the special difficulties 
children have  obtaining records, comprehending complex legal frameworks in a foreign 
language, and most importantly, retaining legal counsel (Women’s Commission 2002). 
The Flores Settlement addressed these explicit conflicts of interest within the INS by 
stipulating conditions of custody, procedures for releasing children to family members, 
and legal mechanisms for contesting a child’s detention.  The federal court intended the 
settlement to provide temporary guidance, and required the INS to develop standards and 
policies for the detention of minors, the publication of which would replace Flores. 
 The INS never wrote or implemented these policies, however, and in 2006 when 
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the T. Don Hutto Family Residential Facility opened, Flores remained the only binding 
legal framework on federal immigration custody of minors.  A former adult detention 
center and medium-security prison, family detention at Hutto was implemented at a 
facility built for adult, male inmates and staffed by corrections officers (aka prison 
guards).  Transforming from a pre-trial detention center for federal prisoners, to a U.S. 
Marshals’ detention center, to a family detention center in a matter of months, the facility 
underwent few changes to its physical infrastructure, décor, programming, or service 
provision.   While the popular press has placed much of the blame on the Corrections 
Corporation of America (CCA), who owns and operates Hutto, the intergovernmental 
service agreements that govern the relationship between federal and private entities 
contained a single alteration: the population of detainees (US Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement 2006b). Hutto is typical of the wider immigration detention system, which 
relies upon surplus bedspace in the criminal justice system, decommissioned army 
barracks and prisons, and speculatively-built “tent cities” (Dow 2005). The detention of 
non-citizen adults occurs largely in former and existing prisons and county jails, and is 
governed by the Detention Operations Manual, a non-binding set of standards and 
procedures based on the Adult Corrections Manual.  By ICE’s Detention and Removal 
Office’s own admission, many detention centers fail to pass American Corrections 
Association criteria for the criminal justice system (US Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement 2003; US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009b). Bearing razor 
wire, prison scrubs, frequent head counts, paltry medical care, unsavory and insufficient 
food, automatically closing doors, and an hour of education a day, Hutto violated nearly 
every provision of Flores, and drew a lawsuit (Bunikyte, et al. v. Chertoff, et al.) in 
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March of 2007. 
Institutionally, Berks and Hutto represent two common governmental 
arrangements in the noncitizen detention system. Both are contract facilities, contracted 
through InterGovernmental Service Agreements (IGSAs). IGSAs devolve responsibility 
for detention operations from the federal government to county governments, and 
counties stand to make significant incomes from these arrangements. As of September 
2009, most ICE facilities were contracted through IGSAs, and of these, seven were 
dedicated to detaining noncitizens. A total of 50% of the total detained population is held 
in these dedicated detention facilities, and the remainder detained noncitizens in criminal 
justice facilities (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009b). Because they are 
inter-governmental, these contracts are not awarded through the federal government’s 
competitive bidding process. In Hutto’s case, Williamson County subcontracts its IGSA 
responsibilities to the Corrections Corporation of America, who pays the county $6,000 
per month for “monitoring” costs.  In the context of an economic downturn and growing 
demands on county resources, detention has become a significant source of income for 
both Williamson and Berks counties.  While Taylor granted CCA a property tax holiday, 
CCA pays taxes into the local school system. Berks, alternately, sits on a large swath of 
county land, amid a recycling center, community college, agricultural extension office, a 
new elderly care facility, a juvenile criminal justice facility, a noncitizen juvenile 
detention center, and a jail. Family custody is part of a larger package of county service 
and income generation (Herman 2001). 
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Figure 1.2: Children at T. Don Hutto Family Detention Center. 
 
(Source: Ben Wheeler, July 2009.) 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Family detention emerged, therefore, within a complex assemblage of legislative, 
judicial, administrative, and political economic processes.  My purpose in this 
dissertation is to unravel a few of these threads: immigration geopolitics, legal 
subjectivity, discipline, and detention’s spatial ordering.  In doing so, I hope to distill the 
different spatial practices that constitute US noncitizen family detention and the legal, 
political, and governmental regimes that make families detainable.  I began my research 
with the following questions: 
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1. What do the different spatial strategies of family detention and its legal 
contestation reveal about the relationship between space and the family, the child, 
and the migrant as political categories?   
 How are the rights of children balanced against the rights of their parents, if their 
treatment is governed by different legal guidelines? What do family detention policy and 
practices reveal about the status of the family in immigration and citizenship law? How 
are any particular needs or rights of families and children met or violated through the 
spatial strategies of family detention? How do the spatial and temporal ordering of the 
Hutto and Berks facilities meet or violate the needs and/or rights of families? How do 
different spatial strategies and/or legal statuses differentiate between families? 
 
2. How do family detention policy and its public contestation reproduce and 
circulate spatialized conceptions of the family and the child?   
 What legal, moral, racial, gender, class, or age-specific categories are used to 
describe immigrant and asylum-seeking families? Are some families perceived to have 
special needs over others? Has detention produced a de facto assumption of parents’ 
criminality or illegality? How are these differentiations established and supported? How 
do proponents and critics of family detention recuperate particular notions of the family 
and the child? What spaces of family life, such as the home, are used to support or 
describe particular notions of the family and the child? How have various spatial 
understandings of the family and the child forced changes in family detention policy? 
 
3. What does the administration and regulation of family detention reveal about 
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new connections between spatial strategies of security and immigration enforcement 
practices (i.e. “the securitization” of immigration)? 
 How did immigrant and asylum-seeking families come to be understood as 
detainable? What kinds of problems do families present to immigration enforcement 
officials? What terms and assumptions framed ICE’s understandings of family 
immigration as a problem? How did detention come to be the preferred solution for the 
problem? What other options were considered but rejected? How does family detention 
fit into a wider range of immigration enforcement practices? How has the legal challenge 
to family detention forced a reworking of immigration enforcement policies more 
broadly? How does family detention compare to other examples of “securitization” given 
in the secondary literature? 
 
OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 The following chapters examine specific aspects of US noncitizen family 
detention policy and practice, and locate family detention in relation to border 
enforcement and geopolitics, immigration and case law, and sexual citizenship.  First, 
however, I describe the geographic literatures from which my research questions and 
methodological approach emerged (Chapter 2).  This review does not exhaust the 
literatures used in the dissertation as a whole, but represent the project’s starting points. 
Each chapter engages therefore with additional geographical and interdisciplinary 
literatures necessary to put my analysis into conversation with a broader intellectual field.  
Chapter 2 charts the intellectual terrain from which my broader theoretical and 
geographical curiosity flowed: recent engagements with (and critiques of) Giorgio 
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Agamben’s theorization of the sovereign ban and topological power; spatial analyses of 
detention and confinement; geographical conceptions of the family; the securitization of 
immigration; and spatial ordering, calculation, and subjectification as power/knowledge 
practices.  
 Chapter 3 describes how my methodological approach evolved to accommodate 
the realities of researching a highly politicized topic in the midst of a highly charged 
campaign to end family detention.  I outline my research methods, what they produced, 
and my analytic process.  In Chapter 4, I contextualize the US’ immigration detention 
system and offer a conceptual framework for understanding detention as a “bordering 
practice” (Newman 2006). While most studies of immigration enforcement focus on 
borderland enforcement actions, the policing of territorial boundaries, and border 
crossings, Mathew Coleman has argued that these studies neglect the rising importance of 
interior enforcement (Coleman 2007a).  As subnational jurisdictions take responsibility 
for immigration policing, and proof of citizenship is required to access an increasing 
number of public institutions, the “where” of security and geopolitics is no longer 
contained by “the border” (Coleman 2009). Noncitizens are held, rather, in 350 different 
facilities across the US, though they remain clustered in the US Southwest.  I describe not 
only the legal and policy measures that enabled the rapid expansion of immigration 
detention in the US, but the existing prison infrastructure that enabled the rapid 
containment of noncitizens.  I place these spatial strategies in relation to each other to 
better understand the resonances between them. (Portions of this chapter will be 
published in Engineering Earth, edited by Stan Brunn, forthcoming 2011.) 
 In Chapter 5, I show how detention is not a single spatial strategy, but a complex 
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process of criminalization and isolation through which detainees become deportable 
subjects. I trace how detention came to seen as an integral component of US-Mexico 
border security more broadly, and how ICE’s practice of family release came to be 
understood as a procedural vulnerability and therefore a threat to territorial closure.  
Engaging with interdisciplinary critical security studies, I seek to temper recent accounts 
of deterritorialized, biopolitical border technologies, especially those that argue that risk 
analysis has displaced discipline as a governmental practice. Rather, I argue that security 
is a heterogenous assemblage that recombines, recalibrates, and rearticulates biopolitical 
techniques.  (A version of this chapter is forthcoming in Geopolitics.) 
 Chapter 6 focuses on Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al., the 2007 lawsuit against 
family detention at Hutto to trace the legal figurations of children, parents, and families. I 
show how noncitizen children are framed more as ‘child-objects’ in immigration law than 
agential, liberal subjects.  Immigration law figures adults, however, as criminalized 
migrant-subjects, ineligible for the due process on which liberal legal regimes are based.   
I then analyze how a Federal District Court judge balanced ‘irreparable harm’ to detained 
children, the ‘public interest,’ and Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s discretion to 
detain noncitizens.  Relying upon “geostrategic discourses” (Ó Tuathail 2003) of external 
threat and internal safety, the judge argued that US detention represents a safe space 
compared to families’ countries of origin. Twisting national security with the ‘best 
interests of the child,’ the judge authorized a legal framework for family detention, but 
with specific spatial requirements.  These legal, discursive, and spatial tactics form what I 
call a geopolitics of vulnerability in which ICE seeks to displace national (in)securities 
onto detained families. (A version of this chapter is forthcoming in Gender, Place, and 
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Culture.)  
 In Chapter 7, I examine the contractual relationships between Immigration and 
Customs and Enforcement (ICE), Williamson County, and the Corrections Corporation of 
America (CCA), and outline to what extent each party was legally and practically 
responsible for detention center operations.  In short, ICE contracted with Williamson 
County, which in turn contracted with the Corrections Corporation of America.  This 
formed a chain of command in which ICE and CCA did not initially communicate 
directly, but used Williamson County as mediator. Thus, when the lawsuit was filed, ICE 
was sued for the conditions of detention created by CCA, while CCA could not be sued 
because private prison corporations are not parties to the Flores agreement.  In effect, this 
contractual triangle surrounded the Hutto detention center in legal procedures while 
deferring responsibility for detention conditions between federal, private, and county 
agencies.  
 In Chapter 8, I examine how ‘the family’ emerged as an object of governance, and 
a key site/category through which to challenge state power, and a site of struggle over 
that power.  Proper family forms—heterosexual marriage and child-rearing in 
particular—have become a condition of political membership. In short, the family is a 
core political identity, refracted through a host of legal categories, and, for many, a 
fundamental category of social organization and identity.  In this chapter, I compare 
immigrant rights advocates’ efforts to reform ICE’s custody policies, to transform 
detention spaces from “prison-like” to “home-like” spaces.  I trace how, on the one hand, 
advocates’ critiques of family detention condensed around private space, autonomy and 
freedom of movement.  ICE’s architectural plans for new “family residential centers” 
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focused on security, surveillance, and population control.  The struggle to define “family 
appropriate spaces” was, therefore, a struggle over the regulation of intimacy, privacy, 
and care. More broadly, Chapter 8 highlights the state’s enduring interest in the family, 
reproduction, and kinship as a condition of political membership. 
 In the final chapter, I synthesize the previous arguments and outline their 
implications for theorizing detention in and beyond geography. I argue, in short, that 
detention should be understood as “a doing,” (Gregory 2006a). In the context of the 
border, security, and immigration regimes analyzed in this dissertation, detention is, more 
specifically, a process of creating deportable subjects. Even as the majority of families 
passed their Credible Fear Interviews (CFIs) and stayed in the United States, families felt 
criminalized, isolated, and feared their impending deportation (as described in Chapter 5).  
At the same time, social services are increasingly unavailable to even “legal immigrants,” 
so that noncitizenship precludes forms of social and political exclusion, as well. For 
Nicholas De Genova, “what makes deportability so decisive in the legal production of 
migrant ‘illegality’… is that some are deported in order that most may remain (un–
deported) as workers, this particular migrant status may thus be rendered ‘illegal’” (De 
Genova 2002, 39). Immigration law and enforcement policy are, therefore, “deliberate 
interventions that have revised and reformulated the law,” forming “an active process of 
inclusion through ‘illegalization’ ” (ibid.).  Drawing on recent engagements with different 
aspects of Giorgio Agamben’s work, I argue that US immigration policies tie banishment 
from US territory to abandonment by state institutions.  I conclude the dissertation by 
considering the political ethics required to challenge current US immigration enforcement 
practices like family detention. I think through the ways in which detained families are 
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more “bound and constrained by power relations in a situation of forcible exposure” than 
they are depoliticized, biological bare life (Butler 2003, 32). It is here, I argue, that the 
second half of Foucault's modern biopolitics, “making lives and letting die,” points to 
more subtle modalities of sovereign power (Foucault 2003, 241).  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
DETENTION 
 Governments often implement detention in an ad hoc manner, refashioning the 
geographies of legal access and immigration advocacy in ways that have dramatic 
impacts on detainees’ asylum and immigration claims. For example, Mountz (2004, 
2010) analyzes Canada’s reaction to the arrival of 600 Chinese refugees via boat in 1999. 
Seemingly overwhelmed by the arrival of such a large group, Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada set up a temporary processing center in a former gymnasium. 
Designated as a ‘port-of-entry’ rather than a detention center, the migrants were not 
officially on Canadian soil. Rather, they passed through a ‘long tunnel’ that was not 
considered Canadian territory, and therefore not technically detention. And since they 
were not officially detained, advocates and attorneys were barred from contacting them. 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada then established provisional detention centers and 
immigration courts twelve hours by car from Vancouver, where legal experts and regular 
courts are located. The results of the asylum claims heard in these courts were 5% 
positive, while asylum claims by Chinese have a 58% approval rate in Vancouver’s 
courts. Similarly, following a raid in which 270 beef processing plant workers were 
arrested for immigration-related crimes, Immigration and Customs Enforcement set up 
temporary immigration courts on fairgrounds in rural Iowa (Saulny 2008; and see 
Coleman 2007a). These ad hoc detention practices, ‘long tunnels’, and remote locations 
create ‘detached geographies’ through which detainees are spatially separated from the 
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services that facilitate their rights claims. 
 In addition to these detached geographies within territorial boundaries of nation-
states, governments strategically use these boundaries to exclude asylum-seekers from 
the rights guaranteed by international law. In the Australian and European contexts, 
Hyndman and Mountz (2008) argue that nation-states are tending toward strategies of 
externalization. Australia and Britain, for example, have set up asylum and visa 
processing centers on islands and in dominant sending countries (respectively) to prevent 
migrants from reaching the territorial jurisdiction of the receiving state. By forestalling 
their physical arrival on Australian and British soil, these governments prevent asylum-
seekers access to the rights afforded them under international law. Rather than being 
detained on arrival (at an airport or border crossing) or within the boundaries of a nation-
state, governments detain people in transit. Provisional ports-of-entry, temporary courts 
in rural areas, and extra-territorial detention indicate not a coherent, centralized state 
strategy, but nation-states’ willingness to combine multiple detention strategies. There is 
no single geography of detention, therefore, but an emerging and continually changing 
assemblage of spatial tactics. 
 The changing character of detention directly impacts the legal geographies of 
detention in two ways. First, as alluded to above, the location of detention directly 
impacts detainees’ access to rights and information (Hyndman and Mountz 2008; Mountz 
2004). Analyzing legal access from the perspective of legal aid and advocacy 
organizations in Britain, White (2002) points out that the funding of these organizations 
directly impacts the spatiality of legal counseling. Official policy may include provisions 
for legal representation of asylum-seekers, for example, but the withdrawal of funding 
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from critical organizations can effectively eliminate legal representation without a change 
in policy or law. Law and policy domains are, therefore, situated in wider governmental 
networks and state apparatuses. Second, the legality of detention spaces is critical to 
understanding the geographies of detention. Because detainees are held under ambiguous 
legal norms, under vastly different conditions, and for indefinite periods, analyzing the 
relation between law, state power, and space has been particularly important. As 
explained above, detention centers and the detainees held in them are ambiguous legal 
entities. State governments often exempt detainees from due process, obstruct their 
access to legal counsel and courts, and detain individuals indefinitely in remote locations 
(Coleman 2007a). These remote, detached, and externalized geographies of detention 
work to physically segregate, contain, and exclude people to whom the law seems not to 
apply. 
 For many, detention and detainees represent material examples of Giorgio 
Agamben’s “state of exception,” a contemporary reworking of German theorist Carl 
Schmitt’s understanding of sovereignty and law (Amoore 2006; Coleman 2007a; Gregory 
2004a, 2006a,b; Hyndman and Mountz 2008; Minca 2005). Schmitt’s (1985, 2003) 
theory of sovereignty assumes that state power flows from a single sovereign, who has 
the power to decide when, where, and for whom the law is in force. Likewise, the 
sovereign can call a “state of emergency,” in which the rule of law is suspended. For 
Schmitt, these “spaces of exception” are concrete, bounded, territorial spaces, much like 
traditional political geography theorizes the nation-state as a government with power over 
a discrete, bounded territory. Agamben (1998, 2005) argues, however, that the “state of 
exception” has become the norm, a fundamental ordering principle in modern politics. In 
18 
 
essence, the sovereign marks boundaries between an included national citizenry and an 
excluded foreign Other, and this process of exclusion is, for Agamben, the founding 
moment of political life. Thus, excluded persons are never completely excluded, but are 
“included through exclusion,” and, therefore, occupy a “zone of indistinction” between 
the force of law and the suspension of law (Agamben 1998, 2005). Held outside of the 
law, detainees can be rendered ‘bare life’, and become nothing but biological beings open 
to an unmediated expression of sovereign power. As a paradigm of power, the process of 
inclusion–exclusion operates throughout political life, as a topological relationship. Thus, 
inclusion–exclusion is not just bounded in discrete, territorial ‘spaces of exception’, but is 
woven into everyday decisions made by “petty sovereigns” (Butler 2004) in positions 
throughout state bureaucracies (Belcher et al. 2008; Coleman 2007a,b). The ‘state of 
exception’ has provided, therefore, a way of understanding detention as the production of 
quasi-legal spaces, as spaces in which the state has suspended the law for certain people. 
 Alternatively, others have asked not how the suspension of law is the exercise of 
executive (sovereign) power, but how law expands executive power. Tracing out the 
emergence of the Bush administration’s claims to sovereign decisionism, the United 
States’s post-colonial occupation of Cuba, and the detention of migrants there in the mid-
1990s, Gregory (2006a) argues that Guantánamo Bay’s detention camp is not so 
exceptional. As Reid-Henry (2006) has also argued, the current detention camp was 
established in this specific legal and colonial context, and the status of Guantánamo Bay 
as US territory has never been wholly resolved. Rather, as Belcher (2008) argues, calling 
Guantánamo Bay a ‘space of exception’ masks how the suspension of domestic criminal 
law for ‘enemy combatants’ has allowed that space to be ‘filled’ with military law and a 
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new and separate court system for detainees. In addition to housing a new court system, 
the camp has also served as a testing ground for ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ 
(torture), extraordinary rendition, and indefinite detention. Thus, Guantánamo Bay has 
been an important site for the development, codification, routinization, and expansion of 
certain detention practices. These geographers understand law as performative, as made 
through the embodied practice of legal discourses, rather than a transcendent rule system 
as is often implied by Agambenian analyses (Butler 2004; Gregory 2006a). In other 
words, this research asks how detention and its variants have become normalized – i.e. 
governmentalized – through the reconfigurations of sovereign, governmental, and 
disciplinary power. 
 This method of inquiry also asks how certain people become detainable in the 
first place. Through changes in legal categories, media representations, and policy 
discourses, different groups of people come to be seen as migrants, immigrants, asylum-
seekers, refugees, illegal aliens, or criminal aliens, with each term connoting raced, 
classed, and gendered bodies. In turn, the legal categorizations of people and spaces are 
linked to these representational practices. For example, applying the term “aggravated 
felony” to migrants only and expanding the term to include a wide range of petty offenses 
(e.g. shoplifting) has uniquely criminalized immigrants as a group (Coleman 2007a). 
These legal categorizations are linked to broader identification practices that produce 
detained persons as worthy or deserving of detention. Thus, the representational practices 
that depict different groups as unwanted, foreign, or dangerous inform legal and policy-
making discourses, producing these groups as justifiably excludable and detainable 
(Ackleson 2005). 
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 The material practices within detention centers are, then, bound up with the visual 
and textual representations of a nation-state’s outsiders more generally. Based on first-
hand experience, Falah (2007) describes how Israeli security forces use solitary 
confinement, stress positions, sleep deprivation, and repetitive questioning to 
purposefully dehumanize and demoralize detained persons. Gordon (2006) and Sexton 
and Lee (2006) point out that torture has long been institutionalized in US prisons, and 
that the colonial legacies of slavery are bound up with the ‘colonial present’ (Gregory 
2004b) of mass incarceration, immigration detention, and Guantánamo Bay. In the case 
of the Abu Ghraib war prison in Iraq, torture practices rang an unfortunate resonance 
with the Baathist’s use of that site for the same purpose – imprisoning and punishing 
perceived enemies. Performed by US soldiers, however, these practices are also linked to 
a global network of US-operated prisons, detention centers, and training camps (Gregory 
2004a, 2006b) and to the knowledge practices that link them. Here, Gregory’s (2006a) 
sustained engagement with both Agamben and the performances of detention 
demonstrates how Guantánamo’s detainees were systematically stripped of their political 
subjectivity and treated as ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998). The micro-geographies of torture, 
interrogation, and indefinite detention rely on interdependent representational, discursive, 
and spatial practices, to routinely discipline ‘foreign’ or ‘enemy’ bodies in specific ways. 
 Analyzing the spatialities of detention makes (at least) five significant 
contributions to understanding detention. First, the uneven topography of detention sites 
– the ways in which detention spaces vary across space – reveals the malleability of 
detention as a spatial practice. People are held in former jails, with prisoners in existing 
prisons, in tent cities, on ships, and in makeshift cells in courthouses, airports, and ports-
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of-entry the world over. Second, this uneven topography is directly related to uneven 
geographies of legal practices and boundaries. The ambiguous legal status of detainees 
allows them to be held in a range of places, without oversight and without recourse to 
rights (or often the legal counsel that might protect them). These legal and political 
ambiguities help to create the overarching sense of indeterminacy that characterizes 
detention. Third, this indeterminacy results from the exceptionality of detention as an 
‘included exclusion’, as a space in which there is no distinction between law and its 
suspension. Fourth, these ‘spaces of exception’ are produced through discursive practices 
and are imbricated with the normal, everyday operation of government. Fifth, detention 
practices have specific legal, political, and historical geographies that point toward the 
continuation of a violent, colonial past, rather than a break from a more peaceful, law-
abiding near past. Studying the geographies of detention offers a critical vantage point for 
understanding new spatialities of state power, especially as the relationship between 
nation-states and territory are reconfigured in response to global migration, trade, and 
security concerns. 
 
IMMIGRATION AND SECURITY 
 As a geographical phenomenon, migration and immigration have primarily been 
addressed in terms of political economy (Hierbert 2006; Samers 2002, 2003), push-pull 
factors (Black et al. 2006), costs and benefits to host and sending countries (Borjas 2001), 
identity and citizenship (Ehrkamp 2005; Leitner 1995; Leitner and Ehrkamp 2006; Secor 
2004), state-level policy analysis (Ackelson 2005; Ibrahim 2003, 2005), and boundary 
formation (Ackelson 2005; Coleman 2005, 2007a, b; Gilbert 2005; Nevins 2002). 
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Political economy scholars tend to address migration as a capital-labor relationship, 
mediated by a capitalist state apparatus. This research frames migration as a labor market 
issue and analyzes both regulation and migration in these terms (e.g., Clark and Gertler 
1983; Collins 2006; Hiebert 1999; Knowles 1995; van Houtum and van der Velde 2004). 
In contrast, scholars of national and transnational identity approach im/migration from 
the perspective of the subject, analyzing the ways in which national and transnational 
identities are reconfigured through the migration process. The scholarly work on national 
identity is immense and ranges from studies of assimilation policies (Ehrkamp 2006; 
Forrest and Johnston 2006) to generational integration of migrants (Christou and King 
2006; Walton-Roberts and Pratt 2005), to patterns of inclusion and exclusion (Ellis 2006; 
Kofman 2002; Leitner 1995, 1997; Yeoh 2006). Researching immigration and identity 
from these perspectives has led scholars to question the utility of the nation-state as the 
proper scale of analysis as migration becomes a more permanent fixture in the lives of 
people (Ellis 2006; Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan 2003; Ley and Kobayashi 2005). 
Methodologically, this scholarship ranges from ethnographic and qualitative studies of 
subjective experiences of migration to quantitative, longitudinal studies of demographic 
statistics.  
As I explore in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5, boundary formation has focused 
on the role of localized border management in national identity formation (Berelowitz 
2005; Browne 2006; Mahtani 2002), nation-state policy responses (Ackelson 2005; 
Anderson 1999; Heyman 1999), as a contested site between globalized trade and national 
security (Blatter 2004; Coleman 2005; Esparza et al. 2004; Gilbert 2005, 2007). This 
work sees the border as a spatialization of the processes examined in other migration 
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literatures. Current immigrant detention, including family detention, arose through a 
multi-scalar, multi-sited process. In my research design, I treat immigrant detention as a 
complex of multi-sited practices, or a heterogenous assemblage of spatial strategies, 
embodied practices, and imagined geographies that include but exceed ‘the state.’ As 
Purcell and Nevins (2005) argue, critical political economy tends to treat the state as a 
medium or dependent variable of the capitalist system, even when the contested character 
of the state is addressed. Thus, evaluating the relationship between immigration and the 
state as a relationship between flows of labor and capital can neglect other power 
relations at work.  
In the case of the U.S.-Mexico border, Purcell and Nevins argue, the resulting 
policies were driven more by localized concerns than national policy-makers, and 
policing practices were shared between enforcement locations (Nevins 2002). Thus, both 
policy and enforcement developed through uneven multiscalar negotiations. In contrast, 
Coleman (2005) argues that for Washington, D.C.-based policy-makers, the border is an 
abstract, empty territory, while the difficulty of borderland terrains prevents border patrol 
employees from executing border security policies as mandated. The presumed (and oft-
cited) tension between neoliberal geo-economic demands and geo-political security 
measures form too convenient a story. Mountz (2004) takes the argument further, and 
uses her ethnographic analysis of immigration bureaucracy as position from which to 
question the very identity of the state. Locating state power in the operation of a specific 
agency, during a specific time in a specific place, everyday bureaucratic practices belie 
the agency’s coherent public image. 
 Where and how the state actually exists is, then, called into question. Secor (2007) 
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analyzes the spatiality of the state from the perspective of middle class residents of 
Istanbul, and notes that it is at specific points of contact (government offices, the hospital, 
arrests) that people experience state power. Thus, state employees’ banal actions produce 
the effect of a menacing state apparatus. At the same time, however, rights claims can 
only be made to the state. This “recoiling desire” for state protections enrolls citizens as 
ambivalent subjects, as residents and the state mutually constitute each other, however 
unequally (Secor 2007). For De Genova (2002), immigration enforcement practices 
materialize the process of “illegalization,” a historically specific, contingent process of 
defining undocumented transboundary migrants’ relationship to the state. If we take for 
granted people’s free movement, rather than the state’s right to regulate transboundary 
mobility, the state rather than “the undocumented migrant” defines the problem, the 
analytic object, and methodological focus for studies of illegality and immigration 
enforcement.    
 Inland immigration enforcement is ICE’s primary role in the integrated, “layered 
approach” to homeland security led by DHS (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
2007a). Scholars have analyzed the implementation of new biometric surveillance 
technologies (Amoore 2006; Martin 2010; Muller 2004) and expedited screening for 
frequent travelers (Gilbert 2005; Sparke 2006). With this expansion of surveillance, 
everyday life becomes a field of possible threat and of security intervention (Amoore 
2006; Martin and Simon 2008; Bigo 2002). Scholars refer to this process of making a 
group of people, a space, or an activity into objects of security practice securitization. 
While some scholars privilege elite discourses in the enrollment of new security objects 
(Ackelson 2005; Waever et al., 1993; Waever 1995), others look at how multiple 
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institutions, operating with different goals, order material relations of power to particular 
ends (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007; Dean 1999; Foucault 2007; Hannah 2000; Ibrahim 2005; 
Muller 2004; Watts 2003). For geographers, the ordering and calculation of spatial 
relationships is particularly salient in security discourses (Elden 2007; Hannah 2006; 
Rose-Redwood 2006). Implemented as part of the Secure Border Initiative, but applied to 
many kinds of migrants, family detention offers a discrete case from which to examine 
processes of “securitization” in the post-9/1 United States. In this dissertation, I seek to 
problematize the boundary-making and categorization practices that produce the 
conditions of possibility for family detention. The crisis of the 9/11 attacks has provoked 
a reorganization of immigration enforcement practices, including high-profile workplace 
raids and the integration of local law enforcement into immigration policing (Coleman 
2007). If the state itself is not an object, but gains its apparent coherence within a 
patterned interaction between state actors, citizens, and immigrants, then any 
reorganization of immigration enforcement also reconfigures the relationship between 
these parties. Changes in immigration enforcement practices, including the expansion of 
detention space, represents a significant retooling of state-society relations, and a critical 
moment in which to analyze the specific techniques and technologies that are 
reconfiguring those relationships. 
 
LAW  
 For critical legal geographers, laws bound space and establish the boundaries of 
citizenship and associated rights (Delaney 2001). Laws enforce normative socio-spatial 
relationships by spatially excluding certain groups from public or national spaces 
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(Blomley 2003, 2005; Mitchell 1996). In the case of immigration, the ill-defined 
“aggravated felony” has allowed petty misdemeanors to be retroactively used against 
undocumented migrants, thereby justifying their incarceration as “criminal aliens” (see 
Coleman 2007; Dow 2005; Kanstroom 2000a, b; Miller 2004; Morawetz 2000, 2004; 
Welch and Schuster 2005a, b). “The law” is not an objective rule system applied to the 
material world, but a socio-spatial practice, given meaning through the embodied 
performance of legal speech, testimony, consultations, and judicial decisions (Butler 
1997; White 2002). Furthermore, detention centers are highly localized spaces of 
enforcement, however, requiring a different conception of the scale of law (Bigo 2007). 
Analyzing socio-spatial relations from the perspective of the body has focused research 
on how mundane activities reproduce gender, class, and racial differences (Marston 
2000). Further, taking the body as a scale of geographical analysis problematizes the 
analytical value of “national,” “regional,” “local,” and “household” (Braun 1997; 
Marston et al., 2005), since actual bodies move through multiple spaces on a daily basis. 
This research brings the critique of scale into conversation with legal geography by 
analyzing how the particular spatial orderings of detainees’ bodies within Hutto and 
Berks are judged to be legal or illegal, depending on corresponding judgements of 
detainees’ statuses. Thus, family detention reveals the contingency and malleability of 
law in practice, contributing an analysis of the family as a legal category to legal and 
political geography. 
 Tracing family detention through the spatial ordering of migrant bodies also 
shows how definition of the family changes over space and time. Sexual citizenship 
scholars have noted the legal privileges granted to heterosexual, nuclear families and 
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spouses (Binnie 1997; Bell and Binnie 2000, 2006; Elman 2000; Lubheid 2002; Lubheid 
and Cantú 2005; Simmons 2008), but immigration laws do not privilege all families in 
the same way. While marriage and kinship relations remain a primary path to US. 
citizenship, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) de-emphasized family privilege by restricting the definition of family members 
(Inniss 1997-8). Thus, the “immigrant family” has been differently defined and legally 
constituted over time, with dramatic effects on the material welfare of migrants (Ackers 
and Stalford 1999; Dobrowlsky and Jensen 2004; Van Hook and Balisteri 2006; Willen 
2007). Further, asylum and children’s rights overlap with immigration law. Most of the 
plaintiffs in the ACLU’s case were asylum-seeking children, whose detention is limited 
in both Flores v. Reno (1997) and U.S. asylum law. In the case of asylum-seeking 
parents, however, asylum law alone limits their detention, and asylum status is decided 
by Citizenship and Immigration Services asylum officers, located within the Department 
of Homeland Security. In the event asylum officers do not find credible fear and reject 
the claimants’ evidence of persecution, the asylum-seeker is referred to Immigration 
Court (Ramji-Nogales et al., 2007). Thus, the paths of detained families into and out of 
detention are largely determined by legal frameworks that differentiate between non-
citizens. This dissertation interrogates how governments use the law to manage 
populations through different legal definitions of the family. In the following chapter, I 
examine how different legal frameworks differentiate detained parents and children from 
each other and from other detainees, producing a complicated legal geography for 
detained families. Thus, my research contributes a geographical account of the context-
dependencies of law to existing research in legal geography. This will have wider 
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implications for political geographic understandings of the spatial relationships between 
nation-states and political subjects. 
 
FEMINIST AND CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS 
 If geopolitics unfolds in the everyday (Secor 2004), then feminist geopolitics 
could benefit from shifting its gaze to immigration law, policy, and enforcement practice.  
As Coleman (2008a) points out, this area is under-explored in geographers’ studies of 
immigration precisely because of the scalar disjuncture between individualized screening, 
interview, detention, and deportation practices and the universalizing tropes of national 
security, threat, and sovereignty that dominate official policy discourses (Coleman 2008a, 
b).  Feminist political geographers have focused their critiques of ‘mainstream’ political 
geography on just this problematic (Hyndman 2007). Bringing this approach to 
immigration geopolitics, Coleman (2007a) and Varsanyi (2008) show that immigration 
enforcement is increasingly interior to the U.S., part of the devolution of federal 
immigration powers to local law enforcement. The geopolitics of immigration unfolds, 
therefore, in day-laborer centers, neighborhoods, corporate security and prison 
contractors, churches, and workplaces. Critically, the surveillance of these spaces is 
increasingly linked through database merging and algorithmic data analysis (Amoore 
2009), employee verification requirements (e.g. E-VERIFY), and the cooperation of local 
and federal police. This ‘postentry landscape’ of immigration enforcement demands, 
therefore, that the relationship between immigration law and enforcement practice be 
closely examined. 
 Feminist geopolitics, too, has neglected the role of immigration law and policy-
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making, as it has focused at both finer and globalized scales of interaction.  Particularly in 
the case of women’s political action, understanding the ways in which politics unfolds in 
living rooms, kitchens, and organizations traditionally considered “non-political” is key 
to understanding how marginalized groups mount their own “counter-geopolitics” (Secor 
2004).  As Hyndman (2004a) argues, focusing on the state obscures violence and 
insecurity at other scales.  Where the state remains the focus for feminist political 
geographers, it is by analyzing the embodied practices of statecraft, the banality of 
administrating immigration law, that allows a fuller understanding of the spatialities of 
state power (Mountz 2003, 2004). In fact it is often through narratives of ‘the home’ that 
migrants understand and articulate the complexities of their transnational lives (Staeheli 
and Nagel 2006), and migrants’ “homeliness” serves as a metric of “deserving” and 
“undeserving” migrants (Gedalof 2007).   
 Yet immigration politics in the U.S. has long blurred the lines between “foreign” 
and “domestic,” since municipal school districts and state welfare systems mediate 
noncitizens’ access to services (see Coleman 2008b). The case of family detention further 
problematizes the separation of “foreign” and “domestic.”  That is, it is not only that 
public policy issues of childcare licensing and state custody overlap with national 
security and immigration, as I show in Chapter 6 and 7, but that the conversation takes 
place in and through conversations about meal and bathing times, headcounts, bodily 
constraint, parental discipline, and host of other topics.  Analyzing the legal contestation 
of family detention, focuses our attention on how immigration geopolitics unfolds in the 
everyday lives of real people, and the ways in which daily life itself becomes 
criminalized.  It is parents feeding children, brushing teeth, taking baths, playing, going 
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to school, bedtimes, etc. that becomes the site of intervention for immigration 
enforcement agents.  It is precisely through the banal, everyday activities of the 
household that the geopolitics of family detention unfolds.   
 
FAMILY  
 In geography, feminist geographers have devoted the most attention to family-
related issues, most likely driven by feminist theory’s emphasis on the family and 
household as sites of women’s exploitation. Feminist geographic work has, therefore, 
focused on the institutions that reproduce gendered and uneven power relations. Although 
addressed from a number of theoretical and methodological angles, the relationship 
between gender, paid work, and identity has been the focus of much of this work (Bain 
and Nash 2007; Bondi 1991; Gidwani 2000). Problematizing the insularity of the 
assumed private space of the home in liberal democratic theory, ‘the home’ has been the 
primary vehicle for examining family-related topics. The home spatializes gendered 
household labor, especially the organization of kitchens, washrooms, and leisure areas 
(see special issues of Gender, Place and Culture Issue 13:2, 13:6). The home is a site of 
paid labor, such as au pairs, leading scholars to argue that professional women’s hiring 
out of domestic labor produces a gendered international division of labor (e.g., Cox and 
Narula 2003; Pratt 2002, 2004, 2005; Silvey 2004). Linda McDowell’s work has 
examined the intersections of women’s worklife, state welfare restructuring and concepts 
of home and belonging (e.g., 2004, 2007), while Alison Blunt (2005) devotes her book to 
analyzing the practices of domesticity and diaspora, the politics of home-making in 
postcolonial India. Thus, geographic analyses of ‘the family’ have tended to side-step the 
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family itself in favor of a broader vocabulary—household, home, domesticity, private 
space, reproduction labor, and care.  These studies implicitly include familial 
relationships, but displace “the family” as the conceptual locus.     
 There is significant, but scattered, geographic work that can provide entry points 
to a productive examination of ‘the family.’ Geographers have shown that the family can 
be a site of complex labor arrangements. In these studies, the family itself can be a site of 
conflict, as external demands for labor (from village councils or off-farm employment) 
demand the re- allocation of gendered household tasks (Gidwani 2000; Mutersbaugh 
1998, 1999; Roberts 1996). Analyzing income or labor power at the level of the 
household misses the delicate and complex negotiations of peasant agrarian economies. 
The family, in these analyses, is the conduit of a complex spatio-temporal arrangement, 
involving children, women, and men alike. Analyses of state restructuring have analyzed 
the reinscription of the nuclear family as a site of welfare provision. This trend has 
marginalized the growing number of single-parent households (Winchester 1990). Since 
family law privilege the mother in custody cases, this economic and political 
marginalization of female-headed households has led to a feminization of poverty (Jones 
and Kodras 1990). These studies demonstrate the crucial link between the 
institutionalization of the family in welfare policy and the real proliferation of non-
nuclear families. Thus, the ideal nuclear family operates as a category of exclusion, often 
masking the role of race in policy-making. 
 While these diverse approaches have yielded nuanced analyses that problematize 
the family, home, and private space as bounded entities, could these critiques be 
circumscribed by their unacknowledged orientation to a white, European norm of the 
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nuclear family (Oyewumi 2000)? Or does the emphasis on gender signify a desire to 
denaturalize and decenter the family, a preference to be more specific about the processes 
that constitute families? The question becomes, then, what would studying the family do 
for geographic knowledge? For Valentine (2008) and Harker (2009, 2010), intimacy and 
“family practices” (respectively) frame employment, mobility, migration, and housing 
decisions over the lifecycle. Placing care practices at the center of analysis, rather than 
biological or marriage kin ties, provides a more flexible and, Jon Borneman argues, an 
ethically inclusive methodological frame through which to understand how people make 
lifeworlds together (Borneman 2001).  A focus on care, intimacy, and family practices 
privileges the banal energetics of shared spaces, bodies, fluids, foods, and experiences, 
the “enduring ties” through which we negotiate our inherent dependency on others for 
survival (Butler 2002).  
 
SPATIAL STRATEGIES 
 Political economic analyses of prisons provide a rich framework for 
understanding the Hutto and Berks facilities in terms of their economic value. 
Geographic research on prisons has developed a nuanced account of rural prison location 
(Bonds 2006; Che 2005; Gilmore 2007), criminalization of drugs and poverty (Beckett 
1997; Gilmore 2007), and the commodification of space (Mitchelson 2007). As Gilmore 
(2007) shows, urban disinvestment and high poverty rates coincided with the devaluation 
of agricultural commodities in California, creating geographically marginalized labor 
surpluses in both urban and rural areas (see also Bonds 2006; Mitchelson 2007). These 
scholars analyze the ways in which the commodification of space ‘fixes’ capital flows, 
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labor patterns, and political discourses (Harvey 1982). These accounts provide an 
analytical model for examining the geographies of power through the circuits of capital, 
the organization of space, and the relative empowerment or marginalization of different 
groups. 
 This dissertation, however, focuses on different kinds of circulation, for example, 
the physical mobility of migrants within the Hutto and Berks detention facilities, and the 
mobilization of discourses of families and children and security. In Chapter 7, however, I 
link the circulation of detained families between detention centers and their case files 
between ICE and USCIS to the circulation of money between federal, state, county, and 
private institutions. I use the concept of spatial strategies to understand how immigration 
policy-making and enforcement practices normalize ICE’s authority to police 
noncitizens, the federal government’s authority to make national boundaries, and 
Congress’ legislative role.    
 Spatial strategies normalize spatial relationships, as well as create and regulate 
relationships between bodies, the built environment, and mobility (De Certeau 1984). 
Family detention is a spatial strategy because ICE uses detention to enclose immigrants 
while they await immigration court dates or deportation. Within detention centers, staff 
use additional spatial strategies (e.g., rigid schedules, headcounts, threats of family 
separation) to create order within the detention center. The use of detention, in particular, 
to control immigrant families emerged in the context of the “securitization” of 
immigration, discussed above and explored in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5. These 
spatial strategies work together with political discourses with the aim of securing the 
physical survival of the U.S. nation-state. Non-governmental organizations also employ 
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spatial strategies, such as occupying public space and long-distance marches, to make 
family detention and detained families’ rights visible to a wider public. This convergence 
of different, even opposing, governmental rationalities, institutions, procedures, 
knowledge practices, and spatial strategies is what Michel Foucault calls governmentality 
(Foucault 1991, 2007; Rose 1996). Working through spatial strategies like family 
detention, governmentality offers theoretical framework for analyzing how law, 
bureaucracies, and individuals circulate and normalize social, legal, and political 
categories through spatial strategies and discursive practices. 
 This conceptual framework provides three main analytical strengths to my 
research. First, this dissertation analyzes the attempts, methods, and ways of thinking 
about how to control people by controlling space in family detention centers. Second, the 
conceptual framework links local micro-geographies of daily life at Hutto and Berks to 
each other and to “national” geographies of immigration law and policy. I analyze, 
therefore, the consistencies and contradictions between the spatial strategies and 
discourses used by different actors in family detention policy. Third, this framework links 
spatial strategies of family detention to the legal, political, and social discourses of the 
family. Using a combination of qualitative methods, described in the next chapter, this 
dissertation draw together a diversity of sources to analyze the ways in which 
immigration enforcement policies—and its alternatives—use, contest, and transform the 
spatial ordering of detention. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 My goal in this dissertation is to explore the geographies of contemporary US 
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state power, particularly how materiality of border, immigration, and legal practices reify 
the process of “illegalization” (De Genova 2002).  Analyzing immigration law, 
enforcement practices, and the circulating textual practices surrounding family detention 
as an assemblage of spatial strategies, I take care to attend to the “chaotic bundle of 
storylines” (Coleman 2005). The literatures summarized above show how these 
narratives condense around a few nodal discourses: security, borders, discretion, private 
space, vulnerability, family, il/legality, and rights.  Detention and deportation unfold 
through a series of spatial practices, such as externalization, neo-refoulment, remoteness, 
invisibility, and forced repatriation. My analysis of family detention draws imagined and 
material cartographies together to understand the ways in which space is ordered, 
calculated, and put to work to consolidate state power over national territory—and to 
thereby reproduce the relations of power that normalize that authority.  Focusing on 
family detention, in particular, foregrounds the ways in which intimacy, private space, 
and relationships become sites of state intervention.  Taking the political ethics of 
detention seriously, this dissertation works along different registers: textual and symbolic 
discourses; the writing of spaces; and the relationality of intimate ties. At the heart of the 
struggle to expand or end family detention lie a series of fundamental questions about the 
character of executive power, its limits, and the constitution of the political. 
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CHAPTER 3: ETHNOGRAPHIES OF CLOSED DOORS 
 
If we as publicly engaged intellectuals begin not from the epistemological standpoint of 
the state and its functionaries but rather from the standpoint of the elementary freedom of 
movement as something like a basic human entitlement, then rather than presupposing 
that there is something inherently suspect about the human beings who migrate, the real 
problem comes into considerably sharper focus: that problem, clearly, is the state itself. 
(Emphasis added, De Genova 2007, 425) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 While I focus on a specific federal policy, family detention, I do so in order to 
problematize the regimes of authority that normalize the practice.  That is, I begin from 
ICE’s terms and inquire, does family detention policy succeed in its aims? Instead I ask, 
what work does family detention do as a governmental technique? My goal is not, 
therefore, to measure how family detention deters future family immigration, child 
smuggling, and illegitimate asylum-seekers, but to analyze the ways in which this 
discursive regime presumes and reproduces a range of legal categories, spatial 
hierarchies, coerced mobilities, and subject-formations.  In the following chapters, I 
analyze the juridical and legal processes through which families became detainable and 
the spatial practices through which these detentions materialize.  I explore, therefore, the 
relationships between legal categorizations, geopolitical imaginings of global space, the 
spatial ordering of detention centers and the ways in which discourses of familial 
relatedness, private space, and authority undergird the spatial practices of family 
detention.   
 In developing this approach, I draw on previous scholarship that has sought to 
trace the complex connections between symbolic national discourses, legal categories, 
and detention’s concrete materialities. Mountz’s institutional ethnography of Citizenship 
and Immigration Services Canada analyzes the everyday bureaucratic response to a 
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perceived immigrant crises.  Focusing on the response to a specific incident, Mountz is 
able to trace how state immigration officials improvise detention practices, how civil 
society reacts in conflicting ways, and the mixed feelings of the bureaucrats charged with 
enforcing immigration law (2003, 2004, 2010). Hall (2008) spent long hours with 
detention center guards at a detention facility in the United Kingdom, and while this 
prevented her from interviewing detainees, it allowed her to explore guards’ identity-
formation processes and to fill a gap in research on detention centers.  Gill (2009, 2010) 
and White (2002) performed extended interviews with a series of actors active in the UK 
asylum process, which allowed them to trace detainee mobility and access to legal 
services (respectively).  In different but resonant ways, each of these authors connects 
specific spatial practices of detention and deportation to the constitution of nationhood 
and state power, and use these “micro” or “local” stories to disrupt depictions of a 
smoothly operating, monolithic state actor.   
 Taking these arguments seriously has some important methodological 
implications. First, federal employees are not the only parties producing the state.  
Rather, a range of actors participate in its everyday production, by ascribing intentionality 
to “the government,” by advertising state agencies’ effectiveness, and even by blaming 
the state for unforeseen events or consequences. Understanding family detention’s 
authorization requires looking far beyond ICE and DHS to understand the unquestioned 
assumptions behind it.  Second, because state actors are never of one mind (and neither 
are their critics), I pay close attention to ruptures and incoherencies within texts, between 
texts, and in the indirect conversations unfolding across the discursive field I analyze in 
the chapters below.  Interview questions and analysis focused on these disjunctures.  
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Third, analyzing state power through the body can reveal relations of power obscured in 
policy or legal texts (Hyndman 2004b).  For example, I analyze the ordering of space, 
time, and bodies in detention centers (Chapter 8) to question the legal distinction between 
detention and incarceration.  As a whole, the project links detainability to the spatial 
ordering of detention centers, but in ways that remain sensitive to the disruptions, 
improvisations, and incoherencies that characterize “everyday” state practices.  
 De-privileging the state as the sole producer of family detention discourses 
requires a multi-method research design. I originally planned to combine semi-structured 
interviews with key participants in family detention: ICE policy-makers, lawyers, 
detention managers, and detainees.  I had planned to collect roughly equivalent numbers 
of interviews from these groups, in order to ensure their respective representation in the 
study.   Researching a “homeland security” issue, I quickly that discovered immigration 
officers were off limits to me.  For wholly different reasons, detained families were 
equally difficult to access.  Families released from Hutto rarely stayed in Central Texas 
for long, and often lost contact with their Austin-based attorneys.  Fewer attorneys work 
at Berks, and these organizations were far more closed to research and media requests 
than those in Texas, making it difficult to establish contacts.  
 In addition, I encountered a deep asymmetry in available knowledge about 
families’ experiences of detention and the legal and political processes behind it. A 
lawsuit (analyzed in Chapter 6) kept family detention in the news throughout 2007, so 
that by 2008, when I entered the field, much was known about conditions at Hutto and 
Berks.  Formerly detained families appeared in documentaries, sat for interviews, and 
attended film screenings to testify about their treatment.  Far less information was 
39 
 
available about how these families became detainable in the first place, and what 
authorized their continued detention (along with 32,000 other noncitizens).  My research 
methods came to focus, therefore, on a broader terrain of immigration law- and policy-
making than originally conceived, and more on the contracts and institutional 
arrangements that support family detention at Berks and Hutto. 
 The original research design did not, therefore, emphasize participant observation, 
as I had not envisioned opportunities for sustained interaction. As a public campaign 
against family detention waged on, my early semi-structured interviews more or less 
repeated accounts found in the popular media. Potential respondents continually asked 
me “what my angle was,” and it became clear to me that my research was one of many 
“messaging” outlets. I found it difficult, therefore, to draw out the detailed minutia that 
animate the daily practices of detention, and it was these informal, unofficial, and often 
arbitrary disruptions that interested me. As I began to attend activist and advocacy 
meetings, however, I found that people exchanged much “off the record” information that 
evinced the banal, arbitrary and often inept actions of ICE and CCA employees. Family 
detention policy has been under continual revision, critique, and development, but 
because ICE retains wide discretion, as I explore in the following chapters, it was far 
more difficult to obtain documentary evidence of these changes, as very often, documents 
simply did not exist.   
 This did not significantly change my research’s direction, but did change my 
methods and my positionality. I worked directly with advocates to draft Freedom of 
Information Act requests, and learned much from their experience with state-level Open 
Records processes. When I received responsive documents, I made copies, scanned, and 
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emailed those that would be of interest to different stakeholders. For example, when I 
received copies of the Williamson County Sheriff's office monitoring reports, I scanned 
them in and e-mailed them to interested parties in Williamson County. I also moderated 
the T. Don Hutto blog (tdonhutto.blogspot.com) from 2008 to fall of 2009, when ICE 
released the last families from the facility. The blog became an archive of media and 
public events and a key resource for investigative journalists and other writers. It was 
important to me–and still is–to share the outcomes of my research with the public in 
expedient ways, since the academic publication cycle and the process of writing this 
dissertation have added years to the dissemination process. I produced texts like press 
releases, opinionated editorials, and two book chapters in collaboration with these 
colleagues. In 2009, we formed a visitation program, and have trained a group of 
volunteers to make regular visits to Hutto.  Through this visitation program (initiated 1.5 
years after I began my research), I was able to gain consistent access to Hutto’s public 
areas and a more embodied and detailed sense of how noncitizens’ cases proceed from 
inside detention centers. While not included in the original research design, these 
comings and goings have provided important ambient knowledge of detention. Without 
this “participant observation,” the research in this dissertation would not be as rich, and, 
personally, I would have found it difficult to weather the emotional difficulties of 
researching detention practices.  
 The research presented in the chapters that follow emerged therefore from a 
sensitivity to “on the ground” politics and a commitment to problematizing the relations 
of power that make them possible.  This dissertation is often times inspired by (and in 
implicit) conversation with different advocates and activists, but my questions are equally 
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driven by theoretical questions about sovereign power, governmentality, and space.  At 
different moments, these theoretical questions allowed me to contribute to new campaign 
strategies.  For example, detention center’s remoteness and invisibility has become 
increasingly important to those with family members inside, and challenging this politics 
of invisibility has become an explicit part of a broader anti-detention campaign and a new 
visitation program at Hutto. In daily meetings or calls, I tended to remain pragmatic, and 
helped draft relatively more limited policy recommendations for ICE.  While it has been 
tempting at times, given the gravity of family and adult detention, I have resisted the 
temptation to wed this dissertation to an advocacy project in a more explicit way.  I 
wanted to retain theoretical freedom and creativity, and the opportunity to do some “big 
picture” thinking outside the pragmatic demands of a campaign or more traditional policy 
analysis.  My goal here is not to improve the detention system, but to interrogate its 
foundations.  This dissertation is a starting point, I hope, for re-imagining the juridico-
political foundations of citizenship, sovereignty, and politics in future research. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Because the research seeks not only to detail the imaginative and embodied 
spatial practices of family detention, but to push on political geographical theories of 
power and space from the perspective of this case, I draw heavily from Michael 
Burawoy’s (1998) call to not just critique existing theories of power, but to reconstruct 
them.  Proposing a “reflective science paradigm” in place of positivist sociological 
methodologies, Burawoy foregrounds the researcher’s movement through the socio-
spatial world, the ways in which researchers change “the field” they study, and the 
42 
 
productivity of those collisions, conflicts, and negotiations. Rather than bracketing the 
researcher, or subordinating her to contextual background noise relative to the object of 
study, reflexive science “starts out from dialogue, virtual or real, between observer and 
participants, embeds such dialogue within a second dialogue between local processes and 
extralocal forces that in turn can only be comprehended through a third, expanding 
dialogue of theory with itself” (Burawoy 1998, 5).  As I moved physically between my 
field sites and home(s), and finally came to call one field site home, this back-and-forth 
movement between research, field, and theory captures the periods of furious collection, 
reflection, and engagement through which this project emerged.  Throughout the research 
process, I “pushed back” not just on existing theories of governmentality, abandonment, 
and law but on the policy-makers, local government officials, and congresspeople with 
stakes in the warehousing of noncitizen families. 
Research Methods 
Document Collection: The documents analyzed in this dissertation came from four 
primary sources: freedom of information act requests, online and print media, litigation, 
and archival research (see Figure 3.1). Because interviews with government officials 
never materialized, I became more creative with, in particular, how I requested 
documents from the federal and county agencies. Having few initial resources besides 
media reports to go on, I first submitted broad information requests and from them culled 
references to other documents. Through these inter-textual citations, and rolling 
information requests, I was able to build my own archive of documentary material on 
family detention. Because the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests are subject to 
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Table 3.1: Data Collection Methods and Data Gathered for Current Study 
Collection 
Method 
Data Gathered Quantity 
Interviews Semi-structured and informal interviews with attorneys, 
advocates, and activists. 
30 
 Interviews with formerly detained families gathered from 
other sources. 
7 
   
Documents Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. litigation Documents. 1000 pp. 
 Emails between County, CCA, and ICE officials. 200 pp. 
 Audits of Berks and Hutto; DHS Corrective Plans. 1760 pp 
 Request for Proposal documents. 200 pp. 
 Press Releases, Fact Sheets, Public Testimonies.  
 Government Reports. 20 reports 
 Non-Governmental Reports. 20 reports 
 County Budget Records from Berks County, PA, and 
Williamson County, TX. 
40 reports 
 Contracts, IGSA’s, including Renewals and Amendments 10 documents 
 News articles  
   
Participant 
Observation 
Meetings with advocacy organizations. 30 
 Conference Calls. 15 
 Public Events.  15 
 Visits to Hutto. 5 
 Visit to Berks (outside only). 1 
 
a range of exemptions, responding agencies excluded many documents for security 
concerns. My requests went to Williamson County, Texas; Berks County, Pennsylvania; 
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In response, I received: contracts; service 
agreements; purchase orders; e-mails between detention center operator, ICE, and county 
officials; monitoring reports; communications between attorneys and ICE; detention 
conditions corrective action plans; and design standards for family residential facilities. 
Additional documents were collected from government websites, and these included 
requests for proposals for new detention centers, ICE public hearings, press releases, fact 
sheets, and the family residential standards. 
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 These documents were supplemented by trips to Williamson County and Berks 
County archives, where I searched through newspapers and other sources in order to trace 
the history of the two detention centers I focus on in this dissertation. The state of the 
archives in Williamson and Berks Counties were very different. Berks County's archive is 
prolific.  I found, for example, deeds dating back to William Penn for the land on which 
the Berks County Family Care Shelter now stands. The Berks County Historical Society 
retains a sophisticated archive, replete with folios documenting the development and 
change of the county's public institutions. Located at the heart of the progressive 
movement, this former industrial center took a great deal of pride in its workhouses, 
asylums, poorhouses, sanitariums, hospitals, and in prisons, and had myriad documents 
tracing their development. At the Williamson County archives, in contrast, I found 
general descriptions of the area's history and scattered newspaper archives. Thus the 
collection, organization, and public availability of these historical sources varied greatly 
between the two sites. These sources form, however, general background material rather 
than the bulk of the empirical study presented below. It was important to me to gain a 
sense of where these two family detention centers fit in the political economy and 
historical geography of their local places. 
 
Interviews: Interviews consisted of semi-structured conversations focused on the aspects 
of family detention policy and practice about which respondents were most familiar. For 
each respondent, I developed a questionnaire that focused on their realm of expertise, and 
also collected general information about family detention policy and practice. Through 
this method I was able to collect both detailed and corroborating information. As 
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reflected in my research questions, one of my goals is to understand how families and 
children come to be understood through a wider set of concepts, such as the home, the 
domestic, childhood, development, and immigration law. One of my most interesting 
findings emerged from my difficulty in eliciting responses on how families and children 
were detected and understood as families. What families and children are was so intuitive 
or obvious that my questions about them raised eyebrows, but were evidently 
uninteresting and yielded little.  
 Interviews lasted from 30 to 90 minutes, and took place in locations of the 
respondents choosing. Despite my assurances that names and identities would be 
confidential, the interviews rarely strayed beyond the discursive patterns those same 
actors put forth in the news media. What I found was that, for most, there is no great 
difference between academic research and investigative reporting, so that signing an 
informed consent form did not arrest their apprehensions about being quoted. This 
difficulty reveals, I believe, one of the pitfalls of studying a high-profile government 
practice. Interviewees were often quite used to giving interviews to the media and did not 
greatly shift their responses or attitudes for me.  My respondents had, for the most part, 
come to a series of decisions about their disposition towards family detention, so the 
interviews were not the opportunities for exploration, experimentation, or discovery that I 
hoped they would be. These interviews were, however, incredibly important  for gaining 
a sense of the policy-making terrain during early fieldwork. 
 ICE never turned me down for an interview, but neither did they grant me one. I 
found a rather impenetrable state apparatus, but it was a bureaucracy obscured more by 
the convoluted delegation of responsibilities than by any discernable design. For 
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example, one request proceeded as follows: 
December 17, 2008: Conversation with Director of Berks: I asked about manuals, 
training manuals, etc. and he said that would have  to be run through ICE.  All of 
that is included in their compliance reports. I asked if, based on his experience, I 
should add that to my current request, and he said yes, so there is less going back 
and forth.  I should definitely add it to my current request so I can see those 
materials when I visit the facility.  He said from a county level, he was fine with it, 
but in the last 2 years they have been careful about what information they put out 
there.    
 
December 18, 2008: My packet has been sent to Patricia Pepe, who originally 
received my request… everything seems to go in a circle. … Interestingly, [the 
Berks Director] maintained that “from a county level” or “perspective” he didn’t 
have a problem with me seeing stuff, but ICE has their own stuff… It always got 
vague.  My guess is that they are trying to do a better job of managing the PR…  
 
Jan. 12, 2008: Called Assistant Field Office Director Patricia Pepe Reiser at the 
phone number Ramella gave me to follow up on my request.  Seemed to be 
confusion about how to reach her, was connected to Mr. Gonzalez “with 
immigration” and he took a message.  
12:55pm CST.  Received message from Trish Reiser at 2:03- request still pending 
at headquarters. 
From there my request languished, and efforts to restart the request were ignored.  These 
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passive rebukes occurred against a backdrop of more antagonistic rebukes.  For example, 
CCA denied the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights access to Hutto, 
and other well-established advocacy organizations faced considerable obstacles gaining 
access to facilities or detainees. Their visits were highly constrained and monitored. 
Attorneys, while facing considerable hostility within detention centers, were the only 
group to have consistent access, were bound by attorney-client privilege, and therefore 
could not facilitate my entry.  
Since the release of families from Hutto, however, I have helped initiate a 
visitation program for women. So while it was not a planned component of my research, I 
have been able to gain access to Hutto as a visitor. Women's detention issues are not the 
focus of this dissertation, but Hutto’s physical plant has not been significantly altered 
since families were released, allowing me to gain a embodied sense of daily negotiations 
with guards and ICE officers. Knowledge gained through the visitation project builds on 
the present research, and will form the basis of future work.  
 I had also initially planned to interview parents detained at Hutto. Unfortunately, 
families released from Hutto did not long remain in the Central Texas area, as most of 
them moved closer to family and other parts of the country. I did not contemplate 
including interviews with current detainees, because of the ethical implications of 
interviewing people in state custody. It became difficult, therefore, to locate the 
population I had set out to interview. I initially sought to contact formerly detained 
families through attorneys working at the facility, but they did not maintain contacts with 
their clients after their cases were resolved. Furthermore, one attorney described how she 
consciously distanced herself from her clients, because their post-asylum needs were 
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significant but beyond her capacity as a lawyer (Fieldnotes May 2008). A few families 
were vocal critics of family detention, and were quickly enrolled in a series of public 
events around family detention. Because so few families are willing to step forward and 
recount their detention experiences, those that did grew weary of recounting their trauma 
before audiences that were unable or ill-equipped to assist them in the challenges of 
settling in the United States. It became difficult for me to justify interviewing those same 
families for my own purposes, once again, when they had recounted their stories 
repeatedly in the public realm. Because I was not permanently located in Austin at the 
time, I could not develop the necessary relationships with local counselors, psychologists, 
or social workers in the event that the interview triggered post-traumatic stress from 
either the family's detention, their experiences of migration, or pre-migration violence 
that led them to claim asylum in the United States. 
 To circumvent this problem, I partnered with an Austin-based organization and 
social work faculty at the University of Texas to develop a survey that we would 
distribute to regional attorneys in the hopes of gathering systematic information about 
families released from Hutto. This project was developed during the fall of 2008 in spring 
of 2009, but faltered when the faculty partner was unable to make a long-term 
commitment. Because this kind of survey required long-term, sporadic bursts of contacts 
and interviews, it did not cohere with my fieldwork schedule well enough for me to 
sustain the project myself. I was concerned, however, to include families’ voices in the 
research, because without them I risked erasing their narratives from my analysis of the 
spatiality of family detention. I have relied therefore on existing testimonies found in the 
litigation, public events where families presented their stories, and interviews collected 
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for two films on family detention to begin to address the perspective of detainees. My 
hope is that through these materials I can begin to address the perspective of detainees. 
 
Participant Observation: My original research design did not incorporate significant 
participant observation, since I had not planned to base the study in ethnographic 
methods. As described above, it became immediately clear that I was dependent on 
advocates, organizers, and attorneys for the richest documents in the most detailed first-
hand information of immigration detention. Furthermore, these actors were engaged in 
phone calls, off the record meetings, and legal meetings with immigration officials. They 
have a sense, in other words, of the everyday antagonisms in negotiations at work in 
immigration enforcement practice, yet these details were often neglected in my semi-
structured interviews in favor of chosen storylines and messages. I learned much more 
about how immigration enforcement practices unfolded in everyday life from the offhand 
comments, chuckles, and sarcasm of those who interacted with them on a daily basis then 
from many of the official outlets. In addition, in contesting state detention practices, 
advocacy, legal, and organizing work pushed on the same state practices, and also 
produced “the government” as an acting, coherent, intentional entity. Approaching 
immigration enforcement practices from a postructuralist perspective, I was attuned to the 
ways in which various actors produced “the effect of the state” that they intended to 
change. Participant observation was, therefore, critical to my formulation of sufficient 
background knowledge, and it was in weekly meetings, conference calls, and strategy 
sessions that I refined my broader questions about the space of family detention, the 
production of various subject formations, and the securitization of immigration. It was in 
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this context that I was able to communicate early findings and contribute my own 
expertise to conversations about family detention. 
 While I worked closely with many advocates and activists contesting family 
detention, this dissertation should not be taken for a study of a social or political 
movement.  First, I did not design the study to focus on the organizational elements of the 
immigrant rights movement, and my research questions were not aimed at tracing these 
dynamics.  This is not to say that a study of immigrant rights and anti-detention 
organizing is not worthwhile; in fact, these kinds of studies are underway (e.g.,  Jimenez 
2009). Rather, because I came to the research with different questions, I represented 
myself in terms of these interests from the beginning.  It was clear to me that I could not 
truly pursue a study of detention through document collection alone, because many of the 
most interesting moments occurred “off the record” and in conversations closed to media 
or press outlets.  These moments were recorded in fieldnotes, and revealed the ways in 
which detention policies and practices were continually revised and the banal 
antagonisms between advocates and government officials.  
 
Analysis: While Burawoy’s reflexive science paradigm framed my relationship to family 
detention policy and practice, Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis served as a 
method through which to capture the resonances and fractures among various actors. For 
Fairclough, discourse is one aspect of social practice, bundled inseparably with activities, 
relations between subjects, instruments, objects, time and place, forms of consciousness, 
and values (2006, 205). Discourse structures “the way a thing is thought, and the way we 
act on the basis of that thinking” (Rose 2001, 36). Meaning is not established through an 
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objective language system, but is temporarily anchored in discursive practices, through 
the embodiment of discourse and the relations produced through it (Waitt 2005). The 
other elements of social practice are organized by discourse, even if their corporeality 
exceeds their discursive purpose (Butler 1990). As such, the researcher is in a uniquely 
privileged position as analyst and producer of discursive formations, and this places 
special responsibilities upon the researcher, the method, and the communication of results 
(Rose 2001). Thus, critical discourse analysis provided a means through which to 
understand how people connect words, statements, rationalities to each other and what is 
produced from those connections. 
 To analyze the data described above, I relied upon established methods of 
qualitative data analysis, specifically critical discourse analysis. I first developed 
systematic codes for each research question and combed through the data. From this first 
pass I drew out "in vivo" codes: words, phrases, or tropes that framed how family 
detention was enacted, imagine, and performed (Cope 2005). Using in vivo and thematic 
codes, I processed the qualitative data a second time, revised initial hypotheses, and 
refined my research questions.  For example, I found that threat, security, and criminality 
were far less pervasive than I had assumed they would be. Instead, my coding lists 
contained terminology from child welfare and social services, indicating, I think that 
while counterterrorism and security may have framed Department of Homeland Security 
press statements, they did not dominate facility-level policies. The coding process itself 
revealed, therefore, the ways in which detention practices were formulated under a broad 
banner of Homeland security in counterterrorism, but were implemented through specific 
relationships with a range of other less spectacular public policy regimes. Using my 
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qualitative data analysis software’s quantitative tools, I then identified the most 
commonly used codes. To ensure that these statistics were not skewed by synonymous 
codes, I double checked these preliminary rankings against a code map, in which I 
grouped similar terms. Visualizing the relationship between these codes allowed me to 
identify key axes around or along which discursive formations seemed to coalesce. From 
here I returned to my research questions, interpreted these data in response to them, and 
developed new questions for further inquiry. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Fieldwork necessarily includes a mix of improvisation, problem-solving, re-
routing, and making do.  The following chapters are indebted to the generosity and 
camaraderie of my fellow organizers, and culminate three years of thinking, strategizing 
and theorizing about family detention.  My aim has been to write relevant and responsible 
analysis that addresses organizers’ knowledge gaps about immigration and administrative 
law, the distribution of authority, and the spatialities of exclusion, while engaging with 
current debates about power, space, and law in our current biopolitical moment. The 
mixed-methods approach described above allows me to move between these different 
spheres, and my role in advocacy implicates me in the circulation of documents and the 
production of detention-related public discourse. In the end, this dissertation represents a 
sustained critical engagement with the legal and political context of family detention, and 
the methods “we” have employed to challenge it.  
 
Copyright © Lauren Leigh Martin 2011 
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CHAPTER 4: BORDER ASSEMBLAGES/TECHNOLOGIES OF BANISHMENT 
ALONG THE US-MEXICO BORDER 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter outlines border and immigration policy-making in the Southwest 
United States to place the detention system’s recent expansion in broader historical 
geographical context of colonial, racial, and ethnic politics. I connect border wall 
contruction to detention center expansion to show how these “bordering practices” 
(Newman 2006) produce an infrastructure that is “ready at hand” (Graham and Thrift 
2007).  I argue that the assemblage of symbolic, concrete, and legal practices produce an 
infrastructure of exclusion. In this bordering assemblage, the topographies of 
infrastructure interlace with topologies of banishment, suturing a series of spatial 
strategies and creating momentum for future border and immigration enforcement 
expansions. Situating detention in relation to a material border infrastructure, Chapter 5 
will show how family detention, in particular, emerged through the securitization of 
immigration enforcement, and Chapters 6 and 7 examine the legal techniques authorizing 
noncitizens detention and deportation. 
As of October 23, 2008, the United States has built just over 370 miles of fencing 
along its 1,952 mile boundary with Mexico (US Department of Homeland Security 
2008b).  Mandated by Congress in the 2006 Secure Fence Act, this phase represents just 
over half of the 700 miles of new fencing to be completed by December 2008.  A 
combination of 10- to 18-foot mesh fencing, 3- to 5-foot vehicle barriers, moveable 
fencing, and patrol roads, “the border wall” winds through flood zones, protected 
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ecosystems, habitats of endangered animals, properties of U.S. citizens, national parks, 
and urban areas. As some Texas residents continue to fight fence construction, and the 
Organization of American States (OAS) evaluates the wall’s human rights implications, 
constructing this series of fences has been more than an engineering challenge 
(Organization of American States Interamerican Committee on Human Rights 2008). 
Rather, the current build-up of border enforcement infrastructure represents a concerted 
effort to “re-border” the US-Mexico boundary and to secure “American” territory from 
unauthorized trans-boundary flows.  
 Security studies scholars have pointed out how the “social sorting” function of 
borders now operates through databanking technologies, allowing airlines and security 
personnel to exclude individuals based on their risk categorization (Amoore and de 
Goede 2008; Bigo 2002, 2007; Coleman 2007a; Lyon 2003; Salter 2006; Walters 2006).  
As Louise Amoore has shown, biometric databanking allows federal, state, and local law 
enforcement to check immigration status more easily than in the past, which has allowed 
the exclusionary aspects of the border to operate far from the international boundary itself 
(Amoore 2006; and see Bigo 2002, 2007; Coleman 2007a; Walters 2006). Trans-
boundary travelers and migrants are now evaluated prior to leaving their country of 
origin, on the basis of more intense surveillance than has been possible in the past. 
Combined with sweeping changes in the jurisdiction of executive agencies, these changes 
in immigration and border strategy have reconfigured the spatiality of the border, locating 
it in a complex system of risks, vulnerabilities, and security practices.  This is part of 
ICE’s strategy to “expand the border outward” and intensify expulsions from inside the 
U.S., leading some to argue that the border is both everywhere and nowhere (Belcher et 
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al. 2008; Coleman 2007a).  
 But if the border is portable, and is never fully “located” at the boundary itself, 
what role does fencing construction, surveillance, and policing along the boundary play? 
Fencing was initially intended to create a material disincentive for migrants attempting to 
cross into the U.S., and while border crossings do tend to decrease in areas with fencing, 
they displace crossings to more remote areas, ironically increasing criminal activity on 
the border by making migrants more reliant on coyotes to cross in remote areas (Nevins 
2007; Nuñez-Neto and Kim 2008). Acknowledging this tendency, Customs and Border 
Patrol (CBP) and ICE, combine fencing with ground sensors, floodlighting, patrolling, 
guard towers, and video surveillance to slow border crossers and channel them into 
heavily surveilled and patrolled areas (Hostelge 2008). The construction of bordering 
fencing, surveillance technologies, and patrolling have gone hand in hand with the 
construction of new detention centers, and the emergence of entire transportation 
networks operated solely for the confinement, management, and expulsion of 
unauthorized border crossers. Border construction is linked, therefore, to a series of 
examinations, interviews, and hearings that code unauthorized border crossers through 
administrative, legal, and medical discourses.  
 As the most visible and highly publicized component of homeland security and 
border enforcement efforts, fencing strategies also symbolize the federal government’s 
proficiency (or, to critics, lack thereof) at securing the American public from harm 
(Andreas 1999). For Newman (2006), the reproduction of symbolic borders between 
groups of people and material practices of border policing can be analyzed as 
interdependent bordering processes. The manipulation of the physical landscape to install 
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fencing and surveillance technologies works to order the Mexico-US boundary region as 
a site of territorial exclusion. The installation of fencing and different surveillance 
equipment projects along the boundary, along with the containment and forced movement 
of noncitizens, should be seen as distinct spatial strategies, each aimed at fixing the 
territorial boundary through the physical exclusion of non-citizens in different ways.  As 
such, fencing and detention materialize categorical bordering practices by ordering the 
movement of people and things in space in particular ways. Thus, the spatial ordering of 
border enforcement and detention in part work to contain bodies for processing and 
removal. Yet these spatial strategies are localized in the backyards of border residents and 
in ecologically fragile areas, creating a scalar disjuncture between border policy-making 
decisions and the sites of implementation (Coleman 2005). 
 This chapter describes some of the historical and legal context in which family 
detention emerged and US boundary and detention infrastructures’ concrete landscapes.  I 
first provide a very brief historical review of creation of the Mexico-US border. The 
second section analyzes the legislative and policy changes through which state resources 
were authorized and mobilized for border enforcement. The third section describes 
materials and technologies used to “build up” the border and the estimated costs of these 
projects. I close the chapter by arguing that border walls, detention, and forced mobility 
should be understood as a border assemblage, a linked but heterogeneous network of 
different spatial strategies, knowledge practices, networks, and mobilities. 
 
‘THE BORDER CROSSED US’: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MEXICO-US 
BORDER 
 The area through which the U.S.-Mexico boundary passes has a long and rich 
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history, and for most of this time, the area has been unfenced, unpatrolled, and 
unregulated. The historical geography of this region is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
but a few points are necessary to contextualize current struggles over fencing and 
surveillance technologies. Following Texas’ secession from Mexico in 1836 and the US-
Mexican War ending in 1848, over half of Mexico’s territory—1.5 million square 
kilometers—was ceded to the United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  
Encompassing roughly the same land area as Western Europe, the treaty granted the US 
parts of Kansas, Colorado, and Wyoming and Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, 
Utah, and California in their entirety (Figure 4.1).  100,000 Mexicans and 200,000 
indigenous people were absorbed with this massive land transfer.  In the 1853 Gadsden 
Purchase, the US purchased more land from Mexico south of the Gila River, establishing 
today’s Arizona and New Mexico boundaries. Neither Mexican nor Anglo residents took 
American integration and settlement lightly, and Mexican and indigenous residents 
contested the white ascendancy that accompanied the new boundary well into the 
twentieth century.  Using both legal and illegal coercive strategies, Anglo-Americans 
divested Mexican-Americans of the landholdings, usually consolidating them into 
massive livestock ranches. In 1859 and again in 1915, Texas Mexicans led violent raids 
against Anglo residents in response to these legal manipulations and the massive loss of 
property (Dunn 1996, 7-9). In retaliation, the Texas Rangers engaged in violent 
repression against Mexican Americans, and the first deployment of active-duty National 
Guard and Army troops was deployed to establish order. By 1900, the violent retaliation 
had largely pacified Mexican-Americans in the southwestern US. Thus, the initial 
‘pacification’ of the border region entailed the violent, quasi-militarized dispossession of 
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racially defined groups, establishing the “American” boundary as a symbolic boundary 
between white and non-white territorial boundary. 
 Yet while Mexican and indigenous people struggled against Anglo-American 
racial discrimination, they also moved rather freely throughout the border region until 
recently. Fostering cultural and economic ties, this mundane cross-border traffic has 
defied attempts to characterize either side of the political boundary as truly “Mexican” or 
“American.” When the Immigration Act of 1924 established the first Border Patrol, 
Mexico-US boundary operations were oriented towards the exclusion of Asian migrants 
and controlling illicit alcohol smuggling, not the prevention of border crossings from 
Mexico. During the Great Depression, for example, they performed massive deportations, 
only to bring thousands to supplement the war-time economy with the Bracero Program 
in 1942.  In combination with Jim Crow laws that prevented Mexicans from buying 
property in white-dominated towns, this “revolving door” immigration policy prevented 
Mexican Americans and Mexican migrants from gaining economic and political capital 
in the Southwest. From its inception, therefore, US border enforcement policies have 
been intimately tied to the management of the labor supply through immigration 
limitations, the use of militaristic tactics to police Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in 
the US, and the disenfranchisement of non-white Americans in the Southwest (Dunn 
1996; Nevins 2002). 
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Figure 4.1: Phases of US Land Acquisition 
 
(Map by Richard Gilbreath) 
  
 Beginning in 1978, border policy shifted from limited physical presence on the 
territory boundary and a pattern of labor recruitment and deportation to a territorial 
emphasis on the criminality of border crossers policy and their implicit threat to white 
America. The current combination of militaristic surveillance and policing can be traced 
to anxieties over a brown-skinned, Spanish-speaking “American Quebec,” spurred in part 
by a vocal Chicana/o civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s and the subsequent 
increased visibility of Mexican-Americans in the southwestern US. A recession, rising 
unemployment, and the highly publicized arrival of 125,000 Cuban and 40,000 Haitians 
in 1980 destabilized the dominant “imagined community” of white, Anglo America and 
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created a perceived crisis of nation-statehood. In 1986, the Immigration and Reform 
Control Act (IRCA) responded to this perceived demographic crisis by mandating a 
closed border and the end of the underground migrant economy (Pub. L. 99-603).  In 
addition to a program that legalized migrants living the US, IRCA increasied funding for 
detention facilities, surveillance technologies, fencing, roads, and border policing.  
Executed through cooperative agreements between Departments of Defense, Justice, and 
the Treasury, IRCA quietly undermined posse comitatus, the statute limiting the role of 
the military in domestic policing (Coleman 2005; Dunn 1996).  In 1990, the Immigration 
Act increased funding for Border Patrol agents, expanded categories of “excludable 
aliens,” limited migrants’ judicial appeals, and awarded arrest power to the INS—at the 
same time as it promoted family reunification and employment-based migration (Pub. 
L.101-649).  And in 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Control Act (IIRIRA) 
codified the INS’ Southwest Border Strategy, described below (Pub. L.104-208).  IIRIRA 
greatly expanded the categories of excludable persons, granted INS officers authority to 
order removals, and streamlined the removal process, effectively removing judicial 
oversight from the immigration enforcement process.  Thus, immigration legislation in 
the 1980s and 1990s framed immigration and border enforcement as intertwined issues of 
criminality and national security, necessitating enforcement-led strategies.  By increasing 
funding and resources for border policing, the CBP and INS became a significant 
material presence in the borderlands  
 After IIRIRA added resources to immigration and border enforcement, the field 
was relatively unchanged until the 2003 Department of Homeland Security Act, which 
reorganized enforcement operations and codified border security as a homeland security 
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priority.  In 2005, however, two major legislative changes occurred changing the face of 
border security.  First, the REAL ID Act expanded the Secretary of Homeland Security’s 
waiver authority to “all legal requirements necessary to ensure expeditious construction” 
of security barriers (Pub. L. 109-13; Nuñez-Neto and Kim 2008, 7). Second, the Secure 
Fence Act amended IIRIRA and mandated the construction of 850 miles of fencing, later 
amended to “not less than 700 miles of fencing.”  The Act mandated the 370 miles be 
built in priority areas by December 2008 (Figure 4.2).   
Figure 4.2: Existing and Future Fence Projects 
 
(Map by Richard Gilbreath) 
 
Thus, beginning in 2005, the U.S.-Mexico boundary saw an unprecedented influx of 
funding.  
 The cursory overview provided above is meant to show, first, that the border has 
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long been contested by the people living in the region, and that “the border” has never 
been a settled, established entity (House 1982). In part, it is the continual flux and 
indeterminacy of the border region that has provided justification for an increasingly 
rigidified boundary; in order for the border to be in force, it must be continually 
reproduced through policing and exclusion practices.  Infrastructure is a nominally 
durable enforcement strategy, built to stand in for the physical presence of border patrol 
officers and to ensure the border’s reproduction in the future. Providing what CBP calls 
“persistent impedence,” border barriers serve three purposes. First, they represent the 
range of policing, surveillance, detention, and deportation practices aimed at 
unauthorized border-crossers and in doing so they, second, aim to deter migrants from 
crossing into the US and, third, legitimize the federal government as the purveyor of 
“security.” The visuality and stark physicality of fencing, in particular, fuses the 
exclusionary symbolism of the border to the physicality of forcible exclusion. As 
Andreas argues: “Border enforcement is about deterrence, but it is also about propping up 
state claims to territorial authority and symbolically reaffirming the traditional political 
boundaries of an ‘imagined community’” (Andreas 2000, 143).  In the context of post-
9/11 border enforcement, counter-terrorism, national security, and the protection of “us” 
from “them” offered a new sense of urgency and nearly unassailable justifications for the 
expansion of coercive power at the US-Mexico border (Grundy-War and Schofield 
2005). 
  
BORDER CONSTRUCTION 
 A series of immigration and border enforcement bills augmented investments in 
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border infrastructure and fostered new levels of cooperation between the Department of 
Defense and border enforcement agencies.  Culminating in IIRIRA in 1996, INS border 
enforcement strategy focused on “prevention through deterrence” (US Immigration and 
Nturalization Services 1996; and see Sundberg and Kaserman 2007). Beginning in 1978, 
seven miles of 10-foot chain link fencing was installed in El Paso, San Diego, Yuma, and 
Tuscon sectors.  These were eventually upgraded to 10-foot corrugated steel walls, and in 
1991 to welded panels of surplus steel and military landing mats left over from the Gulf 
War (Dunn 1996, 66; Fernandes 2007). As today, early fencing projects were 
accompanied by helicopter and small aircraft surveillance, footfall ground sensors, and 
the expansion of detention centers for apprehended migrants. Between 1978 and 1988, 
the INS added twenty helicopters, 278 night vision scopes, in addition to night vision 
goggles, infrared scopes, and remote imaging technologies.  Ground sensors were 
expanded and upgraded, as was low-light-level television surveillance.  Other 
communications and surveillance projects were developed with the U.S. Army, Air 
Force, and Federal Aviation Administration (Dunn 1996, 44).  Twenty-two border patrol 
stations were built, and INS’s budget allocations grew dramatically, comparable only to 
post-9/11 increases in border enforcement. In 1989, the Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) was 
formed at El Paso’s Fort Bliss, and armed forces were enrolled in a permanent 
cooperative relationship with the INS. Aimed at drug trafficking, the majority of support 
entailed “operational” missions, largely ground reconnaissance missions used as much to 
detect unauthorized border crossings as to locate illicit drugs. While new building 
projects were the most visible evidence of this cooperation, engineering and construction 
constituted only 10% of the JTF-6 missions (Dunn 2001, 70). This signaled an 
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unprecedented role for the armed forces in the policing of U.S. territory. Extending the 
paramilitary legacy of border pacification, the Mexico-US boundary has, therefore, long 
been a site where geopolitical, military, and domestic policies intersect.  
 In the 1990s, border patrol operations were integrated across the borderlands, as 
enforcement strategies were bundled and implemented throughout the region. This 
“Southwest Border Strategy” entailed four phases of Border Patrol staffing, technology, 
and infrastructure increases in all 9 southwest sectors, the northern border, and coastal 
borders. Beginning with El Paso’s Operation Hold-the-Line in 1993, the Border Patrol 
deployed law enforcement and surveillance resources at popular points of entry, 
displaying a “show of force” intended to dampen unauthorized border crossings (Andreas 
2000, 92). From 1994 to 1998, fencing increased from 19 miles to more than 45 miles, 
including a 20-foot cement and metal wall topped with razor wire in Nogales, Arizona 
(Fernandes 2007). As the JTF-6 assisted with previous construction efforts, the Armed 
Forces and National Guard assisted the INS with construction projects in 1990s, as well 
(Andreas 2000). The strategy successfully reduced attempted border crossings in El Paso, 
and the effort was expanded to the San Diego sector with Operation Gatekeeper in 1994 
(see Nevins 2002 for a detailed account). In 1995, Operation Safeguard began in Nogales, 
Arizona (expanded to Douglas and Naco in 1999), and in 1997 Operation Rio Grande 
was implemented in Brownsville, Texas (see Figure 4.2). 
 This succession of “operations” was enabled by the resources granted in the 1996 
IIRIRA, which specifically mandated the construction of 14 miles of triple-layered 
fencing in the San Diego sector. The Sandia National Laboratory had recommended 
additional layers of fencing, patrol roads and floodlights to detect and delay crossers long 
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enough for Border Patrol officials to apprehend them (Nevins 2002; Nuñez-Neto and 
Kim 2008).  This triple fencing was to stretch from the Pacific Ocean westward, but the 
California Coastal Commission halted construction at Smuggler’s Gulch, arguing that the 
Border Patrol’s plans to fill in the canyon with 2 million cubic yards of dirt was 
environmentally unsound (see California Coastal Commission 2003). As of 2000, USBO 
and its armed service counterparts had constructed a total of 73 miles of fencing, and the 
implementation of the Border Strategy has stalled in its second phase (US Government 
Accountability Office 2001).  Border enforcement had seen steady increases in funding, 
and decreased border crossings in targeted areas, but each decrease was followed by an 
almost immediate increase in crossings in a neighboring sector.  The short-term, localized 
effectiveness of fencing provided some justification for its expansion, the assumption 
being that with enough fencing, border crossers will be sufficiently deterred.  
 Under the Department of Homeland Security, the Southwest Border Strategy’s 
“prevention through deterrence” doctrine was infused with unprecedented funding levels, 
allowing DHS to coordinate border, drug, and immigration enforcement with more 
federal agencies and armed service support that in the past.  Called the Secure Border 
Initiative (SBI), this multi-agency strategy to “secure America’s borders and reduce 
illegal immigration” increased detention and deportation rates, particularly of Central and 
South Americans  (US Department of Homeland Security 2008a).  Previously, INS/ICE 
released Central and South Americans because they claimed asylum (and asylees were 
eligible for release) or they could not immediately deported. In addition, SBI included 
interior immigration enforcement and the implementation of the Boeing Corporation’s 
SBInet, a complex of surveillance technologies used to detect foot and vehicle traffic 
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along the border (US Government Accountability Office 2008). While not departing 
significantly from pre-9/11 border policy discourses and enforcement practices, SBI 
signalled three major changes to border enforcement.  First, the initiative began 
unprecedented cooperation between federal agencies who had been previously 
antagonistic: federal, state and local law enforcement (see Coleman 2007).  Second, DHS 
made wide use of contracts with private security and technology firms, where it had 
previously relied upon the military for construction and technology implementation.  This 
shift dramatically increased the cost of security, since surplus materials, JTF-6 and other 
military labor was not charged to USBP, but used for training exercises or otherwise 
included in Department of Defense funding (Neto and Nuñez 2008).  Third, Secretary of 
Homeland Security Chertoff used his waiver authority to suspend 37 local and federal 
regulations to build the more than 700 miles of fencing mandated by Congress in the 
Secure Fence Act (See Figure 4.3, 4.4).  Current border construction projects signal, 
therefore, a larger reconfiguration of relationship between domestic law, homeland 
security priorities, and United States territory, leaving large areas of the United States 
without recourse to the protections traditionally offered by judicial and legislative 
oversight of the executive branch. 
 New sections of the border wall significantly impact the land and people of the 
borderlands.  The costs of recent border infrastructure projects demonstrate something of 
the scale of these changes.  From 2005 to 2008, Congress allocated over $2.7 billion for 
SBI projects, $950 million of which was directed towards “tactical infrastructure.” By 
comparison, tactical infrastructure was allocated $20 million from 1996 to 1999 (Nuñez-
Neto and Kim 2008, 21). Border patrol staff increased from 9,902 to over 17,000 between 
67 
 
2002 and 2008.  Pedestrian fencing (Figure 4.5) is estimated to cost $4 million per mile 
Figure 4.3: Border Areas Affected by the REAL ID Act  
 
           (Map by Richard Gilbreath) 
build and $600,000 per year to maintain, while vehicle fencing (Figure 4.6) is estimated 
to cost $2 million per mile and $300,000 to maintain and cost upwards of $9 million per 
mile. In each case, the effects of the wall are felt, reported, and redressed at the local 
level, but these effects rarely reached national news sources and receiving scant mention 
in Congressional and Government Accountability Office reporting. Thus, while DHS and 
CBP argue that the benefits of wall construction accrue to the nation as a whole, border 
construction’s negative consequences remain localized.  
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Figure 4.4: Laws Waived under REAL ID Act 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MTBA) 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) Military Lands Withdrawal Act 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act 
(AIRFA) 
National Forest Management Act of 
1976 
Antiquities Act National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) 
Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act 
(AHPA) 
National Park Service General 
Authorities Act 
Archaeological Resources Protection Act 
(ARPA) 
National Wildlife Refuge System 
Administration Act, 
Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA 
Clean Air Act (CAA) Noise Control Act (NCA) 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Otay Mountain Wilderness Act of 1999 
Costal Zone Management Act (CZMA) Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Eagle Protection Act Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 
Farmland Protection Policy Act (FPPA) Section 102(29) and 103 of Title I of the California Desert Protection Act 
Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act 
of 1977 
Sections 301(a)-(f) of the Arizona 
Desert Wilderness Act 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA) 
Sections 401(7), 403, and 404 of the 
National Parks and Recreation Act 0f 
1978 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean 
Water Act) Sikes Act 
Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 
Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), as 
amended by the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA) Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 
Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act 
(HSBAA) Wilderness Act  
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Figure 4.5: Pedestrian Fencing, Arizona 
 
(Source: Jay Johnson-Castro) 
Figure 4.6: Border Fence, Lighting, and Patrol Roads 
 
(Source: Jay Johnson-Castro) 
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DETENTION INFRASTRUCTURES 
  Where the PATRIOT and REAL ID Acts expanded DHS’ authority to build 
border fencing, to appropriate land from borderland property owners, and to waive 
environmental regulations, immigration legislation has long granted the INS/ICE and the 
Attorney General wide authority to detain noncitizens.  The 1952 Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) authorized administrative detention for immigration enforcement 
purposes for the first time, and through a IRCA, IIRIRA, and the HSA, has given the 
INS/ICE the unilateral discretion to detain noncitizens seeking admission, prior to their 
entrance into US territory (explored in more detail in Chapter 7). Until the 1980s, 
however, there was no “detention system” to speak of because immigration officials, 
judges, and the Supreme Court exercised their discretion not to detain noncitizens in the 
vast majority of cases. IRCA introduced the first criminal penalties for immigration 
violations, particularly for employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers. The 
1996 IIRIRA created, however, large classes of excludable residents, and mandated 
detention for “criminal aliens.” Broadening deportability and mandating detention, 
IIRIRA began the expansion of the detention system as we now know it.  In 1994, the 
INS detained an average of 6785 migrants per day; in 2001, the daily detained population 
settled at around 19,500, where it stayed until 2006.  Between 1999 and 2009, the INS 
and ICE detained noncitizens in 1,528 different facilities. From 2006 to 2010, the daily 
detention population spiked again, settling at the current capacity of approximately 
32,000 (Haddal and Siskin 2010; See Figure 4.7). All detention and removal programs 
have garnered at least 28% funding increases, while the total budget increased 69% 
between 2005 and 2010 (Figure 4.7). 
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Figure 4.7: Budget Appropriations for Immigration Enforcement Programs 2005-
2010 (in $1000) 
YEAR Custody Fugitive Ops 
Institution
al Removal 
Alternatives 
to Detention Transport. Construction Automation Total 
2005 864125 79049 53518 20712 200987 26179000 39605000 67002391 
2006 1161627 121852 93029 38212 230650 26281000 39748000 67674370 
2007 1381767 183200 137494 43600 238284 56281000 15000000 73265345 
2008 1547212 218945 178829 53889 282526 16500000 30700000 49481401 
2009 1721268 226477 189069 63000 281399 5000000 57000000 64481213 
20101 1770000 229700 192500 69900 281900 4800000 90000000 97344000 
Percent  
increase 49% 34% 28% 30% 71% 18% 44% 69% 
Note: Institutional Removal refers to law enforcement collaborations, such as the 
Criminal Alien Program. It does not include 287(g) or Secure Communities, as these are 
separate budget lines. Construction is a separate line item, but supports detention and 
removal operations. Automation "allows ICE to improve information sharing with DHS 
and across ICE organizations." Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
2006a, 2007a, 2008a, 2009c, 2010b.) 
1 Includes Enacted only. 
 
Figure 4.8:  Average Daily Detained Population, 1994-2010 
 
(Source: Haddal and Siskin 2010, p. 12) 
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The Secure Border Initiative included an expansion of the expedited removal 
program (ER) from ports of entry to land and sea areas between checkpoints, and to 
noncitizens apprehended within 100 miles of a border within 14 days of arrival.  
Expanding ER expanded  the detention system’s capacity exponentially, as then Interim 
Director of Detention and Removal John Torres stated, 
Before we implemented expedited removal across the Southwest border, the 
Southwest border, the average amount of time that a person spent in detention 
was about 90 days. Once we implemented expedited removal in South Texas last 
summer, we saw that timeframe drop to about 30 days. Our goal is to get to 15 
days. ... Our current time right now is eighteen-and-a-half days. Why do I 
mention this? It is because it's simple math. If I have one bed, I can hold four 
people in that bed over the course of a year at a 90-day detention rate. As we 
break that down to about eighteen-and-a-half days, I can use that same bed for 20 
people without getting any additional resources….So in effect, we're looking to 
increase by over 100 percent the amount of people we can detain and remove with 
just the addition of 6,700 beds.  (emphasis added, Department of Homeland 
Security 2006b, 6)  
This “speeding up” of deportation allowed ICE to detain and deport noncitizens without 
immigration court appearances, increasing the number of people ICE could hold with the 
same number of beds (See Figure 4.9).  
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Figure 4.9: Total Number of Noncitizens Detained, 2006-2009 
 
(Source: US Department of Homeland Security 2008b, 4; US Department of Homeland 
Security Office of Immigration Statistics 2008c, 3; US Department of Homeland Security 
Office of Immigration Statistics 2009, 3; US Department of Homeland Security Office of 
Immigration Statistics 2010, 3.) 
 Detention infrastructure includes not only detention capacity, but a web of legal 
and transportation networks that allow ICE to move noncitizens through deportation 
proceedings “more efficiently.” In 2009, ICE detained 369,000 noncitizens in two types 
of temporary facilities (“holding areas” and “staging locations”) and two types of 
detention facilities (those housing noncitizens more or less than 72 hours). “Holding 
areas” contain noncitizens for up to 12 hours, after which time they must be transferred to 
a short- or long-term detention facility. “Staging locations” may hold noncitizens for up 
to 16 hours. (It should be noted that the 12 and 16 hour limits do not prevent DHS from 
holding noncitizens overnight, as detainees can be detained in the evening and transferred 
in the morning.) Neither type of temporary facility has sleeping or shower capabilities. 
Together, holding areas and staging locations hold 3% of the daily detained population, 
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and Customs Enforcement 2009b, 9).  Because these facilities do not have to be licensed 
for long-term care, they are virtually unregulated.  They may include locked sections of 
ICE offices or unmarked subfield offices in unmarked office and industrial parks 
(Stevens 2009).  In 2009, ICE operated 186 of these temporary facilities, which are 
excluded from published lists of detention centers. These lists contain only the 300+ 
short- and long-term detention centers, or those that hold noncitizens less than and more 
than three days, respectively.   
 ICE owns seven “service processing centers, but operations are subcontracted to 
the private sector. Private corrections corporations own and operate seven more “contract 
detention facilities,” such as Hutto, while counties own and operate seven jails via 
Intergovernmental Service Agreements, such as Berks.  These 21 dedicated detention 
centers hold around 50% of the detained population, while the remaining 50% is scattered 
throughout “mixed population” county jails and state prisons (US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement 2009b, 9-10). These statistics do not include the growing numbers 
of noncitizens detained by local law enforcement agencies under the Secure Communities 
or 287(g) programs.  Local law enforcement agencies participating in SComm report 
persons of questionable immigration status or violent offenders to ICE, and may hold 
them for up to 48 hours awaiting transfer to ICE custody (Guttin 2009; Shahani and 
Greene 2010).  Thus, the detention system coexists with and within the criminal 
incarceration system. 
A sophisticated transportation network connects these 300 jails, prisons, army 
barracks, and temporary facilities, and this network has seen a 71% increase in funding 
since 2005, the highest increase across removal-related budget lines (Figure 4.8).   ICE 
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transfers most detainees at least once, and 24% of detainees endure two or more transfers. 
So where ICE detained over 369,000 noncitizens in FY2009, it also performed as many 
inter-facility transfers (Transactions Records Access Clearinghouse 2009).  Because 
detention capacity is concentrated in the SW border region, those apprehended in the 
Northeast, for example, find themselves in Texas detention centers. Not only are they far 
from their communities of support, but the borderlands lack sufficient legal 
representation and immigration judges (Human Rights Watch 2009). In addition, federal 
district courts rule different on various aspects of immigration law, such as habeas corpus 
claims, and scholars and advocates have shown that ICE strategically transfers 
noncitizens from more to less immigration-friendly districts (Human Rights Watch 2009; 
Morawetz 2004). Detention and transportation infrastructure work to physically locate 
detainees in regions where ICE can achieve its desired ends: increased deportation. To 
speed deportation, and thereby increase the number of noncitizens per bed per year, ICE 
contracts commercial airlines to fly noncitizens to their countries of origin.  “ICE AIR” 
deported over 367,000 migrants from 22 airports, flying through hubs in Texas, Arizona, 
and Louisiana at a cost of $680 per noncitizen per flight (Harris and Soichet 2008; Olivio 
2009).  In short, this topography of legal and transportation infrastructure means that 
noncitizens in the Northeast, Midwest, and Northwestern US are transferred south in 
order to be deported.  
 ICE has leveled its detention capacity and funding for construction in recent 
years, but has shifted its emphasis to information sharing and collaborations with local 
law enforcement. While Figure 4.9 shows a 28% increase in “institutional removal” 
funding, ICE has added new budget lines for Secure Communities, a program which 
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allows county jails to check the immigration status of people coming through its cells.  
Aimed at identifying “criminal aliens,” the program tends to funnel misdemeanants into 
ICE custody, rather than violent offenders (Guttin 2009).  So while border wall 
construction has worked to push migrants into increasingly dangerous areas, noncitizen 
residents (with or without documents) navigate an interior, post-entry landscape with 
more points of contact between ICE and noncitizen communities. As desert border-
crossings and criminal aliens dominate popular migration imaginaries, border wall 
construction is integrated into a broader network of apprehension, containment, forced 
mobility, banishment.   The policing, inspection, and detention tactics associated with 
territorial borders and ports of entry are now distributed—albeit unevenly—across the 
US, creating a thicker network of institutions that police citizenship.  These spatial 
strategies are linked, institutionally, and deployed, strategically, to create a generalized 
sense of unease, insecurity, and inevitable exclusion for noncitizens (Coleman 2009).     
 
CONCLUSION 
 Rather than sealing US territory from illegal incursions, concrete and steel 
infrastructures seem to proliferate zones of extra-legality, where some US residents find 
themselves without access to information, grievance procedures, and more or less 
stripped of the rights afforded to citizens who do not live near the boundary (Hyndman 
and Mountz 2008). From DHS’ perspective, the REAL ID waivers apply to particular 
stretches of territory—not citizens—and are necessary to ensure the sovereignty of the 
US. These waivers do not, in theory, prevent residents from exercising their rights, but 
they do appear to negate any specific, place-based or territorial rights residents may 
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claim.  The construction of the border wall appears, therefore, to have dramatically 
reconfigured the relationship between law, the federal government, and citizens; the 
‘uniquely American freedoms’ supposedly secured by border enforcement are actually 
diminished in the process of securing them.  Just as enforcement escalations in the 1980s 
and 1990s led to increased illegal activity throughout the borderlands, it appears that 
building the border wall diminished citizens’ access to a host of legal procedures. Thus, 
homeland security practices may create the conditions of insecurity they are engineered 
to prevent (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007). 
 What does detention mean when detainees must be housed with “regular” prison 
populations, in repurposed prisons, or in tents? To proponents of stiffer penalties, “illegal 
immigration” is perceived as a threat to “every facet of our society—security, education, 
social services, and health care” (Pryce in Coleman 2008, 5).  That is, the problem of 
immigration is represented as an on assault the state’s ability to ensure survival of US 
citizens. Yet, the border wall impacts the mobility, property, and livelihoods of people on 
living near the border in myriad ways. As such, the localized and individualized effects of 
border enforcement infrastructural are borne disproportionately by communities in the 
borderlands, while the Department of Homeland Security announces the completion of 
each section of fencing as a victory for the United States as a whole.  Border 
infrastructure remains, as Andreas (2000) argued, an important “stage” for the 
performance of state power.  But as Coleman (2005), the borderlands operate in this way 
precisely because policy-makers imagine it as an open terrain and develop policies 
without consideration of its social, economic, political, or geomorphological particularity.   
 Taken together, border and detention infrastructures combine spatial strategies of 
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deterrence and containment, an ironic internalization of Cold War anti-proliferation 
tactics.  The re-use of military landing mats, army barracks, surplus prison space shows, 
furthermore, how the infrastructures of successive military interventions interlace with 
wars on terror, drugs, and crime.  Wall building concretizes the US’ symbolic mastery of 
the US Southwest, and appears to sediment US claims to national space. Yet, these 
projects occurred alongside long-standing efforts to “push the border outward,” such as 
US consulates’ administration of new immigrant applications abroad, ICE operations 
abroad, and DHS inspections of international ports.  Interior policing, detention, mobility 
between centers, and deportation rely upon a complex logistical infrastructure, as well, 
translated from the world’s largest criminal justice system.  While these material 
landscapes naturalize and normalize exclusion, they must be seen as instruments, “ready 
at hand” (Graham and Thrift 2007) to be repurposed and re-deployed.  As spatial 
strategies, they spatialize power relations in different ways, but in combination, they form 
a complex assemblage of bordering practices. Enclosing national territory from 
unauthorized entries and criminalizing populations, this assemblage of bordering 
practices weaves topographical with topological relations of banishment.  
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CHAPTER 5: DETENTION, DISCIPLINE, AND DETERRENCE IN US 
NONCITIZEN FAMILY DETENTION PRACTICE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 As the previous chapter described, US immigration officials more than doubled 
the yearly detention of noncitizens from 146,760 to 369,483 between 1999 and 2009 
(TRAC 2009).  Moving this volume of noncitizens through its 33,000 bed system, ICE 
now manages the fastest growing incarcerated population and the largest prison system in 
the United States (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009b).  Considering that 
the US incarcerates over 2 million people, the world’s largest national prison population, 
the size and scope of the US’s detention of noncitizens is locally and internationally 
significant.  Implementing a “catch and remove” approach to immigration enforcement, 
the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) both ramped up policing activities and eliminated 
“loopholes” that prevented the older Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from 
detaining noncitizens suspected of violating immigration law. The expanded use of 
detention reflected a more general sense among federal immigration authorities that 
something more was needed – beyond regular border patrol, interior investigations, and 
port of entry inspection operations – to deter undocumented migration to the US (US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2003). As a result, a whole range of individuals 
who previously would not have been detained in order to effect deportation – including 
arriving asylum-seekers, Central Americans who could not be quickly deported, and 
“vulnerable” populations, such as families – were caught up in a growing immigration 
prison complex. 
 Immigration scholars often treat detention as a function of deportability. Indeed, 
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the specific legal, institutional, and infrastructural conditions of detention are rarely 
addressed as strategic components of immigration enforcement. A small but growing 
detention literature has tracked, however, how confining noncitizens and transferring 
them to isolated centers is a crucial aspect of state strategy vis-à-vis the regulation of 
immigration. This research not only links detention to a “deportation turn” in the 
wealthiest states across the globe (Collyer forthcoming), but shows how detention 
includes a series of surveillance practices that migrants internalize before, during, and 
after their encounters with immigration authorities (e.g., Bigo 2007, Coutin 2010, Martin 
and Mitchelson 2008, Mountz 2004, Schuster 2005a, b). Moreover, this previous research 
outlines how the location and conditions of detention allow states to engineer detainees’ 
access to legal protections, representation, and resources (Gill 2009, Hyndman and 
Mountz 2008, White 2002). In the US, detention falls to the administrative side of 
immigration policy-making, and administrative discretion to detain noncitizens is thereby 
protected from federal court oversight beyond immigration law, itself notorious for its 
deference to lawmakers over courts (Neuman 2005).  Policing, detention, and deportation 
have reverberating effects, however, and interrupt household incomes, force migrants to 
give up possessions and savings, and fragment the relations of care that sustain 
transnational migrant networks. As I show below, the effects of detention-as-deterrence 
policies exceed those policies’ stated aims. Detained families’ accounts of isolation, 
family separation, bodily ordering, and criminalization reveal heterogeneous, but 
resonant, impacts on transboundary migrants.  
This chapter has two primary goals. First, I want to show that noncitizen detention 
has become a key strategy—specifically a spatial strategy—in the US Department of 
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Homeland Security’s approach to border and immigration enforcement.  Most 
importantly, I show how DHS agencies have come to understand transboundary 
migration as a territorial vulnerability, and how confinement in prison facilities became a 
central US immigration enforcement tactic, and then a key counter-terrorism strategy.  I 
trace shifts in detention policy and practice through the case of family detention because 
the difficulties in detaining parents and children together illuminate the improvisational 
character of enforcement policy-making.  Second, I argue that conceptualizing 
detention’s increasingly central role in risk-based, biopolitical security regimes requires a 
new lens on disciplinarity. ICE’s apprehension and detention policies seek to deter future 
migrants as much as ensure deportation, yet detained families’ understood their detention 
in terms of its effects on their relationships to each other and to broader support networks. 
Their narratives reveal how ICE’s detention policies impact noncitizens’ decision-
making, but more importantly, the ways in which these interactions exceed ICE’s aims.  
Detention’s disciplinarity is not defined by institutional efforts to remake individuals, but 
oriented towards the behavior of entire populations of future, potential migrants, 
disciplinary tactics--spectacular enforcement practices and subjectification. As risk and 
security have become dominant themes in for scholars of international relations and 
geopolitics, it is critical to attend to the ways in which disciplinary modalities of power 
are reconfigured—and re-incorporated—into the risk-based security practices (and 
ontologies).  
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DETENTION, RISK, AND DISCIPLINE 
 The scale of US noncitizen detention may be novel, but detention and 
confinement have become common policies in major receiving countries and, 
increasingly, in transit countries, as well (Collyer 2007, Coleman 2007, Hyndman and 
Mountz 2008). Liza Schuster locates detention in a European states’ efforts to control 
transboundary migration: the deportation of out-of-status migrants, the detention of those 
suspected of being out-of-status, and the dispersal of settled refugees away from 
communities of support (Schuster 2005a, b). From the perspective of migrants’ journeys, 
however, status changes with a series of arrivals, departures, and everyday mobilities, so 
that “status mobility” and “geographical mobility” are more complexly linked than the 
geopolitical marking of territorial boundaries would allow.  This range of state and self-
management practices lead Schuster to conceptualize exclusion in a way that captures not 
just territorial removal, but forms of legal (documentation regimes, education, healthcare) 
and social (racism, xenophobia and prejudice) exclusion. In the UK, Nicholas Gill has 
shown how a range of middle-men impact migrants’ mobilities within detention system, 
in addition to asylees’ pathways into and out of detention center (Gill 2009). Similar 
criminalization, presumed guilt, and “bogus asylum seekers” discourses frame 
government responses to migration, a pattern that Alison Mountz has documented in 
Canada, as well (Mountz 2010). Though couched in specific jurido-political milieux, 
speedy deportation, frequent inter-center transfers, isolation from legal representation, 
and strategic invisibilization characterize detention practices in the EU, US, Canada, and 
Australia.  For Bigo, the agglomeration of waiting zones, centers, and malleable status 
place migrants on a “long march,” “where circulating is tolerated, but stopping to rest or 
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settle is not allowed…It is the time of endless circulation, of constant rotation” (Bigo 
2007, 30).  Detention is not the final point or a limit case of “mobility management,” but 
a space in which exclusion and banishment congeal (ibid., Foucault 2007, 107-110).3
 Quite apart from these ethnographies of detention, critical border and security 
studies scholars have analyzed how newly implemented technologies of border 
inspection, identification, and surveillance follow transboundary travelers before, during, 
and after their passage through a port of entry. Identity profiling, databanking, and risk 
analysis techniques work together with x-ray scans, pat-downs, “behavior observation,” 
and “passenger imaging” allow security professionals to calculate a transnational 
migrant’s probability of committing a crime (Adey 2009, Amoore 2009, Amoore and de 
Goede 2008, Amoore and Hall 2009, Martin 2010). While these inspections are more 
visible in places like airports and government buildings, security agencies have linked a 
number of previously distinct databases and access to credit card transactions and phone 
records, allowing them to continually evaluate risk.  Surveillance studies scholars have 
long argued that these risk-based “social sorting” (Lyon 2003, 2006) mechanisms remain 
diffuse and disconnected, forming a fragmented “surveillant assemblage” (Haggerty and 
Ericson 2000) rather than a coherent, “Big Brother” surveillance apparatus. The social 
sorting that differentiated between more and less dangerous subjects has been redeployed 
to evaluate risk to the “population and the way of life,” so that everyday security 
practices aim to pluck “the hidden terrorist” from the everyday comings and goings 
required for capitalist circulation (Martin and Simon 2008).  Focused on risk 
  
                                                 
3 Stuart Elden offers a similar argument regarding Foucauldian discipline. He argues that Foucault 
understands disparate disciplinarity modalities of army barracks, schools, hospitals and asylums to meet in 
Bentham’s Panopticon, rather than emanate from the prison, as many scholars have argued. S. Elden, 2001. 
Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of Spatial History. London: Continuum, pp. 
120-150.  
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management’s knowledge practices, and ways in which state security institutions 
integrate the techniques, this strain of research has emphasized the respatialization of the 
border, as borders are pushed both outward and inward and exist “everywhere and 
nowhere” (Coleman 2009, Belcher et al., 2008). 
 For Michael Dillon, infusing national security decision-making with risk-based 
evaluation represents a fundamental shift in political ontology, and therefore at security 
professionals’ concept of the human (Dillon 2007, 2008). Where liberal law and 
disciplinary regimes revolved around various notions of a whole human, defined by 
labor, language, or signification, Dillon argues that risk-based power/knowledge regimes 
model the biopolitical governance as a transactional space. In this transactional space, 
neither the biological species being nor the moral individual are the primary objects of 
intervention. Instead, risk modeling defines this transactional space in terms of networks, 
associations, and patterns between digitized pieces of information.  Represented by credit 
card transactions, travel patterns, and criminal records, life in this transactional space 
unfolds through the circulation of commodified goods, the connections between people 
and things, and the spontaneous emergence of disruptions.  More a digital aggregate than 
an individual, a “person” exists only insofar as s/he is related to the circulation of goods 
and services. The connections and associations produced by this circulatory existence 
map, therefore, a terrain of continually shifting possibilities (see also Amoore 2009). 
Seeking to calculate and control risk, homeland security has become, Dillon argues, a 
science of contingency, through which security professionals deploy ever-more 
sophisticated algorithms at a shifting terrain of possibilities. As security agencies link 
nationality, religion, language, and dress to risk profiles, people become threatening in 
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and through their connections to suspicious places, people, and things.  Weaving risk 
analysis into immigration and border enforcement, these risk-based modeling practices 
produce a political ontology of connection, circulation and contingency, and a subject 
that is more a risk-pooled cohort than a whole moral individual or liberal subject.  
 For penologists, however, risk management does not represent a leaving behind of 
imprisonment or disciplinary technologies, but reconfigures the prison’s transformative 
function.   Actuarial approaches to crime control produced a shift—if a halting, 
incomplete, and discordant one—from rehabilitative approaches to imprisonment towards 
to the segregation of risky populations from safe ones. The purpose of imprisonment is 
no longer to return reformed individuals to society, but to contain risky populations for 
the sake of public safety (Feeley and Simon 1992, Garland 2001). Furthermore, criminal 
history determines access to citizenship benefits, and adjudication has been replaced by 
an administrative criminal justice system with wide discretionary authority. As states 
respond to the pressures to protect their citizens from the negative effects of neoliberal 
globalization and state security agencies scrutinize transnational mobility, policy-makers 
have framed immigration both as an issue of social order/crime control and national 
security. In this context, a person’s guilt, innocence, or political identity is secondary to 
state security agencies’ efforts to segregate, contain, and control risky populations.  In 
addition, administrative boards decide sentencing and parole, so that punishment’s 
distribution has become largely an administrative matter, separate from the adjudication 
processes that (nominally) guarantee due process.  Placing authority with administrative 
rather than judicial bodies, the criminal justice system has come to resemble the 
immigration system. While it has become commonplace in the US to refer to the 
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“criminalization of immigration,” the concurrent “immigrationization of crime” and 
“criminalization of immigration” indicate, Miller argues, the emergence of “a new system 
of social control that draws from immigration and criminal justice, but is purely neither” 
(Miller 2002-3, 618). What we may be witnessing is not just a blurring of domestic and 
foreign policy (Coleman 2008b), a threshold or a mobius strip folding inside into outside 
(Bigo 2001), but the generalization of confinement as a spatial practice of neoliberal 
biopolitical governmentality (Peck 2004, 392).   
 What do we make, then, of detention’s strategy of bodily confinement alongside 
digitized risk analysis technologies, like biometric data collection, identity management, 
digital imaging, and databanking? How do we square detention’s blunt instruments with 
these diffuse, less invasive surveillance technologies? And conceptually, how does 
detention’s disciplinary legacy diverge from or cohere with the aforementioned 
biopolitical technologies? Dillon’s analysis distinguishes between disciplinary, legal, and 
risk-based subjects, yet securitized spaces continue to require legible subjects (Martin 
2010). Studies of risk-based national security practices have, for the most part, avoided 
questions of disciplinarity, choosing instead to focus on emerging biopolitical 
assemblages. Without reducing detention centers to disciplinary institutions, detention 
scholars have noted, however, how key aspects of Foucauldian discipline remain 
important to border and immigration enforcement.  
 For Mountz (2010), detention belongs to a spectrum of containment practices: 
categorization, physical enclosure of detention centers, performances of strong state 
responses to migration, and strategic in/visibilities. She details, further, the ways in which 
“feeling watched” defines migrants’ lives and border-crossings experiences, even when 
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they obtain legalized status. For Mountz, this spectrum of containment practices work to 
produce migrant identities even where state immigration authorities are not present. 
Coutin, similarly, illuminates how US immigration enforcement practices confine 
noncitizens’ movements before, during, and after their detention and deportation (2010). 
Faced with stigmatization in the US and in the countries to which they are deported, 
migrants internalize judgment, criminalization, and restricted mobility of the detention 
center. They, in turn, stay close to home, restricting their own mobility.  Post-entry 
deportability also works as a form of social control for noncitizens. As Coleman (2008a) 
has shown, noncitizens can be excluded after they have been admitted, judged by both 
actions (e.g., criminal charges) and characteristics (e.g., homosexuality). That is, the 
border inspection haunts the post-entry landscape of noncitizen residency. De Genova 
(2002) argues that deportability’s (and detainability’s) indeterminacy is far more 
conducive to producing a docile labor force than the 100% deportation DRO envisions. 
Thus, as a site of surveillance’s performance and internalization, the detention’s 
disciplinary power works through a double movement of spectacle and subjectification 
that reverberate far beyond the detention center itself (c.f. Elden 2001; Foucault 2007, pp. 
107-110). 
 Modulating imprisonment with risk management has not, therefore, made the 
prison nor disciplinarity less important, nor have they been superceded by biopolitical 
security practices.  Rather, as I hope to show below, disciplinary techniques—
categorization, spatial partitioning, hierarchical ordering—have long been remodulated to 
provide the spatial ordering, visibility, and models of correct behavior necessary for a 
society “governed through freedom” (Rose 1999).  Releasing the prison from its reform 
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imperatives (Garland 2001), physical confinement is portable social risk mitigation 
strategy; prisons are recombinant institutions and confinement a versatile risk 
management practice. Aimed at inherently mobile, transnational, and connected 
populations, this “geopolitics of mobility” combines nominally domestic public policy, 
immigration law, and exceptional executive powers to secure particular territorial orders. 
Interdiction, dispersal, transfers between detention centers, voluntary return, forced 
repatriation, and off-shore detention locate detention in a different relation to receiving 
countries’ sovereign territory. Foreigners’ detention is, as Bigo (2007)  argues, the price 
of security, as illiberal border zones are essential to the liberal governance.  Linked to an 
assemblage of surveillance, policing, profiling, and forced mobility practices, detention is 
a key spatial strategy in the US’ mapping of national and global space.    
  
CRIMINALIZATION, SECURITIZATION, AND TERRITORIAL 
VULNERABILITY 
 As various immigrants have been understood as the primary source of “internal 
enemies” and threats to national security, tying noncitizen detention to US geopolitical 
positioning. In the case of Chinese exclusion at the turn of the 19th century and Japanese 
internment during World War II, detention and deportation policies were explicitly racial 
and ethnic. Immigrants—as opposed to non-permanent residents—have been variously 
understood as racial, religious, linguistic, and ideological threats that cannot be distinctly 
separated from efforts to establish particular territorial and geopolitical orders (Nagel 
2002; Tesfahuney 1998).  Following a series of large refugee influxes (such as the 1980 
migration of 125,000 Cubans to Florida) and a growing public perception of the southern 
border as “out of control,” the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 
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instituted the first criminal penalties for immigration–related crimes into immigration law 
(Pub.L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359).  In the decade following, immigration law became more 
punitive, and the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) institutionalized mandatory detention for a broad range of documented and 
undocumented migrants (Pub.L. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546). In particular, the 
bill broadened the category of “aggravated felony” and created the Expedited Removal 
(ER) program. In particular, IIRIRA broadened the category of “aggravated felony” to 
include a range of petty crimes and worked retroactively. This ever-expanding list of 
“aggravated felonies” funneled noncitizens with criminal records—both recent and long 
past—into mandatory detention.  Further, the Expedited Removal (ER) program 
deputized INS (and now ICE) officers to issue deportation orders to undocumented 
migrants apprehended at ports of entry with limited court oversight.  Migrants in ER 
processing became subject to mandatory detention. Noncitizens in the US face, as a 
result, expanded spaces of policing and shrinking judicial oversight since the mid-1980s 
(Coleman 2007). Even while administrative detention is not technically considered 
punishment for immigration-related infractions, mandatory detention both practically and 
symbolically linked immigration status to criminality.  
Detaining Children 
Migration-related detention took an exclusively penal form in the US, which 
created specific problems for detaining families. Old army barracks, former prisons, 
existing prisons and jails, and a range of impromptu holding areas produce a highly 
uneven landscape of detention (Dow 2005, Welch 2002). Unaccompanied children were 
often detained in these facilities, languishing for long periods without legal representation 
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or the ability to navigate the adversarial legal system on their own (Women’s Refugee 
Commission 2002). In 1997, Flores v. Meese required the INS to stop holding minors in 
restrictive facilities, and to release them to family members or sponsors (Flores v. Meese 
Settlement 1997). The lawsuit also stipulated access to education, counseling, medical 
and dental care, recreation, and state child welfare institutions, effectively creating a 
separate INS custody system for children. In the 1990s, the INS routinely released 
families with “Notices to Appear” (NTA) before an immigration judge, but, as I show 
below, releasing “vulnerable populations” came to be understood as a “procedural 
vulnerability” in the immigration enforcement system. In cases where parents had 
criminal convictions or fell into mandatory detention categories, the INS often detained 
parents and children separately (Women’s Refugee Commission 2007). The problem of 
family of where to detain families arose, therefore, from contradictions between 
mandatory detention of parents and INS’ inability to detain children in penal facilities.   
The Detention and Removal Office’s Endgame strategy specifically laments the 
lack of Flores-compliant, child-appropriate facilities, and notes that the lack of “soft 
facilities” for low-risk detainees impedes DRO’s 100% removal target (US Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement 2003).  In similar statements, Secretary of Homeland Security 
Michael Chertoff observed: 
There are certain housing needs that are required when you have children. We're 
working … to find a way to solve those housing needs so that when family groups 
come across, we have the ability to detain them as well, until we can remove 
them.  And, we don't release them into the community where, more likely than 
not, they're going to abscond. (Department of Homeland Security 2006b).  
91 
 
As with smuggling and border “illegalities” more broadly, DHS and ICE couched family 
release as a (potential) vector of illegality: “by expanding Expedited Removal to cover 
illegal alien families, DHS is closing down a loophole that has been exploited by human 
smugglers and helping stop future illegal immigration” (US Department of Homeland 
Security 2006). Migrating families represented not only an opportunity for terrorists, but 
were framed as uniformly illegal. Families’ exceptional status came to be viewed as an 
entry point for potential terrorists.  Perceived as vulnerabilities, ICE’s previous policies 
and procedures became categorical pathways into and out of the US, and legal status and 
smuggling logistics became vectors of threat in the same complex system. For DHS, the 
problem of detaining “low-risk” noncitizens was a matter of infrastructural suitability, 
rather than a conflict between legal precedent, humanitarian need, and “catch and 
remove.”  
INS responded to these difficulties by detaining families in a variety of ad hoc 
facilities, such as guarded hotel rooms, and Berks opened as the first dedicated family 
detention center in March 2001. Housing only 84 beds, Berks did not accommodate all 
families apprehended by ICE, and as of 2001, ICE had not developed overarching family 
detention or release policies to guide its field offices. Families’ treatment varied widely, 
therefore, between border checkpoints, ports of entry, and INS field offices, and the 
agency continued to release most families encountered at the US-Mexico border with 
NTAs.  When Berks opened, the INS announced plans to open Berks-like facilities across 
the US, to accommodate the larger number of families seeking asylum (Schmitt 2001, 
Rosin 2001).   
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 Detention and the War on Terror 
 During the flurry of security policy-making after 11 September, 2001, 
immigration law’s wide administrative authority to detain and deport quickly became a 
strategic legal component in US domestic counter-terrorism operations (explored in more 
detail in Chapter 7).  Attorney General John Ashcroft expanded INS detention rules in 
lieu of obtaining real authority to preemptively detain terrorist suspects. Immigration and 
Naturalization Services, and the then-new Department of Homeland Security after it, 
targeted noncitizens, Arabs and Muslims for increased surveillance and self-reporting, 
and many were detained and eventually deported through these “voluntary reporting 
programs” (Aldana 2004, Nguyen 2005). ICE detained others under the pretenses of 
immigration investigations, allowing counter-terrorism officials more time to investigate 
potential criminal charges. ICE detained others under the pretenses of immigration 
investigations, allowing counter-terrorism officials more time to investigate potential 
criminal charges. Ashcroft also stiffened asylum’s evidenciary requirements, which made 
it more difficult for political refugees to seek protection in the United States. In other 
cases, the INS and ICE enforced long-ignored clauses in immigration law, such as an 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) clause requiring noncitizens to report address 
changes within 10 days of a move. ICE (and the INS before it) did not have the resources 
or procedures to keep track of the address change forms it demanded, so that bureaucratic 
mismanagement landed many authorized residents in detention (Miller 2002-3). Without 
reconfiguring immigration law’s admission and exclusion principles, executive branch 
agencies exploited immigration officers’ administrative authority to make enforcement 
policy, especially their discretionary powers to detain noncitizens without court 
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oversight, charges, or evidence.  These policy recalibrations embedded immigration 
enforcement in an emerging security-driven institutional context.  Administrative 
immigration detention became, therefore, a key spatial strategy in the domestic War on 
Terror, though it operated with considerably less public visibility than the military’s 
administrative detentions.   
 Against this backdrop of expanded administrative detention, DHS reframed 
border and immigration enforcement to become synonymous and interchangeable with 
counter-terrorism. The border-crossers and drug traffickers of 2000 became potential 
conduits for terrorist operations:  
Prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the primary focus of the Border Patrol was on 
illegal aliens, alien smuggling, and narcotics interdictions.… After 9/11, it was 
apparent that smugglers’ methods, routes, and modes of transportation are 
potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited by terrorists and result in terrorist 
weapons illegally entering the United States… [T]he potential exists for a single 
individual or small group to cross the border undetected with biological or 
chemical weapons, weapons of mass effect, or other implements of terrorism. 
(Emphasis added, US Customs and Border Protection 2004, 4) 
Emphasizing smugglers’ strategic invisibility, transportation infrastructure, and pathways 
across the border and back, CBP’s border became not a line, secured through a series of 
barriers, but a complex of networks, material assets, and wealth.  Incorporating networks 
into CBP’s concept of the border, undocumented labor migration became a condition of 
possibility for terrorist attacks and constituted, in the context of the War on Terror, a 
significant territorial vulnerability. ICE’s investigative sub-agencies focused on tracking 
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and freezing trafficking assets, which included detaining and criminally charging 
smugglers. ICE’s investigative sub-agencies focused on tracking and freezing trafficking 
assets, which included detaining and criminally charging smugglers. As “illegal 
migration” came to be understood as a conduit, transboundary mobility itself came to be 
understood as a pre-condition for terrorist activity, and border and immigration 
enforcement as preempting certain conditions of possibility for another attack.    
“Catch and Remove” 
 Learning from its 1994 “Prevention through Deterrence” Southwest Border 
Strategy, CBP asserted that “the proper mix of assets increases the ‘certainty of 
apprehension’ of those intending to illegally cross our borders,” which “has established a 
deterrent effect in targeted locations” (Customs and Border Protection 2004, pp.8, 9). 
These “mission alignment” efforts linked border security to interior immigration 
enforcement and prosecution efforts in new ways.  ICE’s Office of Detention and 
Removal Operations, as mentioned in this paper’s opening, sought to “deport all 
deportable aliens” and to “support DHS efforts to deter illegal migration” (US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2003, p. ii).  Integrating these then-new agency 
missions into SBI, DHS rolled out a bundle of border surveillance technologies (SBInet), 
increased border patrols, and expanded Expedited Removal’s time, space, and 
applicability. DHS expanded ER from ports of entry to zones within 100 miles of the 
southern or coastal borders, and to all transboundary migrants caught within 14 days of 
arrival. “Ending catch and release policy,” DHS targeted “Other Than Mexicans” 
(OTMs), especially Central American migrants who could not be immediately deported 
and for whom the INS and then DRO did not have sufficient detention space (Department 
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of Homeland Security 2006b).  As more migrants became detainable, and then detained, 
confinement came to occupy an increasingly important role in DHS’ attempts to manage 
“illegal pathways” and flows.  Expanding detainability and bedspace required a series of 
legal, administrative, and infrastructural changes and concretized detention’s increasingly 
important institutional location in immigration and border enforcement. 
 By creating new detainable populations nearly over night, “catch and remove” 
produced an immediate detention bed shortage. To address this shortfall, DHS opened a 
number of new, primarily private detention centers in the southwest United States, 
contracted with county jails through Inter-Governmental Services Agreements (IGSAs), 
and added beds to existing ICE facilities.  While the 596 family beds represented a small 
percentage of this total, family detention’s story reveals three key elements of these 
changes.  First, DHS addressed the SBI-produced family detention space shortage by 
opening the T. Don Hutto Family Residential Facility (Hutto hereafter), a 512-bed 
medium security prison, owned and operated by the Corrections Corporation of America 
(CCA) in Taylor, Texas. As of September 2009, ICE owned six detention centers; of the 
remaining 250+ detention centers, 14 are private, dedicated detention facilities, and the 
remaining 240 hold noncitizens in mixed facilities that hold both convicted prisoners and 
civil immigration detainees, as described in Chapter 4. Second, Hutto operates under an 
Inter-Governmental Service Agreement (IGSA) between ICE and Williamson County, 
Texas’ Commissioners’ Court, who in turn contracted with CCA to operate Hutto.  Both 
privatized and devolved to local government, Hutto’s contractual relationships are typical 
of the complex of jurisdictional delegations and deferred liabilities that dominate the 
detention sector.  Third, almost two-thirds of Hutto’s families came from Central 
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America, and fell into DHS’ new categories of detainability (Coutin 2010).  Mexican 
families represented 3% of the total between May 1, 2006 and June 23, 2009, while 
Salvadoran families were 29%, Honduran families 25%, and Guatemalan families 20% 
(Figure 5.1, 5.2). Family detention succeeded then, in drawing new populations into the 
detention system, even if these groups do represent a large percentage of border crossers 
annually.    
Figure 5.1: Number of Adults and Minors Detained from May 1, 2006 to June 23, 
2009 at the T. Don Hutto Family Residential Facility, by Country of Citizenship. 
 
 
(Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Responsive Materials to American 
Civil Liberties Union Freedom of Information Act Request.  On file with author.) 
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Figure 5.2: Percentage of Total Families Detained at T. Don Hutto from May 1, 
2006 to June 23, 2009, by Country of Origin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Responsive Materials to American 
Civil Liberties Union Freedom of Information Act Request.  On file with author.) 
 
While Hutto was not exceptional in the juridical and political-economic landscape 
described above, DHS focused on the facility’s “success” in detaining families, and used 
the policy to represent the efficacy of the “catch and remove” policy as a whole:  
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of non-Mexican aliens apprehended along the border were being detained. In 
May, ICE opened a new 500-bed facility in Williamson County, Texas that is 
specially equipped to meet family needs. In August 2006, only 28 family units 
were released, compared with 820 in the month before the facility opened; a 97 
percent decline in family releases on the southern border. (US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement 2008d) 
These statistics mask the fact that many of Hutto’s families were not apprehended at the 
border, but elsewhere within the United States.  For example, one mother was detained 
with her child when she arrived to pick her/him up from the Division of Unaccompanied 
Children’s Services, a Department of Justice agency charged with noncitizen children’s 
custody (Interview 2008). Further, a majority of detained families file for asylum and are 
granted political asylum in the United States (America’s Family Prison interviews 2007, 
Interview 2008). They are not, therefore, deportable, but their detention comes to stand in 
for and imply mass deportation, and as Coutin argues, is “designed to convince migrants 
that they are on their way out” (Coutin 2010, 5). The excerpt implies, further, that Hutto’s 
500 beds remain filled, when the San Antonio Field Office Director admitted that far 
fewer families appeared at the southern border than expected, and adult women filled half 
the facility from 2007 onwards (In re: Hutto Detention Center, Deposition of Marc 
Moore).  
As a spectacular and strategic representation of “success,” family detention served 
as a metonymic performance of the detention system as a whole.  Using the relatively 
small and more easily apprehended group to represent non-Mexican migration as a 
whole, family detention performed DHS’ hardened sensitivity to humanitarian 
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migrations. Beyond these performances of strong state power, however, detention works 
on noncitizen populations in a number of ways that cannot be reduced to deportation or 
disciplinary norms of imprisonment.  Detention combines a range of geographical 
imaginings, as I described above, and spatial practices that mediate detainees’ 
relationships to themselves, each other, and to networks “on the outside.” Rather than 
opposing detention’s geopolitical role to its application, i.e. policy to practice, detention 
works through an heterogenous and often contradictory combination of spatial practices.   
Hoping to “catch and remove” existing undocumented migrants and to deter 
future migrations, detention is as much a spectacle of state power as it is an enforcement 
tactic (Andreas 2000). ICE’s attempts to create a purely “lawful” national territory are, 
therefore, bound up with ICE’s attempts to discipline potential migrants. Ironically, 
intensifying border and immigration enforcement often encourages smuggling operations, 
as those seeking to cross the border increasingly require assistance to cross highly 
patrolled and remote areas (Cornelius 2001, Hing 2001, Nevins and Aizeki 2009). As 
others have argued, border and immigration enforcement practices often produce the so-
called problem of illegality they ostensibly intended to solve (Massumi 2005, 
Bialasciewicz et al., 2007, Martin and Simon 2008). Working to secure national 
populations by changing the behavior of an abstract, global population of potential 
migrants, detention intertwines the disciplining of individuals and populations with 
geopolitical mappings of global space. 
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DETENTION’S DISCIPLINARITY: ISOLATION, ORDERING, AND 
CRIMINALIZATION 
ICE’s legal authority and institutional position does not, however, capture 
detention’s full effect on detained families, nor facility-specific policies and practices. It 
is the quotidian ordering of bodies, space, and time within detention centers that 
constitutes the practice as a spatial strategy.  While I described how ICE links detention 
to border and counter-terrorism policing above, daily life in detention is, for most 
detainees, managed by non-federal actors and unfolds through a host of other practices. 
At Hutto, for example, CCA coordinates visitation, head count, telephone, recreation, 
education and detainee work policies. They stock and set prices for commissary items, 
including phone cards.  The embodied practice of detention unfolds through a diverse set 
of material practices that cannot be collapsed with the geopolitical imaginings that 
comprise ICE’s “catch and remove” policies.  Yet for detained noncitizens—families, in 
this case—it is the daily spatio-temporal ordering that dominates their experience.  As I 
show below, detention’s disciplinarity works through location, isolation, criminalization, 
and forced mobility, a combination of spatial practices that both perform state power and 
changed the ways in which detained parents and children understood themselves.   
Location 
 In choosing between two sites to house the second family detention center, an 
internal report mentioned Hutto’s proximity to a strong immigrant advocacy community: 
“Austin, which is 25 miles from Hutto, has a broader NGO and CBO base that have 
typically been very strong advocates for immigrants. The Political Asylum Project of 
Austin also known as PAPA is a pro bono agency actively involved in advocacy for 
immigrants” (Emphasis in original, Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. Anonymous 
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Memorandum). (PAPA, now known as American Gateways, is one of the few entirely 
pro bono legal organizations in Austin and does not engage in lobbying or political 
advocacy.) Hutto, however, was selected, indicating a degree of both conflict and 
improvisation among ICE decision-makers.  What these internal evaluations reveal is that 
ICE is acutely aware of detainees’ relationships to surrounding communities. Valuing 
isolation/connectedness to surrounding communities and supporting institutions as a 
negative geographical characteristic implies a concerted effort to remove detainees’ rights 
“by geographical design” (Mountz 2010).  Hutto’s proximity to Austin does not 
overcome the fact, however, that the facility is functionally separate from Taylor, 
serviced by a single asphalt road, and hidden from town by a large railroad depot.  
Bordered by softball fields, a state highway, and agricultural land, the former prison is 
virtually invisible to most of Taylor. Thus, detaining noncitizens in remote detention 
centers serves to both manage noncitizen flows and to enclose “illegal” populations from 
“legal” ones, a practice that attempts to create territorial orders based on legal status and 
im/mobility.  
Length of Confinement 
 For migrants seeking to stay in the US, detention is a long series of medical 
exams, intake interviews, mental health check-ups (more available at Hutto than any 
other detention center), and court appearances interspersed with indefinite waiting 
periods.  Showers, meals, headcounts, and recreation time pace the days of waiting for 
decisions, appeals, and release dates.  While ICE opened Hutto to receive families in 
Expedited Removal, most of Hutto’s families applied for asylum, which removed them 
from the average 30-day ER processing, and placed them in a much longer series of 
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interviews and hearings.  Further, fewer families arrived than expected, and ICE detained 
non-ER families at Hutto, as well.  Immigration and asylum case management is 
distributed among 2 DHS agencies (ICE, Citizenship and Immigration Services) and the 
Department of Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR). So while 
asylum-seeking families became eligible for release after passing their credible fear 
interviews, immigration judges set bond and field office directors set parole.  Many 
families arrived with few resources to pay the $1-7,000 bond and parole costs, and asked 
for these amounts to be reduced.  Their files travelled, therefore, from CBP (for those 
detained at the border), to ICE, to an immigration judge, to CIS, and back to ICE and an 
immigration judge. Each court appearance, request, and decision in the release process, 
which runs separately from their asylum decision process, took weeks, so that even the 
most fortunate of families spent months in detention (Interview 2008).  
 While Hutto’s families were able to take advantage of the nearby pro bono legal 
services described above, detainees’ lack of legal knowledge and services protract their 
legal cases.  As one detained parent stated, “When you’re inside, you don’t know nothing 
about the law, you don’t know nothing what is going on. So everything some guy tell 
you, you believe it, whether is true or false, you believe it. Because no one will tell you 
what is your right” (America’s Family Prison Interview 2007). Without sufficient funds 
for bond/parole, Hutto’s early residents spent up to 11 months at Hutto, until a federal 
lawsuit required ICE to review families’ eligibility for release monthly (In re: Hutto 
Settlement 2007). This situation is not unique to Hutto, as Berks’ families and adult 
asylum-seekers have spent years in detention (Women’s Refugee Commission 2007). Fed 
up with long detention stays, some detainees chose to sign voluntary deportation orders 
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and forego legitimate claims and return home in order to avoid continued detention.  
Long detention stays compounded the sense of physical isolation, as detained families’ 
felt more removed from their families, and more anxious about their potential removal.  
Isolation 
 For detainees, family relationships spanned beyond Hutto’s fenced perimeter and 
included kinship networks in the US and abroad.  Some families were settled into 
marriage with US citizens, while others had both close and distant connections with 
family members with refugee, asylum, legal permanent resident, and undocumented 
status. Thus, Hutto’s enduring isolation, phone, visitation, and disciplinary policies 
shaped families’ relationships to undetained family and friends.  ICE sets minimum 
detention conditions standards for its contractors, but these standards have no legal 
“teeth.” That is, they are non-binding guidance documents and do not constitute legal 
obligations, nor rights or entitlements.  CCA (a for-profit firm) sets phone card and 
commissary prices and sales that detainees can purchase either with their own money or 
CCA’s $1/day work opportunities.  In many cases, however, phone cards are 
prohibitively expensive or unavailable. One detainee, held for seven months, reported:  
You buy a phone card, about $10 or $20 and you get 10 minutes, and that’s only 
inside the US.  Outside it’s going to be less [fewer minutes]. I think I talked to my 
family about two times only. So I didn’t have much contact because the card was 
too expensive. I was missing my family….Because before I was released, there 
was a war in [my country]. And I didn’t know where they are, how can I connect 
with them, if they’re okay (America’s Family Prison, Interview 2007). 
For ICE, detaining parents and children together constituted family unity, but for detained 
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families, contact with their families members in the United States and abroad mitigated 
the isolation of detention and helped them manage their cases. Another detained parent 
testified to the following in the 2007 lawsuit against Hutto’s detention practices:  
We have not been able to purchase phone cards for about a week, and when I 
asked about it, I was told by the officer, we have more important things to do 
rather than worry about your calling cards.  Without the phone card, I'm cut off 
from anyone who can support me. That is not family friendly. I can't even talk to 
my family. The Hutto overview says the facility operates in accordance with 
certain standards. The CCA and ICE run the facility to suit themselves. (In re: 
Hutto Detention Center Transcript of the Injunction for Equitable Relief, 21)   
For this parent, communication sustains family relationships, and the control over—and 
neglect of—this communication revealed the asymmetrical power relationships at work 
between ICE, CCA, and detained families. 
 For those families who could afford to visit, Hutto’s visitation policies disrupted 
families’ physical intimacy, as the traditional plexi-glass separators prevented physical 
contact.  This was particularly difficult for families who travelled long distances, and 
found they were able to visit with their relatives for an hour (and sometimes less) at a 
time.  For detainees, the ordering of these visits, their uniforms and identity bracelets, 
stigmatized them as criminals before their families, an intensely humiliating experience:   
If my sister or my mother came to visit, the children and I would not be allowed 
to hug them or even to talk directly to them. We would have to stay on the other 
side of the glass and talk to them through the phone. I could not bear for my 
family to see me and my children in jail like we are criminals trapped on the other 
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side of a plexiglass wall, talking only through phone in the wall. That would be so 
sad and upsetting that we have told our relatives not to visit us at Hutto. (In re: 
Hutto Detention Center, Declaration of Deka Warsame, 7.) 
Hutto’s visitation room now curtains these plexi-glass windows, and women currently 
detained at Hutto retain the contact visits families won in the Hutto Settlement in 2007. 
These visits are still overseen by CCA guards and limited to one hour, but are far more 
hospitable than visitation polices in other adult facilities (which indicates that these 
dynamics are likely more acute elsewhere in the detention system).  In conversations with 
detained women, however, the stigma of criminalized detention remains, and some still 
refuse visits from family members (Fieldnotes March 2010). As Ruth Gilmore has 
argued, families “on the outside” do time with their imprisoned loved ones, producing 
emotional and financial effects that reverberate far beyond Hutto’s chain link fences 
(Gilmore 2007). Thus, while detention centers’ enclosure creates a partitioned 
cartography, the regulation of detainees’ access to “the outside” bears down on networks 
of care.  
Criminalization 
 The symbolic economy of detention relies upon archetypal imprisonment 
practices, familiarized through popular representations of criminality.  “Feeling like 
criminals,” parents and children both internalized and rejected their de facto punishment, 
as reflected throughout these quotes.  Children, for example, acted out the process of 
being released, enrolling dolls as detainees, ICE officers, and lawyers (Interview 2008).  
One parent recounted how her children stopped asking her for things, even after they had 
been released. The “criminalization” of immigration enforcement unfolds not only 
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through institutional linkages between the criminal justice and immigration systems, but 
permeates the selection of detention centers, their internal spatio-temporal ordering, and 
detainees’ relationships to surrounding communities and their kinship networks. 
Detention’s disciplinarity works through the imbrication of public performance, the 
controlled circulation of noncitizen bodies, and the scripting of detainees as prisoners; it 
is thoroughly relational, presuming certain connectivities while wearing down others.   
Forced Mobility: Transfers 
 Family detention diverges from broader detention trends in one important aspect: 
inter-facility transfers. I note this here, because frequent transfers impact adult detainees’ 
relationships to their families, legal representation, and communities as much as isolation, 
spatial enclosure, and criminalization. With two family detention centers, and now one, 
detained families’ only transfers are from short-term CBP facilities to Hutto or Berks. In 
2008, however, ICE transferred 52.4% of its detainees, up from 19.6% in 1999. In 
addition, ICE transferred 24% of its detainees multiple times (compared to 5.6% in 1999; 
Human Rights Watch 2009). Some detainees report being transferred six times over the 
course of their detention (Del Bosque 2010). Considering that detention rates reached 
369,483 in 2009 (and are expected to reach 400,000 in 2010), transfers require an entire 
transportation and logistics system all their own.   This reveals, I think, that ICE’s 
detention system utilizes forced mobility and relocation as much as confinement.   
 While isolation diminishes legal access, legal scholar Nancy Morawetz (2005) has 
shown how ICE often transfers detainees to federal district courts that refuse to hear 
habeas corpus complaints through which detainees constitutionally challenge their 
detention, in order to ensure removal. Recent Supreme Court decisions state that 
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detainees must file habeas corpus claims in the jurisdiction in which they are detained; 
since ICE retains discretion over all detainee transfers, ICE effectively chooses the venue 
for habeas claims. Louisiana’s Federal District Court refuses to hear habeas cases, 
deferring to ICE in every case, even though other district courts commonly hear these 
challenges and grant release. Transferring detainees between facilities allows ICE 
manipulate “due process,” exploiting the US Federal Court’s uneven legal geography to 
attain its desired legal outcomes. The remote location and arbitrary forced mobility 
between facilities undermine detainees’ ability to retain lawyers, receive family support, 
or build relationships with fellow detainees (Dow 2005, Del Bosque 2010).  ICE is 
known to transfer or seclude detainees who attempt to organize politically, and to move 
known organizers frequently to prevent them from establishing relationships with new 
groups of detainees.  So while facility operators mediate detainees’ relationships to their 
families and surrounding communities, ICE’s repeated and frequent transfers further 
destabilize detainees’ relationships to each other. These affective and emotional 
connections are of a different character than the transboundary conduits or risky 
populations, yet detention bears down on them in ways that resonate.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 Detention is not a single spatial practice of confinement, but a combination of 
textual policy discourses, knowledge practices, geographical imaginaries, and material 
orderings.   Through “catch and remove” policy’s geopolitical design, ICE may imagine a 
purified legal cartography of externalized, illegal others and documented, legalized 
persons, but this dream of purified community does not determine the material conditions 
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of actual detention centers. Instead, detention practices stitch together a range of 
geographical imaginings, bureaucratic improvisation, and institutional legacies from the 
criminal justice system.  And even while detention depresses families’ communication 
and visits, and Hutto’s interior ordering restricts personal mobility, neither are detained 
noncitizens entirely locked down or enclosed from national space.  Rather, on the one 
hand, ICE’s discretionary transfers keep them in forced circulation, and on the other 
hand, detainees do organize inside detention centers, make connections with community 
members, and contest their detentions.  ICE may seek to minimize territorial vulnerability 
long the border, and embed confinement in complex system of digital surveillance and 
risk analysis, but those detained produce detention discourses, as well, both through 
everyday embodied routines and in their own narratives of it. Private corrections firm 
employees perform detention, as do ICE policy-makers, detainees’ attorneys, families, 
and surrounding communities.  Detention is, I have emphasized, a heterogenous 
assemblage of knowledge practices, geographical imaginings, geopolitical designs, 
infrastructure, institutions, daily routines, and media representations.  
 What I hope my analysis illuminates is that, in a particular way, disciplinary 
relations of power haunt confinement and security practices.  Neither ICE nor CCA may 
seek to reform detained families, but family members react to and remake themselves 
through the process of their criminalization.  Detention policies may not seek to remake 
detainees, but ICE does hope family detention deters future migration.  Through the 
spectacle of confinement, ICE seeks to perform its response to crisis and the inevitability 
of deportation.  As a deterrence strategy, detention figures a transnational field of 
potential, future migrants, subjects that calculate the risk of border crossing and seek to 
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maximize their returns on migration.  For Mountz (2010), this arrangement produces a 
“transnational panopticism” through which migrants also produce surveillant state power 
by presuming its omniscience.  Immigration geopolitics works through, therefore, the 
recalibration of disciplinary relations of power with emergent risk ontologies and security 
institutions.  So while constructing a whole, human individual is no longer the purpose of 
confinement, detention does make relational, circulating, connected subjects that cannot 
be reduced to the risk-pooled cohort alone. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE GEOPOLITICS OF VULNERABILITY: CHILD-OBJECTS, 
MIGRANT-SUBJECTS, AND IMMIGRATION LAW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In April 2007, a group of lawyers sued the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) for detaining children at the T. Don Hutto Family Detention Center, a former 
medium-security prison in Taylor, Texas (Bunikyte et al. v Chertoff et al. 2007).  Citing 
Hutto’s prison-like conditions, the plaintiffs argued that the facility violated noncitizen 
children’s protections under an existing legal settlement, Flores v. Meese (1997), which 
granted minors in federal immigration custody with the right to release, unrestrictive 
environments, and a range of services unavailable in adult facilities.  Because ICE 
detained parents and children together at Hutto, the case revolved, in particular, around 
the spatiality of children’s legal protections in the immigration system.  Specifically, the 
parties to Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. debated whether existing law confined 
children’s protections to children’s bodies, or included the relationships and spaces that 
constitute “home-like environments.” Immigration law endows ICE with wide “discretion 
to detain” noncitizens, and federal courts have limited power to intervene in immigration 
enforcement practices (Coleman 2007a; Varsanyi 2008).  Litigated in federal court (Fifth 
Circuit Western District), Buniktye became a site of struggle over the limits of both ICE’s 
discretion to detain noncitizen children and federal courts’ authority to challenge 
immigration enforcement practices.  This struggle unfolded through broader narratives of 
American territorial sovereignty, childhood development, and immigrant criminality and 
shows how immigration law (re)spatializes US geopolitical orders. I argue that debates 
about children’s rights in the immigration system—understudied in geographic research 
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on immigration, borders, and security—illuminate deeper struggles over executive power, 
the spatial practices of immigration enforcement, and immigration law.    
The case provides fresh empirical insights into the struggle over the role of 
judicial, executive, and civil rights in current US immigration law, but Bunikyte et al. V. 
Chertoff et al has wider implications for conceptualizing the spatiality of immigration law 
and its geopolitical designs.  Since 1889, US immigration policy has fallen to the 
legislative and executive branches of government, allowing them wide latitude to 
formulate admission and exclusion policies beyond the purview of the Constitution.  
Bunikyte’s transcripts demonstrate, as I show below, how positioning immigration as 
foreign policy authorizes ICE’s broad administrative discretion, and does so in and 
through federal court rulings. Immigration law-making is more than institutionally or 
jurisdictionally geopolitical, however. As I show below, “geostrategic thinking” (Ó 
Tuathail 2003) permeated the legal reasoning of both ICE and the federal judge, who 
used parents’ asylum claims to map a world of vague external danger, and then twisted 
children’s (essentialized) vulnerability with national security vulnerabilities, and 
“children’s best interests” with the “public interest in enforcing immigration laws.”  More 
broadly, the case elucidates the ways in which formal immigration law includes ad hoc 
mappings of (dangerous) global space, and how the blurring of these formal and informal 
geopolitical discourses legitimates the spatial practices of detention. 
  Children’s specific legal figurations illuminate the ways in which this geopolitics 
of vulnerability authorizes detention, family detention’s spatio-temporal ordering, and the 
policing practices that channel noncitizen’s into detention. Below, I first situate my 
analysis in recent work in immigration geopolitics, children’s rights, and feminist 
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political geography. In the second section, I trace out how current immigration law and 
precedent figure a  “child-object” rather than an agential “child-subject.”  Intriguingly, 
the presumed innocence and vulnerability of this child-object both restricts ICE’s ability 
to detain children and reinforces parents’ status as criminalized migrant-subjects.  The 
third section analyzes how the parties to Bunikyte et al v. Chertoff et al articulated 
different geopolitical visions in and through specific configurations of children’s and 
families’ legal subjectivity. I show how the plaintiffs’ attorneys argued that children’s 
right to release include family release and used children’s rights as the basis for more 
expansive family rights. ICE, for their part, argued that parents retained custody of 
children within Hutto, releasing the agency from its obligations to noncitizen children 
under Flores.  The judge, alternatively, argued that children’s rights to release did not 
extend to parents, but that ICE had legal custody of children at Hutto and was bound by 
Flores. In contrast to these formal legal arguments, parents’ descriptions of Hutto’s daily 
life challenged the easy bounding of legal rights to children, forming a counter-narrative 
to all three 'official' legal arguments. Approaching the practice of immigration law as a 
polyvocal site of struggle (Chouinard 1994), I will argue that immigration litigation is a 
critical site for feminist engagements with the geopolitics of mobility.  I argue that these 
geostrategic discourses spatially constitute a governmental regime that maximizes 
precarity for “them” while minimizing it for “us” (Butler 2009), producing what I call a 
“geopolitics of vulnerability.” 
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CONCEPTUALIZING  A GEOPOLITICS OF VULNERABILITY 
Children's Legal Subjectivity 
 Migrating children present immigration authorities with specific legal challenges 
that have not been taken into account in geographical research on detention or 
immigration geopolitics.  Children’s transboundary migration is rarely interrogated in 
geographical analyses of children’s legal subjectivity and political agency.  Recent work 
on children’s political participation has, however, contemplated the methodological 
difficulties studying children’s political agency (Bell 2008), and argued for a fuller 
conceptualization of the ways in which children actively make spaces (Aitken 2001; 
Bessant 2004; Jans 2004; Katz 2004; Leiter et al. 2006).  In immigration law, children’s 
immigration claims are solely derivative of parents’ claims (Thronson 2007-8), and for 
Bhabha (2003, 2009), this displacement of children’s ‘best interests’ produces a 
“citizenship deficit” through which children are rendered de facto stateless subjects. Yet, 
children’s rights and feminist scholars have cautioned against fetishizing existing legal 
regimes as sources of children’s empowerment, enfranchisement, or political 
participation, however. For example, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) contains an expansive set of entitlements for children, but its realization has been 
limited (Mayall 2006; Stasiulis 2002).  Ruddick argues, further, that the child-subject 
defined by “best interests” principles is “an impossible subject since, by liberal definition, 
the child cannot speak for him or herself without adult authorization” (Ruddick 2007a: 
514).  Intriguingly, some citizen children have been vocal spokespersons for their 
undocumented parents, a form of political theater that dramatizes the parents' 
displacement from their what is implicitly their proper role as family representatives 
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(Pallares 2009). While child-subjects are always already in a relation of dependence with 
a series of caregivers (Ruddick 2007a,b), the political agency of children is not materially 
confined to the child-object of immigration law or the partial subject of domestic family 
law.   
As Katz (2004) argues, analyzing children's paradoxical legal subjectivity 
evidences geopolitical processes difficult to see at other scales. At the margins of the 
nation-state, where liberal law is suspended for noncitizens, how do we understand the 
relationship between children and their caregivers, when immigration law considers 
parents aliens not persons?   How do we understand the position of the precarious child-
subject in the context of an immigration regime that suspends constitutional rights for 
adults? How do we understand children’s legal subjectivity where their immediate 
caregivers are not full liberal subjects either?  Where caregivers represent children in 
family and children's courts, Bunikyte's plaintiffs were children. Flores v. Meese (1997) 
created a contractual relationship between “minors in immigration custody” and 
immigration officials, while adults' alien status prevented them from federal court 
protections. Bunikyte reveals not only how US geopolitical agendas mobilize immigration 
law to create wide spaces of administrative discretion over noncitizens’ bodies, but that 
specific constructions of childhood and adulthood underly immigration law and 
enforcement policy. In the context of immigration geopolitics, these categorical 
differences are directly related to the spatialities of immigration enforcement: policing 
and arrests, detention center conditions and location, deportation decisions, and the 
embodied process of physical removal from the United States.  
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Immigration Geopolitics 
Beginning in 1889, the Supreme Court issued a series of rulings that the federal 
government held “inherent sovereign powers” to determine political membership--and 
exclusion--because otherwise it would be “subject to the control of another power” (Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States 1889, 603 quoted in Varsanyi 2008, 884).  Mobilizing 
“racialized narratives on the penetration of external menaces in national space through 
immigration” (Nagel 2002, 972) the Supreme Court considered noncitizens’ admission an 
issue of sovereign territorial power, enabling the limitation of judicial authority over 
immigration matters, and culminating in what is understood as the federal government's 
“plenary powers.”  Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893) took the plenary doctrine one 
step further, ruling that the federal government retained sovereign right to deport 
noncitizens from the territorial US without judicial intervention (Varsanyi 2008). Making 
noncitizens subject to rejection and deportation, plenary power over immigration treats 
noncitizens as “aliens” rather than “persons” (Varsanyi 2008).  Authorizing a separate 
immigration law regime, the plenary doctrine “works paradoxically through the law as it 
at once holds [constitutional] law at bay,” thereby suspending constitutional protections 
for noncitizens (Coleman 2007b, 62). In other words, noncitizens do not have recourse to 
the full gambit of constitutional protections when encountering the law as via the 
immigration system. Through this series of court decisions, federal courts made 
non/citizenship a discursive, legal, and political axis in a broader “geopolitics of 
mobility,” in which national elites used admission and exclusion policies to create 
specific politico-territorial orders (Coleman 2007b, 2008a,b; Hyndman 2004a; Nagel 
2002; Tesfahuney 1998).  The plenary doctrine of immigration authorized, therefore, the 
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suspension of noncitizen's constitutional protections—including the right to liberty—in 
the interests of national security.   
Criminalizing Asylum 
In addition, immigration officials have approached asylum-seekers with 
skepticism since the 1980s, when large numbers of Cuban and Haitian migrants arrived 
on Florida's shores.    The refugee resettlement and asylum system has long been charged 
with geopolitical bias (Cianciarulo 2007), and in the 1990s, immigration officials began 
to view asylum as an immigration strategy abused by “bogus” claimants (see also Coutin 
2003; Mountz 2010).  Following the 1996 immigration reforms, asylum-seekers faced 
indefinite detention while their claims were processed (Dow 2005). Current immigration 
policy categorizes asylum-seekers declaring themselves at ports of entry as “arriving 
aliens” until their claims are deemed credible by immigration officials.  In other words, 
asylum-seekers are classified as undocumented immigrants and thereby subject to 
mandatory detention. Once detained, “arriving aliens” are not eligible for release on 
bond, unlike undocumented migrants apprehended inside the United States.  The asylum-
seekers’ position is particularly difficult because they cannot claim asylum until they are 
physically in US territory and often cannot obtain valid travel documents from the 
countries they are fleeing.  Part of a global trend preventing and/or preempting asylum 
claims (Dikec 2009; Hyndman 2005; Hyndman and Mountz 2008), classifying asylum-
seekers as aliens suspends international protections afforded them and criminalizes 
undocumented arrival.  In this context, categorizing noncitizens has embodied and 
material effects on noncitizens' pathways into and out of the US detention system 
(Mountz 2004, Chapter 7). 
117 
 
Geostrategic Discourse  
In the context of this regime, administrative discretion and respatializing 
enforcement capacities, detention operates as a spatial strategy of containment and forced 
mobility imposed by federal immigration officials on noncitizens (Hyndman 2005). 
Visually containing noncitizen bodies and the problem of 'illegal immigration,' detention 
broadcasts state power in action, as discussed in Chapter.  Thus, enforcement’s spatial 
practices are critically linked to broader narratives of in/security.  Making “explicit 
claims about the material national security interests of the state across a world map 
characterized by state competition, threats and dangers,” this geostrategic thinking bases 
its claims in “transcendent national interests and existential security concerns” (Ó 
Tuathail 2003, 95). In Bunikyte in particular, ICE and the federal judge link “security 
vulnerabilities” to children's “special vulnerability,” and “national interests in enforcing 
immigration law “to “children's best interests,” suturing child and national protection 
together in ways that have little to do with the material well-being of the children 
detained at Hutto.       
A Geopolitics of Vulnerability  
 To flesh out this geopolitics of vulnerability, I analyze the ways in which federal 
actors deployed abstract, universalizing, and global discourses of vulnerability, threat, 
and sovereign right to marginalize the cases of 26 individual noncitizen child plaintiffs.   
Building on feminist political geography, this chapter conceptualizes immigration law as 
a site of struggle over space (Chouinard 1994) that “link[s] international representation to 
the geographies of everyday life” (Dowler and Sharp 2001, 171).  Emphasizing the 
embodiment of state policy-making (Mountz 2003, 2004), feminist political geographers 
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have argued for new empirical material and new conceptualizations of “the political” 
(Hyndman 2004b; Marston 2000; Secor 2001; Staeheli et al. 2004). Building on this 
work, I approach immigration law, particularly litigation, as an active, embodied, and 
situated set of institutional practices, a “tapestry of lived relations and practices 
which…express multiple forms of empowerment and exclusion over how spaces can be 
used and by whom” (Chouinard 1994, 430).  As the court transcripts will show, litigation 
does not produce coherent storylines, nor does immigration law specify enforcement 
practices.  As Coleman argues, immigration law is better understood as  “an open-ended 
and at times chaotic economy of discourses and practices” (Coleman 2008b, 1098).  As I 
describe below, the litigation became a struggle over the embodied boundaries of 
children’s legal subjectivity and the spatio-temporal ordering of Hutto itself. Bunikyte 
invites us to critically analyze, first, the ways in which immigration law relies upon 
geostrategic discourses; second, the ways in which this immigration geopolitics includes 
specific constructions of children's vulnerability against parents’ criminality; and third, 
how immigration geopolitics authorizes material practices of family detention in and 
through federal court authority. 
 
CHILD-OBJECTS/SUBJECTS AND MIGRANT-SUBJECTS:  
LIMITING PLENARY POWER OVER IMMIGRATION 
 Two previous cases illuminate how children’s derivative status limits local 
policing of immigration. In Plyler v. Doe (1982), the Supreme Court considered whether 
“Texas may deny to undocumented school-age children the free public education that it 
provides to children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens.”  
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Ultimately deciding that Texas did have the right to deny services to undocumented adult 
migrants, the Court argued that “At the least, those who elect to enter our territory by 
stealth and in violation of our law should be prepared to bear the consequences, 
including, but not limited to, deportation.”  Children, though, “are not comparably 
situated. … It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these 
children for their presence within the United States” (Plyler v. Doe, 220).  Appearing to 
support children’s rights to education, the case presumed a child-object, property of a 
household, not a child-subject—a legal person—endowed with political agency 
(Thronson 2002). Lacking the intentionality presumed of adult migrants, and therefore 
grounds for punishment, children’s dependence limited local withdrawal of services.  
This subordinate legal position is bound, however, to the full responsibilization of 
parents, to the figure of an “illegal alien” who can be punished.  Thus, decisions bearing 
on noncitizen children elaborate an immigration geopolitics, in and through the 
opposition between child-objects and criminalized migrant-subjects.  
 “Unaccompanied minors” present a more substantial challenge to immigration 
officials, however, since their presence cannot be as easily explained by parental 
coercion.  “Minors,” instead of “children,” unaccompanied children were detained, 
processed, and deported through the adult system prior to the Flores Settlement 
(Women’s Commission 2002).  Engaged in immigration's adversarial legal process, even 
the most litigiously competent children are often unable to obtain the necessary 
documentation without adult assistance. Many countries require adults to request birth 
certificates, so that age itself becomes a barrier to making successful claims.  In the 
asylum system, which limits claims to political and religious persecution, immigration 
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judges routinely dismissed young people’s political activity as warranting persecution. In 
the words of one judge, “it is almost inconceivable that the Ton Ton Macoutes could be 
fearful of the conversations of 15-year-old children” (Civil v. INS, 140 F.3d 52,55 [1st 
Cir. 1998] in Thronson 2002, p. 979).  Thus, young people faced an immigration system 
that discriminated against them on the basis of their presumed apolitical nature and the 
age requirements of the administrative process.  The boundary between child- and 
adulthood is woven into the legal categories of admission and exclusion and has wider 
impacts on judicial decision-making, dramatically impacting children's location in the 
detention system.  
 Seeking to ameliorate the effects of detention on children, advocates settled 
Flores v. Meese, a decade-long lawsuit with the INS that achieved a substantial set of 
protections for minors navigating the immigration system alone, based on their ‘special 
vulnerability’ (see Figure 6.1). As a class action lawsuit, the Flores settlement produced a 
contractual agreement between “all minors in federal immigration custody” and federal 
immigration authorities.  Stipulating INS release preferences, administrative procedures 
and conditions of custody, Flores endowed children with the right to be released to 
family members and guardians, to challenge INS/ICE detention decisions, and to access a 
variety of services. In short, the settlement entitled children to a series of relationships, 
binding children’s rights under Flores to particular spatial and temporal orders. Like 
Plyler, Flores was based on the presumption of innocent child- subjects, and created a 
more robust legal process for children navigating the immigration system. Flores did not, 
however, reconfigure the admission or exclusion categories through which children’s 
immigration status is ultimately decided, limiting children’s entitlements to conditions of 
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release and confinement. Importantly, Flores delineated a difference between the 
decision about whom to detain/release and where to detain them.  The spatiality of 
children's legal protections under Flores was particularly important in Bunikyte, when it 
became unclear whether accompanied children would be granted access to those legal 
protections.   
Table 6.1: Flores Settlement  Stipulations 
Release of children to parent, legal guardian, adult relative, adult individual 
designated by parent or guardian as capable, licensed program will to accept legal 
custody, or an adult individual seeking custody; 
Provide for physical, mental, and financial well-being; 
Ensure child’s presence at INS (now ICE) and immigration court proceedings; 
Maintain communication with guardians about address changes, transfer of custody, 
leaving the country, and any dependency proceedings involving the child; 
Provide bond hearings in every case and reasons for housing him/her in detention 
facilities; 
Meet minimum standards of care for children that remain in ICE custody: 
• proper physical care, suitable living conditions, food, clothing, personal 
hygiene; 
• routine medical care; 
• individualized needs assessment; 
• appropriate educational services; 
• at least one hour of exercise per day, recreation and leisure; 
• at least one individual counseling session per week; 
• group counseling at least twice per week; 
• acculturation and adaptation services; 
• orientation upon admission; 
• religious services; 
• contact visits with family; 
• reasonable right to privacy; 
• family reunification; 
• legal services information; 
• appropriate service delivery, sensitive to language culture, age; 
• age-appropriate rules; 
• no corporal punishment, humiliation, mental abuse, nor punitive interference 
with daily life. 
(Source: Flores v. Meese Stipulated Settlement) 
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Families as Geopolitical Vulnerabilities 
 Heterosexual families have traditionally occupied a privileged position in 
immigration law and enforcement (see Donovan et al. 1999; Elman 2000; Lubheid and 
Cantu 2005; Simmons 2008 on immigration law's heteronormativity).  In admission 
policy, “family unity” remains a stated goal of immigration law, and family sponsorship 
remains the primary avenue to gain legal residency in the United States (US Department 
of Homeland Security 2009). Yet the category of “child” exists in a dependent relation to 
a “parent,” as children’s immigration claims are solely derivative of parents’ claims 
(Thronson 2007-8).  Sponsorship requires accepting financial responsibility for 
petitioning family members, making it impossible for citizen children, for example, to 
sponsor their parents.  Immigration law often conflicts with, however, legal regimes 
elaborated by subnational jurisdictions, especially family, children’s, and custody laws 
premised on the “best interests of the child.” Access to public services often requires (or 
is perceived to require) parental involvement, which has prevented citizen children of 
undocumented parents from receiving those services (Van Hook and Balisteri 2006).  In 
child custody decisions, there are no clear rulings on the relevance of parents’ 
immigration status, resulting in the informal use of a parents’ undocumented status to 
deny custody.  In these cases, federal immigration law operates as de facto child custody 
law (Thronson 2007-8). Conversely, granting custody to unauthorized parents can bar 
children from filing immigration claims, so that custody decisions often have dramatic 
implications on the immigration status of children (Thronson 2002; and see Ruddick 
2007a).  Figured as child-objects and persons by different legal regimes, immigration 
law's hierarchical family hinders children from receiving protections granted them by 
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other courts (Thronson 2007-8; Bhabha 2009).  
 While admission categories both limit and privilege certain forms of family unity, 
enforcement practices produce a more complex legal terrain for families migrating or 
seeking asylum in the US.  Families have traditionally been released with Notices to 
Appear (NTAs) before an immigration judge, but in March of 2001, U.S. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) contracted with Berks County, Pennsylvania, to detain 
families in a recently vacated elderly care facility.  Housing 84 people, the Berks County 
facility opened as an extension of an existing juvenile detention program which was in 
compliance with the Flores agreement (Women’s Commissions 2007).  The INS claimed 
to have opened Berks to allow the agency time to establish families’ identity, but for 
asylum-seeking families, this process sometimes dragged on for years (Women's 
Commission 2007).  In 2003, the Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) 
stated plans to expand its capacity to detain families and other vulnerable populations, 
citing its reliance on substandard and prison-like facilities as its primary impediment (US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2003). 
 Following the attacks of 11 September, 2001, the INS suspended all refugee 
resettlement and the REAL ID Act (Pub.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302) implemented new 
security screenings and evidenciary requirements for both refugees and asylum-seekers 
(Cianciarulo 2007). All noncitizens seeking entry—humanitarian or otherwise--to the US 
were viewed with suspicion, and beginning in 2003, the new Department of Homeland 
Security scoured immigration enforcement policies for vulnerabilities.  In this context, 
ICE argued that releasing families represented a ‘loophole’ that enabled adults who 
would otherwise be subject to mandatory detention to be released from custody:  
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By expanding Expedited Removal to cover illegal alien families, DHS is closing 
down a loophole that has been exploited by human smugglers and helping stop 
future illegal immigration … This new facility enables us to have deterrence with 
dignity by allowing families to remain together, while sending the clear message 
that families entering the United States illegally will be returned home. Because 
of limited family bed space families caught at the border were often released with 
‘Notices to Appear.’ Smugglers were well aware of this practice and often 
exploited this loophole to create the image of a family unit.  In cases where 
families were detained, the families, including children, were detained separately. 
(US Department of Homeland Security 2006b)   
Seeking exploitable opportunities for release, DHS came to understand families' special 
status-- implicitly based on children’s special status—as a vulnerability in border 
security.  Emphasizing smugglers’ criminality over the children being trafficked, ICE 
evoked the intentionality of illegal immigration, which framed family detention as both a 
crime prevention strategy and a corrective to family separation (Bhabha 2000). As 
described in Chapter 5, DHS collapsed smuggling with “future illegal immigration,” 
criminalizing family migration in general and obscuring the legal grounds (such as 
asylum) for families’ presence in the United States. In this context, ICE opened the T. 
Don Hutto Correctional Facility as a “Family Residential Facility” in May of 2006.  The 
expansion multiplied family ‘bed-space’ six-fold, from 84 to 512 beds, in an effort to 
hold all families of questionable immigration or asylum status.  
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BUNIKYTE ET AL. V. CHERTOFF ET AL. 
 Built by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) in 1995, the T. Don 
Hutto Family Residential Facility operated as a medium-security prison for prisoners 
from Oregon, a federal pre-trial detention center, and a US Marshalls’ detention center.  
In 2006, Williamson County, Texas, and ICE entered into an Inter-Governmental Service 
Agreement (IGSA) authorizing the detention of “alien families” at Hutto, and Williamson 
County subsequently changed its contract with CCA to accommodate the detainees.  A 
common arrangement between the federal government, countries, and private corrections 
corporations, IGSAs devolve detention operations to counties and corporations (US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009b).  Were it not for Flores, which created a 
contract between ICE and minors in their custody, there would have been no legal 
mechanism through which to hold ICE, Williamson County, nor CCA responsible for the 
conditions at Hutto.  As Flores is written, Williamson County and CCA were not parties 
to the settlement, and while their actions were examined in Bunikyte, Flores bound 
neither neither party to federal oversight.   
 When it reopened as a family facility, Hutto retained the double fencing, 
concertina wire, automatically closing and locking doors, cell blocks, regimented daily 
schedules, surveillance, discipline, and supervision of its previous life as a prison.  CCA 
staff issued families uniforms, prohibited them from bringing “contraband” (drawings, 
crayons, toys) into their cells, and offered little medical or mental health care. Muslim 
women were not allowed to wear their own headscarves, and the facility’s schedule often 
prevented daily prayers.  CCA staff performed headcounts two to three times per day, in 
which families were required to stay in their cells until 2 staff members counted and 
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recounted every detainee.  This amounted to 11-12 hours of confinement per day, 
preventing outdoor recreation and exercise, not to mention freedom of movement.  The 
cells included a bunk bed, crib (if necessary), and open toilet.  Children received one hour 
of education per day, and many became ill from the food.  A cement facility with little 
natural light, the rooms were cold in the winter and humid in the summer, and toilets 
frequently backed up.  Trained as correctional officers, CCA staff threatened confinement 
and separation as disciplinary tools, and received no re-training to address the needs of 
asylum-seekers, migrants, children and families (American Civil Liberties Union 2007a; 
Bunikyte v. Chertoff et al).  Were it not for the presence of children, Hutto would have 
blended seamlessly into the landscape of immigrant detention, populated by ‘re-
purposed’ prisons, military barracks and bases (including Guantanamo), county jails, and 
juvenile correctional facilities (Dow 2005; Fernandes 2007).    
 Turning now to the text of Bunikyte's litigation, I analyze the ways in which 
plaintiffs' attorneys, ICE, the federal judge, and the plaintiffs' parents, first, figured 
children's and families' legal status in different ways.  Second, I examine how broader 
claims about the limits (or lack thereof) of ICE discretion to detain families relied upon 
these subject formations.  Third, I trace how ICE and the judge, in particular, wove 
geostrategic discourses into their legal arguments, deploying abstract mappings of global 
threat to justify expanding detention to noncitizen families. Litigation is not only a site of 
struggle over the “limit case of the liberal subject,” as Ruddick (2007a) argues, but shows 
how struggle over legal subjectivity are simultaneously struggles over political 
recognition, state sovereignty, and the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that found 
the nation-state.  
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Children’s Rights as Family Rights 
In April of 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union, University of Texas 
Immigration Law Clinic, and private law firm LaBeouf, Lamb, Greene, and MacRae LLP 
sued the Department of Homeland Security for non-compliance with Flores, on behalf of 
26 children detained at Hutto.  Based on the conditions described above, the lawsuit 
charged ICE with violating its obligations under Flores on 17 counts, and sought “to 
enforce the Flores Settlement on Saule’s behalf, to secure her release, and to ensure that 
she is not separated from her mother and her sister” (In re Hutto Family Detention 
Center, Bunikyte v. Chertoff et al, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 1, 4).  
In addition to guaranteeing detained children “home-like” conditions and social services, 
Flores mandated a preference for both release and family unity.  A pre-settlement 
Supreme Court ruling stated, “The parties to [Reno v. Flores] agree that the [Immigration 
and Naturalization] Service must assure itself that someone will care for those minors 
pending resolution of their deportation proceedings. That is easily done when the 
juvenile's parents have also been detained and the family can be released together” (Reno 
v. Flores 1993).   Figuring the plaintiffs as both rights-bearers and relational subjects, the 
attorneys argued that children’s rights included family release. In effect, they sought to 
create family rights in and through the dependent, rights-bearing child. 
As the judge pointed out in the initial hearing, ICE could have complied with 
Flores by releasing the children to other family members and keeping parents in 
detention, a veiled threat that resulted in plaintiffs’ filing restraining orders to prevent 
separation (Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al., Temporary Restraining Order).  In response 
to this legal—and potentially spatial—splicing of the family, the plaintiffs asserted 
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children’s rights to family unity did not transfer rights from children to parents:  
Plaintiff does not contend that the Settlement protects adults in ICE custody or 
compels the release of her mother based on her claims under the Settlement, as 
defendants suggest. Rather, plaintiff seeks to enforce her own rights under the 
Settlement, and argues that her release from custody with her mother is compelled 
by the Settlement’s fundamental imperatives to promote family unity and to house 
minors in the least restrictive setting. … [H]er individual claims under the 
Settlement are directly affected by her ability to remain in close proximity to her 
mother--an outcome that is clearly favored by the general policy favoring release 
to a parent under Flores… (Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. Plaintiff’s Reply in 
Support of her Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Ordering her Immediate 
Release from Hutto With Her Mother, 2-3) 
Children have a right to spaces with parents in them, therefore, but parents have no legal 
right to the same. This configuration of child-based family rights did not technically 
endow noncitizen parents with their own rights, but covered families under an umbrella 
of children’s protections, without challenging the legal regimes that confine adults more 
broadly. The plaintiffs' difficulties in developing even the most generous application of 
children's rights to families highlights the contradictions between rights afforded the 
child, who is always already in relation to a series of caregivers, and the suspension of 
legal protections for their immediate caregivers.   
The Right to Care 
  While the plaintiffs were children, the litigation revolved around parents’ 
testimonies of the disintegration of relations of care and psychological examinations of 
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the detained plaintiffs.  Primarily asylum-seeking families, the plaintiffs’ complaints 
included details of their parents’ rape, torture, and persecution.  Their testimonies bore 
complex and contradictory tales of breakdowns and refusal, of the embodied effects of 
carceral detention and of their rejection of that same criminality. Articulated through the 
spaces of everyday parenthood--bedrooms, bathrooms, kitchens, and schools--parents’ 
testimonies revolved around the interdependencies necessary for the reproduction of 
ways of life: 
In this jail, Majid and I cannot be good parents.  We cannot provide Kevin with 
the basic things that he needs.  We cannot give our sick child inhalers for his 
asthma or cream for his eczema or food for his health.  We cannot give him a pen 
to write with or any books to read.  We cannot teach him about the outside world 
or let him run around the way young boys should.  We are totally helpless as 
parents and depend on the guards for everything.  They control our every 
movement and activity, from the time we eat to the time we see each other.  We 
cannot even turn off the light at night when we want to go to sleep. (Bunikyte v. 
Chertoff , Declaration of Masomeh Alibegi, 2) 
Hutto’s disciplinary order disrupted, for these parents, the energetics of care--the eating, 
playing, bathing, and napping--that defined their role as parents.  The testimonies allude 
to a litany of questions from children, and parents’ increasing frustration at their inability 
to satisfy them.  These narratives belied, in minute detail, ICE’s claims about the 
“residential” character of the facility, by showing how the normal relations of care and 
parental authority, which implicitly defines “the home,” were disrupted by the power of 
the guards. 
130 
 
The spatiality of familial care was, therefore, regulated at a bodily and molecular 
scale. The everyday metabolism of care, through which the plaintiffs’ mothers defined 
their identities as mothers, was undone by the carceral ordering of space, time, and 
authority within Hutto.  
I can’t talk to anyone because I only speak Creole.   I have to rely on Sherona to 
translate from Creole to Spanish and then whoever else is around to translate from 
Spanish into English if I need to ask for something.  I am dependent on my 
daughter in a way I would not be if were not in jail and it is inappropriate for a 
mother to have to rely on her daughter this way, it is like making her into the 
mother and me into the child and she is only thirteen years old. (Bunikyte v. 
Chertoff , Declaration of Delourdes Verdeiu, 3)  
These accounts of inverted familial authority illuminate a frustrated motherhood, in 
which care and authority are mutually constitutive. Thus, these parents understood the 
restrictions placed on parental authority as destruction of the family itself.   Parents’ 
dependency on guards and surveillance practices formed the basis of a counter-narrative 
of impotent parental authority, articulated through distorted relations of dependency 
between parents and children, the annihilation of private space, and emotional unease.  
Mothers reported anxiety, sadness, exhaustion, crying, sleeplessness, and illness, these 
physical weaknesses being evidence of their impotence as parents.  These testimonies 
narrated a relationality of parent- and childhood, of mutual interdependence, that far 
exceeded the legal mechanisms through which the case proceeded.  It is not simply that 
these families viewed children’s rights as linked to the narrations of care, but that they 
demanded more spatial autonomy than the law could provide, in and through these 
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relations of care. Monopolizing access to food, clothing, blankets, toys, and books, CCA 
staff overlaid carceral relations of authority over “the architecture of the family unit” 
which undermined the relations of (inter)dependence between parents and children.  
Thus, the normative distribution of rights and responsibilities within families is 
reconfigured so that CCA operated as an in loco parentis, infantilizing parents with 
respect to their children.  Parents’ narratives of frustrated care figured, therefore, a range 
of actors with variegated obligations under immigration law and a wider political 
economy of deferred responsibility than could be accounted for in the lawsuit's “official” 
legal argumentation.  
ICE Discretionary Power: Displacing Custody 
ICE’s defense counsel argued, however, that Flores did not apply because the 
children were detained with their parents, and that parents’ were their practical guardians 
while in detention.  For ICE, parents’ illegal status displaced children’s rights, confining 
children to the status of household property (Thronson 2002).  The defense argued, 
therefore, that the plaintiffs’ only case was “abuse of discretion,” which the defense then 
argued was an invalid complaint since Congress has endowed the agency with the 
authority to detain the parents: 
In fact, you know, while there may be alternatives that the ACLU would like the 
government to do, it’s not in the ACLU’s discretion to determine how the 
government is going to operate its immigration program.  It’s the Court’s 
decision, of course, of whether or not the government is abusing its discretion, 
and in this case, I would suggest that the government was not. (ICE attorney 
Victor Lawrence, Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. Transcript of the Injunction for 
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Equitable Relief, 236) 
ICE’s legal approach attempted to displace children’s rights to “home-like environments” 
under Flores on the basis of their parents’ illegal status.  Emphasizing the criminality of 
the migrant-subject, ICE sought to shift the case to discussion of territorial sovereignty 
and security, over which ICE had established authority and federal courts did not. 
Approaching family detention in the context of enforcement-led immigration 
policy, ICE emphasized the agency, autonomy, and intentionality of parents, especially 
parents' intentional breaking of immigration law: 
Of course, they’d rather be free, but they did break the law.  They did break the 
law, and they came to the United States illegally, and the government has the right 
to detain them (ICE attorney Victor Lawrence, Bunikyte v. Chertoff, Transcript of 
the Injunction for Equitable Relief, 23).   
 
Essentially what this case comes down to, your Honor, are four families who are 
in the United States illegally, who are unhappy that they’re in a detention 
environment, as the government is absolutely entitled to do given the fact that 
they did arrive in the United States illegally (ibid., 231). 
ICE's argument had three important effects.  First, by emphasizing parents’ intentionality, 
the defense erased children’s rights under Flores, effectively arguing that Flores did not 
apply to children accompanied by undocumented parents.  From this perspective, the only 
way for children to access their entitlements under Flores would be to separate them from 
their parents in ICE custody.  (This would have resulted in their transfer to the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement, who has managed custody for unaccompanied minors since 2003.) 
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Secondly, therefore, ICE argued that families were legally considered accompanied 
adults. Third, charging parents with custodial responsibility within Hutto transferred 
responsibility for the care/harm of children from ICE to the parents.  Their argument 
consolidated rights in ICE’s executive discretion and responsibility for the rule of law, 
childhood development, and everyday care in the parents, for whom there are few legal 
frameworks to challenge ICE’s discretion.  
 ICE's legal arguments emphasized the plenary power over immigration law, a 
position that relies upon a criminalized (adult) migrant-subject.  Emphasizing territorial 
vulnerability, ICE inscribed responsibility for border security onto each individual 
migrant crossing the border, regardless of context of their individual migration.  The 
defense’s argument thereby mapped a geopolitics of vulnerability that figures the US as 
the sole victim of violences large and small.  Understood exclusively in terms of their 
illegal entry, the parents faced a legal terrain of all-responsibility-no-rights, and the 
corellary displacement of children's rights allowed them no agency and therefore no 
rights.  This coupling of hyper-vulnerable American territory with the hyper-
responsibilization of individual adult migrants prioritized universalized “public interest” 
over the claims of specific children.  
Calculating Irreparable Harm 
Where the plaintiffs sought to use children’s rights as an umbrella over the entire 
family, the defense’s argument telescoped any family rights into a discussion of parental 
illegality.  The judge was unconvinced, however, by ICE’s argument that the agency’s 
discretion to detain annulled the application of Flores to the Hutto facility, but worried 
that the plaintiffs’ arguments transferred children’s rights to the parents that would 
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eviscerate their responsibilities for legal border crossing: 
So it is [plaintiffs’] position that as long as an illegal is in this country with a 
child, the placing of that person in incarceration in jail, where they usually go 
before I sentence them or before they're deported, they cannot go to jail anymore, 
they are -- they get a free pass with their child? (Judge Sam Sparks, Bunikyte v. 
Chertoff , Transcript of Injunction for Equitable Relief, 11) 
The judge posed an opposition, therefore, between the rights of children (to release and 
family unity) and ICE’s discretion, and by extension the plenary doctrine of immigration.  
Ultimately, the judge agreed that ICE retained discretion over the detention of parents, 
despite the Flores settlement and Reno v Flores' clear preference for releasing families. 
The judge thereby affirmed children’s subordinate position in immigration law and 
enforcement, reproduced the culpability and criminalization of parents, and voided the 
possibility of family-based legal claims in enforcement matters.  
But even without granting parents rights through their children’s claims to the 
Flores agreement, the judge had the authority to release the families. To grant 
preliminary injunction--in this case the immediate release of the families from Hutto--the 
plaintiffs needed to meet four criteria: (1) substantial likelihood that Hutto violated 
Flores; (2) substantial threat that the children would suffer irreparable injury if not 
released from Hutto; (3) the threatened injury to the children outweighed any damage that 
release would cause ICE; (4) release would not disserve the public interest (Bunikyte, et 
al v. Chertoff et al. Order, 11).  Because of the overwhelming evidence from parents’ 
testimonies that Hutto violated the Flores, the judge readily agreed that the conditions at 
Hutto violated Flores’ stipulations on conditions of confinement. The remaining criteria 
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demanded, however, a calculus of harm between detained children, ICE and a 
universalized “public interest” (see also Bhabha 2000).  First, the judge refused to 
undermine ICE's discretion to detain noncitizens in violation of immigration laws.  
Coming to this conclusion invalidated, he argued, the plaintiffs’ claims to irreparable 
harm because “the detentions themselves were entirely lawful” (Bunikyte, et al v. 
Chertoff et al. Order, 36).  That is, “irreparable harm” could only be established by 
challenging the legality of ICE’s discretion, which is the basis for the plenary doctrine in 
immigration law.  Defining law and irreparable harm as mutually exclusive worked, 
further, to cleanse the federal court of its own responsibility for children’s harm, 
mystifying the violence authorized in and through the law. 
Second, agreeing with ICE’s defense, the judge minimized the harm to the detained 
children by emphasizing their small number and normalizing the trauma incurred during 
migration.  He did not dispute the fact that detention would harm children, but that 
detention was the only harm done to them in the process of travelling to the US:  
I am not convinced that there is irreparable injury to the children. I am convinced 
that there could be injury psychologically to the children.  These children come 
extremely vulnerable because of the circumstances of their being here, not being 
where they're secure, not being where they know where they are…. But I don't 
think there's any doubt that living in the conditions that I've heard today before 
the changes certainly didn't improve the psychological aspect of a young child or 
adolescent's life. Now, oddly enough, it may have been a lot better than they were 
when they -- before they were captured.  May have been better than it was before 
they got to this country.  But that doesn't excuse the way we act in this country. 
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(Emphasis added, Judge Sam Sparks, Bunikyte v. Chertoff, Transcript of the 
Injunction for Equitable Relief, 221; 238) 
 
It's going to be expected that these children have had difficulties, and those 
difficulties contributed, to some degree, to their mental status. How much and the 
fact that they're still illegally here because of the acts of their parent or parents, 
you know, I don't know how they could be severely damaged by facilities, but 
we'll see. (Judge Sam Sparks, Bunikyte v. Chertoff, Transcript of the Status 
Conference, 51) 
The harm caused by detention is not irreparable, first, because it is legal and, second, 
because it cannot be quantified separately from pre-detention trauma. This calculus of 
harm generalized parents’ abuses across a dangerous “elsewhere” beyond US borders, 
despite the fact that ICE has detained families from over 40 countries. Framing the US as 
the space of law and order, asylum and immigration is both the proof of the American 
“exceptional excellence” and the source of childhood trauma (Puar 2007). It is precisely 
this exceptionality that justifies ICE’s discretionary power at the border, as these zones of 
illiberal rule both legitimize and maintain the presumably liberal and democratic space of 
the United States (Basaran 2008).  This dichotomized figuration effectively pathologizes 
transboundary migration, again displacing responsibility for the effects of detention onto 
the parents’ choice to migrate.   
Negotiating a Settlement 
After the judge ruled that Flores did not establish the right to family release, and that 
detention could not be proven to cause irreparable harm, the parties settled.  Where early 
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arguments in the case focused on the distribution of entitlements between family 
members, the settlement negotiations focused on transforming the spatio-temporal 
ordering at Hutto from “prison-like” to “home-like” conditions. (I explore this dichotomy 
further in Chapter 8.) The settlement included a litany of changes to the physical 
infrastructure, relationships between guards and detainees, and access to services (see 
Figure 6.2). Further, the settlement required ICE to review parole, bond, and release 
decisions for each family on a monthly basis, so that families would not be detained 
indefinitely. Compliance with the settlement was evaluated semi-annually by a federal 
magistrate, until June of 2009.  Ironically, the “benefits” afforded to children under the 
settlement accrued to not just the plaintiffs, but to their parents and to the families 
detained at Hutto thereafter. Parents could not share children’s rights to release under 
Flores, but could, by dint of their spatial co-presence, share their rights to “home-like 
facilities,” so long as they remained segregated from the general population. The right to 
certain conditions diverges from the spatiality of rights to release; like oil and water, 
parents and children’s rights can share surfaces, but cannot mix. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the more complex range of considerations taken up in children’s and 
family law, I have shown that immigration law figures its subjects rather bluntly, as 
innocent child-objects and criminalized migrant-subjects.  Their mobility defines their 
legal status, as child-objects are presumed to be apolitical, inert, and silent, while 
migrant-subjects are highly politicized, self-conscious actors willfully choosing to violate 
legal boundaries.  In short, children are moved, passively, and adults move, actively and 
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by choice, rendering family groups unintelligible. Ruddick has argued that children’s 
“best interests" enables a ventriloquist politics of representation, in which “the child  
Table 6.2: Provisions of In re Hutto Family Detention Center Settlement 
Schedule: 6:30am earliest wake time; no wake-up time on weekends; flexible showering system. 
Education: 5 hours of class/day; computers available; individual assessments for each child; certified 
teachers; adult English as a Second Language classes available. 
Recreation: All family members have open and outdoor recreation available every day; craft activities 
available in the pods; movie nights and monthly birthdays available; children can have writing 
utensils in living areas; field trips available; Spanish and English television available. 
Living Conditions: 4” mattresses provided; painted walls and murals; room decorations allowed; porcelain 
toilets to replace stainless steel; rooms unlocked at all times; room searches not conducted 
arbitrarily. 
Clothing: Families wear own clothing; CCA provides clothing if necessary. 
Toys: communal toys in each pod; children allowed to keep toys in rooms during the day; facility accepts 
donated toys. 
Privacy: One room in each pod designated for private toilet use; privacy curtains added to cell toilets. 
Grooming: Hair products and barber services available; supplies available at commissary. 
Food: Menu revised regularly; cafeteria-style menu; salad bars available; meat-based courses available 
every day; snacks available in refrigerators, vending machines, and at the commissary. 
Mental Health Services: Town Hall meetings each week; Individualized needs assessments performed 
upon admission; children have individual and group sessions available. 
Medical & Dental Care: Full-time pediatrician on site; immunization available; more space provided for 
consultation; Spanish-speaking staff; toothbrushes and over-the-counter medicines provided. 
Visitation: Contact visits permitted; designated, private rooms available for meetings with attorneys; hours 
posted clearly; children not required to accompany parents. 
Detainee Movement: Interior doors open; freedom of movement between housing pods and non-restricted 
areas; parental consent for children’s movement; check-ins replace headcounts. 
Phone Access: Phone cards reasonably priced; detainees informed that calls are recorded, but not 
monitored in real time; free telephones for legal services provided. 
Mail: Staff does not read mail; families can receive books and clothing. 
Staff: casual uniform replaces enforcement uniform. 
Orientation:  Explains rules, services, grievance procedures; local non-profits permitted to give legal 
orientation programs; handbook provided to incoming families. 
Legal Counsel Access: attorneys can leave phone messages for detainees; message delivered in a timely 
manner; instructions for reaching pro bono legal representation provided in each pod; attorney-
client privilege respected by staff. 
Library: legal materials available regularly; free access to library; stocked with sufficient books; facility 
accepts book donations. 
Facility:  Razor wire removed; no fence or bars on front entrance; landscaping on grounds; intake doors 
wooden, unlocked; no signs describing Hutto as ‘correctional.’ 
Record Keeping:  Resident files to contain intake forms, disciplinarly reports, records of counseling, 
commissary records; case records locked. 
Work: Detained parents allowed to work for $1/day. 
Employment Requirements: Experience/advanced education required for Child Care Professional staff. 
(Source: In re Hutto Family Detention Center Settlement Exhibits A, B, C.) 
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danced around the issue with a series of partners: parents who defend their liberty to raise 
children as they see fit; the state, which has an abiding interest in the child as futurity; 
and an increasingly complex array of representatives” (2007a, 520). As the plaintiffs' 
attorneys, their parents ICE, and the judge purported to act in the plaintiffs' “best 
interests,” and the children gave few testimonies, Bunikyte hardly broke new ground for 
children's political agency.  Intriguingly, however, children's 'best interests' and 'special 
vulnerability' made the case possible, as the presumed dependence of children required 
the creation of legal protections.  Even while the child-objects figured by Flores and 
Plyler were not quite persons, the protections granted them go far beyond what is 
available to adult “aliens.” Children's and adult's legal subjectivity is mutually 
constitutive, so that each displaces the other while neither achieve recognition as a 
“person” before the law. 
Immigration geopolitics unfolds, then, in and through an asymmetrical 
distribution of liberal norms of right and responsibility among unaccompanied children, 
families, and adult migrants.  It is not the case, as others have argued, that the law is 
suspended for those in detention, but that immigration law does not afford migrant-
subjects a liberal balance of rights, obligations, and punishments. As Basaran argues, 
“Border zones are legal constructions and law is an ordinary means by which the liberal 
state legitimizes illiberal rule…” (2008, 341). Immigration law legitimizes the 
geopolitical scaling of the plenary doctrine of immigration, and the particular post-9/11 
fusion of national security and immigration legitimizes detention as a practice.  The 
illegality of the migrant-subject and illiberal immigration enforcement practices serve as 
recursive justifications, each leading inexorably to the other.  Thus, “border zones are 
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characterized by legal proliferation rather than being outside the law, by juridical 
complicity rather than executives acting on their own… These are not places without 
rights, but places with difference--and thereby lesser—rights” (Basaran 2008, 340; 347).  
Weighing the “best interests” of 26 individual children against “the public interest,” “the 
rule of law,” “border security,” the judge used the ambiguity of children’s rights to create 
an opening for judicial affirmation of the juridico-political configuration of immigration 
geopolitics in the United States. Bunikyte's resolution did not, therefore, represent a shift 
in federal court rulings on children in immigration custody, but does illuminate the 
geopolitical implications of children's legal status, and the ways in which immigration 
law pits children's vulnerability against criminalized, hyper-responsibilized parents.  
Understanding these how these legal distinctions are put to work in immigration law and 
enforcement is critical to understanding how geopolitical narratives create the conditions 
for policing, detention, and deportation practices in the United States.  
As this chapter has shown, the legal distinctions between children and adults are 
bound up with geopolitical mappings of external danger and internal safety, such that 
family detention protected both the US and noncitizen children.   As Mountz argues 
(2003, 2004) and I explore in the next chapter, legal categorizations impact noncitizens' 
pathways into and out of detention, even if, as Coleman (2005) argues, legal and policy 
discourses do not map cleanly onto the sites of enforcement.  For Butler (2009), ICE's 
and the judge's legal arguments mobilize a narcissistic and uni-directional narrative of 
victimhood that justifies policies that maximize the physical vulnerability of a litany of 
others, under the assumption that “our” vulnerability will be minimized.  Twinning 
children's “special vulnerability” with perceived security vulnerabilities in the 
141 
 
immigration enforcement system, this assemblage of institutions and practices displaces 
physical vulnerability from the US nation-state onto an anonymous population of external 
others and produces, I argue, a geopolitics of vulnerability.  More than a discursive 
coupling, the plenary doctrine frames immigration as a threat to territorial sovereignty, 
authorizing wide administrative discretion to exploit the precarity of migrants’ legal, 
political, and physical positions.  Understanding emerging detention and enforcement 
practices requires close attention to the intersections of law, administrative authority, and 
enforcement practices. It is here that noncitizens continue to contest the legal apartheid 
between “aliens” and “persons” and the spatial practices of securitized sovereignty.   
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CHAPTER 7: DELEGATING DISCRETION: LAW, THE PLENARY DOCTRINE 
AND SOVEREIGN POWER 
 
“From the point of view of the law, detention may be a mere deprivation of liberty.  But 
the imprisonment that performs this function has always involved a technical project.”  
(Foucault 1995 [1977], 257) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In Chapter 6, I described how Judge Sparks deferred, in the end, to ICE’s 
discretion to detain whomsoever it deemed necessary to achieve compliance with 
immigration law. Analyzing the Hutto litigation’s transcripts, however, I found that legal 
precedent on administrative discretion—executive officials’ ability to make judgments 
beyond regulations and statutues—also protected ICE, a legal regime that applies to all 
executive agencies.  For example, attorneys argued over the boundary of ICE Field Office 
Director Marc Moore’s decision-making process.  In his deposition, the FOD is allowed 
to recount the content of his decisions, but, as the ICE attorney claimed, his “pre-
decisional” thought process was off-limits to the plaintiffs. The following is one of many 
discussions of Moore’s “deliberative privilege:”    
[Plaintiffs’ Counsel 1]: Have you kept women [at Hutto] that were pregnant?  
[Moore]: Yes.  
[Plaintiffs’ Counsel 1]: So do you consider pregnancy not to be a significant 
factor-- 
[Defense Counsel]: I’m going to object to the extent we are starting to stray into 
his deliberative process and making decisions on parole releases.  
[Plaintiffs’ Counsel 1]: It's in the regulations. I'm asking him how he applies the 
regulations. He brought those up. 
[Defense Counsel]: He considers all --- as he said before, he considers all of these 
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criteria, but when you start delving into [how factors are] weight[ed], you're 
going into the thought process he has behind the parole decision. 
[Plaintiff’s Counsel 2]: He testified that he adheres to the regulations. So we are 
saying he said he adheres to the regulations; he let some pregnant people out. He 
adheres to the regulations; he doesn't let some pregnant people out.  The policy is 
that, obviously, some pregnancies can be paroled. It is perfectly acceptable and it 
is not pre-decisional to ask how he distinguishes between those two. 
[Defense Counsel]: His thought process behind each of those parole 
determinations is pre-decisional to that parole decision. 
[Plaintiffs’ Counsel 2]: But his adherence to the policy, he has distinguished 
between the way that he adheres to a policy. We haven't asked him about a 
specific parole decision. We are asking how he adheres to the policy. The policy 
has already been set. He's not making policy. That's not pre-decisional. It says in 
the regs, some pregnant woman must be paroled or should be paroled. How is he 
applying that? That‘s not pre-decisional. It's in the regs. He says he obeys the 
regs. Some pregnant people get out, some don't. So what's going on? 
[Defense Counsel]: To the extent it involves a measure of his discretion, it is pre-
decisional. (Emphasis added; Bunikyte, et al. v. Chertoff, et al. Deposition of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director Marc Moore, 86-88)  
“Straying into his deliberative process,” the plaintiff’s attorneys walked a delicate 
boundary between the content of ICE’s agency-wide policies on release, Field Office 
Directors’ application of these policies to individual cases, and the decision-making 
process behind both individual and policy decisions. The difference, then, between policy 
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and execution has a significant impact on the relationship between executive branch and 
the federal courts. More importantly, the discussion above shows how the everyday work 
of immigration officials—especially the categorizations, release decisions, and 
deportation orders—cannot be judicially challenged.   
 For scholars of executive power, this is an intriguing discussion. The decision to 
banish, to set outside political membership and national space, to exclude from the 
normal juridical order constitutes, according to Giorgio Agamben and others, sovereign 
power (Agamben 1998, 2005).  Yet, the very decision-making process is, itself, excluded 
from judicial review.  Parole decisions occupy (and constitute) a specific discursive zone 
between law and policy; ICE is Congressionally authorized to develop, implement, and 
publish immigration enforcement  “regs,” but the deliberation process behind the 
regulations is not judicially reviewable.  “The Chevron deference,” (Chevron U.S.A Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 1984) prevents federal courts from rendering 
judgment on executive policy-making, protecting executive policy-makers from personal 
liability.  According to principles undergirding administrative law, courts defer to 
executive agencies because those agencies are accountable to the voting public (via the 
presidential office), and this accountability forces those agencies to work in the best 
interests of affected populations (2008).  Thus, a Field Office Director’s decision-making 
process about who to detain, why, where, and for how long is exempt from federal court 
review. The plaintiffs’ attorneys in Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. wanted to find out 
how Moore applied “the regs” to individual cases, and to show that he did not, in fact, 
evaluate each family’s eligibility for release, as required by the Flores settlement.  
Protected by deliberative privilege, however, Moore’s thought-process for reaching those 
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decisions could not serve as evidence, even though his written release decision letters 
could. The attorneys ultimately showed that the letters shared the same boilerplate 
language, except for detainees’ name and Alien Number, and contained nothing specific 
to each families’ cases to indicate a detailed, individualized review.  The Hutto 
Settlement required Moore (and subsequent Field Office Directors) to provide more 
detailed rationales for approving or prohibiting release.  
 Interdisciplinary studies of immigration enforcement have explained immigration 
law’s exceptionality as a consequence of the “plenary power doctrine,” a provision that 
sets federal immigration law apart from the constitutional protections governing the 
criminal justice system, citizen’s rights and entitlements, and local immigration initiatives 
(see Varsanyi 2008).4
                                                 
4 Monica Varsanyi (2005?) shows, however, how municipal governments and consulares develop their own 
forms documentation and, therefore, local forms of citizenship, political membership, and immigration 
geopolitics. 
   Since the 1899 Chae Chan Ping, the Supreme Court has ruled 
repeatedly that immigration policy is a foreign policy matter, belonging under the 
purview of Congress and the Executive Branch, and is therefore beyond the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional judgment.  Delegating immigration law-making to Congress gives 
politicians wide latitude to decide how (and whether) immigration law will adhere to 
constitutional principles adhered to in other legal regimes (Neuman 2005).  There is no 
mandate—and therefore no guarantee—that immigration law share the same principles as 
other US legal regimes.  Enforcement policy-making falls therefore outside the purview 
of Supreme Court intervention, severely restricting any due process or fundamental rights 
claims noncitizens may have about their detention or deportation proceedings.  For most 
US legal immigration scholars, then, ICE’s authority to make and remake immigration 
enforcement policies derive from the scaling of immigration as a foreign policy matter.  
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For them, immigration law’s scaling sets it apart from domestic public policy, though the 
physical presence of noncitizens muddles these distinctions in daily life (Coleman 
2008b).  While the plenary doctrine is the Supreme Court’s primary rationale for not 
intervening in deportation and release decisions, however, a range of administrative laws 
protect enforcement policy-making--including detention center operations—from judicial 
oversight, as shown above.   
 Understood from the perspective of the plenary doctrine alone, immigration 
enforcement is a matter of admitting suitable noncitizens and excluding those deemed 
inadmissible at the border. Exclusion becomes considerably more complicated, of course, 
when applied noncitizens already in US territory. In those cases, residents must be 
rendered excludable; in De Genova’s terms, they must be illegalized. In the 1996 laws, 
Congress to limited noncitizens’ access to judicial review of deportation and detention 
decisions. As legal scholar Gerald Neuman (2005) argues, federal courts now police the 
legal and constitutional boundaries of administrative discretion over immigration 
enforcement, but do not rule on the validity of ICE’s use of that discretion.  Immigration 
officials retain the authority not to pursue deportation, to issue a “stay of deportation,” 
and to develop procedures through which to pursue deportation. ICE leadership regularly 
issues “prosecutorial memos” and other guidance on when and how to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion. In other words, there are formal rules about how immigration 
law is to be exercised, but administrative discretion protects this rule-making from 
judicial oversight.  These rules are not the same kind of legal instrument as immigration 
legislation, but neither are they il-, or extra-legal. They may be, however, extra-
constitutional, and among immigration scholars, extra-constitutionality and illegality 
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often become collapsed. So while prosecutorial discretion was initially used for 
humanitarian release, administrative discretion became a way of closing down appeals 
and review opportunities for noncitizens in deportation proceedings under IIRIRA 
(Johnson 2008, Neuman 2005). Thus, immigration agencies have wide authority to 
achieve compliance with deportation orders, and “the Chevron deference,” prevents court 
intervention in the implementation of immigration law.    
 Focusing on administrative discretion allows me to plot the different points of 
contact between detainees and ICE officials, to trace migrants’ pathways into and out of 
detention, and to thereby chart a geography of illegalization.  As I explain in more detail, 
a range of border and immigration enforcement agencies classify noncitizens according 
to where and when they come into contact, and those arrested within the US are afforded 
more due process protections than those arrested at a port of entry or outside US territory.  
In addition to due process, “illegal aliens” are eligible for bond, while “arriving aliens” 
can petition for parole.  While the distinction seems heuristic, bond and parole require 
different actions from detainees, so that access to parole and not bond, for example, has 
dramatic impacts on detainees’ ability leave detention centers while their cases are 
processed. In this chapter, I explore ICE’s “deportation power” through the series of 
enforcement decisions in order to outline the kinds of discretionary decisions through 
which ICE specifies practices of detention and release. I contrast ICE’s authority over 
individual cases (and bodies) with ICE’s delegation of detention operations in order to 
analyze the assemblage of institutions working on noncitizens’ bodies between migrants’ 
arrest and release/removal.  Moving from bodies to spaces, in short, I seek to unpack the 
assemblage of legal and policy instruments make detention possible. 
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APPREHENSION, CATEGORIZATION AND DETENTION    
 Noncitizens come into contact with ICE in a variety of ways. Public institutions 
have begun to request proof of legal residency, and failing to produce documentation can 
result in being reported to ICE.  While these policies vary from state to state, and county 
to county, everyday bureaucratic activities, such as drivers’ license renewals, require 
proof of residency (Shahani and Greene 2009). Departments of Transportation, social 
services, schools, and streets have become, in some places, sites of surveillance, policing, 
and potential arrest.  Since 2006, ICE has also performed workplace enforcement actions 
(popularly known as “raids”) and late-night visits to noncitizens’ homes.5
 During this study, families came to Berks and Hutto in a variety of ways.  ICE 
apprehended some families at ports of entry, particularly those families who requested 
asylum upon arrival.
 In border cities, 
local law enforcement regularly calls CBP to act as an interpreter in conversations with 
non-English speaking victims, witnesses, or suspects.  Once on the scene, CBP can 
choose to ask for documentation and take people into custody. Noncitizens may, 
therefore, be rendered excludable far from the border and long after entry. By linking 
with local law enforcement and a range of banal state institutions, which have nothing to 
do with federal law enforcement, ICE has been able to increase the potential points of 
contact between its agents and noncitizens (Coleman 2009).  
6
                                                 
5 Raids came under fierce criticism, especially as reports surfaced about children left at school or ending up 
in foster care after their parents were detained at work.  The Obama Administration promised to end the 
raids, but ICE has continued the practice of home raids and workplace actions, albeit under a lower profile. 
 ⁠ A Somali mother and child crossed the Mexico-US border, and a 
local resident advised them not to claim asylum; the mother maintained that, no, her 
 
6 ICE does not collect aggregated statistics about where families have been apprehended.  My data should 
not be taken as representative of detained families as a whole, but of the diversity of families’ interactions 
with CBP, ICE, and other agencies. 
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family members received asylum, and she would, too.  The local resident called CBP, 
who detained the mother and child in a temporary facility, separated them for 10 days, 
then transferred them together to Hutto (explored in more detail below).  Another family 
crossed the Mexico-US border, only to have an acquaintance, who feared harboring them 
would put her at risk, call CBP. Others were picked up from their homes, and still others 
apprehended on city streets.  ICE detained a Canadian-Iranian family when their flight to 
Canada made an emergency landing in Puerto Rico, despite the fact that they had never 
intended to enter the US (Democracy Now 2007).  In another instance, ICE detained a 
boy travelling to the US alone to join his mother.  When his mother arrived to pick him 
up from ICE, they detained her, as well, and transferred them both to Hutto. Noncitizen 
families entered detention, therefore, in a variety of ways. As I elaborate below, when 
and where noncitizens come into contact with ICE has significant implications for what 
happens next. 
Categorization and Detention 
 After “being picked up,” or apprehended in ICE’s terminology, families faced a 
series of categorizations and re-categorizations that determine where they will be 
detained, their opportunities for release, and the likelihood of their deportation. Two 
factors have significant bearing on noncitizens’ detention trajectories: (1) the territorial 
location of their apprehension and (2) the timing of their contact with CBP or ICE.   As 
one participant explained: 
So you cross the border illegally, you're picked up on the southern border, for 
example, or the northern border, and you've been in the United States for less than 
14 days, and you're detained or arrested within 100 miles of the border, then 
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you're put in Expedited Removal. If you're stopped at the border, then you're put 
in Expedited Removal. If you're stopped at the airport, with no documents, with 
false documents, or you actually ask for asylum at the border, you're arrested and 
put in Expedited Removal.  
 
And then in order to get out of Expedited Removal, you have to pass the Credible 
Fear Interview, which shows that you have a reasonable fear of persecution if 
you're returned. So, so that's how you get into Expedited Removal. 
 
If you overstay your tourist visa…, and you got arrested with your children, you 
should not end up at Hutto. Because, let's say you came in as a tourist and you 
never went home and you got picked up in a raid. Or walking down the street with 
your children.  That family is not supposed to go to Hutto, unless Berks is filled. 
Because that family that entered legally would not qualify to be in Expedited 
Removal in the first place. (Interview April 2008) 
The timing and location of noncitizens’ contact with ICE bears directly on noncitizens’ 
access to relief or release. As I have described elsewhere, Expedited Removal (ER) 
deputizes ICE officers to issue deportation orders to certain noncitizens without those 
persons seeing an immigration judge and triggers mandatory detention; ICE typically 
deports ER detainees in under 30 days. This timing applies to families who request 
asylum at a Port of Entry, as it applies to those apprehended along the southwestern 
border.  ICE classifies the former, however, as “arriving aliens” and the latter as “illegal 
aliens,” and these categories determine their access to bond and parole later in the 
151 
 
immigration process.  Families can exit ER’s deportation “fast-track” by requesting a 
Credible Fear Interview (CFI), in which an asylum officer with Citizenship and 
Immigration Services will determine their fear of persecution.  Thus, when and where 
families come into ICE custody bears directly on their access to the immigration and/or 
asylum adjudication process, where they are detained and the duration of their detention.    
 While the Hutto settlement stipulated that non-ER families would go to Berks, 
because that facility was presumed to be more suitable for long stays, this was not always 
the case:  
LM:  I know part of the settlement, too, was that the people detained [at Hutto] 
would be those in Expedited Removal Processing, not people with some other 
ambiguous status that would take longer to decide.  Has that pretty much been the 
case? 
 
Participant: It's only people that are initially placed in Expedited Removal, unless 
Berks is filled, which is the other facility. So our experience is that most people 
are initially in Expedited Removal, but I talked to…to two families, uh, that were 
not in Expedited Removal who were picked up, actually they were picked when 
they went to, um, get their children who were trying to join them in the United 
States.  
… 
LM: So Berks has really become--so now they're basically dividing families by 
their status. If they're in ER, they go Hutto. 
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Participant: Maybe, you know it's unclear to me.  What I think it's also--it's 
geographic…. [Hutto doesn’t] get a lot of people…stopped at the airport in New 
York asking for asylum. So part of that might just be geographic.  So if you're in 
New York, it's closer to take you to Berks, than it is to get you to Hutto. 
(Interview April 2008) 
In practice, families’ pathways into and out of detention are not, therefore, entirely 
predictable on the basis of their “arriving alien,” “illegal alien,” or ER classification. 
Placement decisions (Berks, Hutto, or neither) rested with individual ICE officers, and 
some regional field offices chose to release rather than detain families despite DHS’ 
“catch and remove” policy (Fieldnotes 2009).  Even with seemingly clear-cut mandatory 
detention cases, ICE officers retained much discretion to detain, release, or transfer 
families within their regional field offices. ICE rule-making guides officers’ discretionary 
decision-making, but does not bar them from taking other actions.   
 Families have been (and still are) apprehended by a variety of federal law 
enforcement entities.  While border and immigration enforcement officers often work 
closely together, they work for different agencies, under different mandates, and with 
different authority over the deportation process. Most families apprehended on the 
Mexico-US border moved through CBP stations before being transferred to ICE. As 
described in Chapter 4, CBP runs a number of temporary “staging areas” and temporary 
detention centers that hold noncitizens for up to 72 hours.  Those caught in the interior 
might pass through a similar temporary detention center in an ICE office or a local jail. 
As one mother reported: 
I came, I crossed the border from Mexico to the United States... First, I met [a] 
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lady. She said, gave us a sweater, me and my son. I said, I want to go. I’m looking 
for immigration. She said, ‘No, don’t look for them, just run. If they catch you 
they will deport you.’ I said ‘no, no, I need to go,’ and then she called them. They 
came, they took me to a [Border Patrol station], they took a finger print and 
everything.  After 2 days we were at that place, they tell me that they have to 
separate us—me and my son.  They take him to the foster house, and me to the 
adult detention.  Then after 10 days we met. Then they took us to Hutto together. 
(America’s Family Prison Interview 2007) 
If families face difficulties navigating the legal cartography of their own cases, the 
picture is seemingly equally obscure on ICE’s end.  While Field Office Directors are 
responsible for the case management of detainees in their regions, how families moved 
from one place to another was not always clear to these officials either:   
[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL] Who does [the intake process for Hutto]? 
[MOORE] Well, families are encountered by the Border Patrol or a Port of Entry 
by a C[ustoms] and B[order] P[atrol] or maybe even the Office of Investigations 
as they do their work. Those individuals – and I don't want to speak on something 
I don’t clearly know. My understanding is that they contact the field office 
juvenile coordinator for wherever they happen to be. And that the coordinator 
makes a call, faxes or in some other fashion communicates with whoever is 
assigned to those duties within the Hutto facility to determine whether that family 
is suitable for housing there. (Bunikyte, et al. v. Chertoff, et al. Deposition of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director Marc Moore) 
For families, this process is an anxious one, as it is never clear to them which agency is 
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detaining them, for what purpose, and where. Nancy Hiemstra has tracked this process 
for Ecuadorean deportees, and shown how many are unclear whether they are in Texas or 
New Mexico, in a CBP or ICE facility, in prison or in detention (Hiemstra forthcoming).  
For detained noncitizens, this labyrinth of legal distinctions, intended to differentiate 
legitimate from illegitimate migrants, is confusing and frightening. 
Review and Release  
 Flores also required, however, INS/ICE to review each child’s eligibility for 
release (not only those whose attorneys request one) and a letter stating ICE’s reasons for 
continued detention.  Because children faced greater barriers to fair immigration 
processes, they often languished in the pre-Flores detention system for long periods of 
time.  Prior to the Hutto settlement, bond and parole reviews were particularly 
complicated because Flores required regular review of children’s detention decisions and 
written justification for their detention in secured settings; ICE had no such obligation to 
parents.  As the litigation showed, ICE subordinated children’s claims to their parents’, 
treating families like accompanied adults, and neglected Flores’ requirements to review 
children’s detention decisions regularly.  As one mother noted:  
Mohammed, Asia, Bahja and I do not know why we are in jail. We never received 
any notice of the reasons for why the children are imprisoned here. Mohammed 
tells me it is not fair for him to be in jail because he’s never done anything wrong.  
(Bunikyte v. Chertoff, Declaration of Deka Warsame.) 
In cases where the ICE Field Office Director did review families’ eligibility for release, 
he rubber-stamped his decisions without giving individualized reasons for denying bond 
or parole. These practices reveal, advocates argued, a presumption of detention among 
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ICE leadership.  The settlement ultimately required that the Field Office Director review 
and communicate individualized release decisions (with which the FOD complied; 
Bunikyte v. Chertoff Final Compliance Report 2009). These technical struggles were 
particularly important because review and relief decisions cannot be appealed to a higher 
or external body. In the past, federal courts adjudicated appeals, but Congress limited 
these appeals to increase “administrative efficiency” and move noncitizens through the 
deportation process more quickly.  Once detained, ICE Field Office Directors and the 
Deportation Officers assigned to specific facilities can singlehandedly decide a family’s 
fate. 
 Above, I described how the place and time of a family’s apprehension determined 
their denomination as “illegal” or “arriving aliens” and how this categorization impacted 
where and how long they are detained. This initial encounter determines families’ 
eligibility for release from Hutto and Berks. As Field Office Director Marc Moore 
explained, Expedited Removal’s expansion complicated what used to be fairly clear 
release policies: 
[Plaintiffs’ counsel] And during the time that you have been involved at Hutto 
have bonds always been set for persons who pass their credible fear [interview]? 
[MOORE] Well, I don’t know – I can’t recall exactly when that Board of 
Immigration Appeals decision occurred that – I’m speaking from memory 
because remember that up until the Secure Border Initiative, almost all expedited 
removals anywhere were issued at Ports of Entry. So they were all arriving aliens, 
so there was really no question. Then as you moved in to between the Ports of 
Entry, the immigration court -- and actually, I believe the case was brought out of 
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San Antonio -- the immigration court did not believe those fell within the terms of 
an arriving alien. So they rendered a decision that they believe these cases fell 
within the purview of the Court to set a bond. I think the agency disagreed, and 
BIA ultimately ruled that the immigration court was correct. (Emphasis added; 
Bunikyte, et al. v. Chertoff, et al. Deposition of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement Field Office Director Marc Moore) 
Privileging those within US territory over those outside of it (or in the process of passing 
into it), “illegal aliens” can “bond out” of detention, while “arriving aliens” can only be 
released on parole.  This differentiation affords noncitizens present in US territory more 
procedural rights than those who have never been admitted, and this territorial hierarchy 
has long been considered precedent in immigration law (Neuman 2005). Once ER 
applied to areas between and beyond Ports of Entry, ICE faced the possibility of bond-
eligible ER cases. Prior to the 2004 expansion of ER, placement in ER proceedings 
effectively eliminated noncitizens’ opportunities for release.   
 The difference between bond and parole is particularly important for asylum-
seekers who claim asylum at a port of entry--that is, those who avoid undocumented 
entry and seek legal entrance under established humanitarian refugee law.  Immigration 
judges determine bond eligibility and set bond amounts in noncitizens’ initial hearings.  
ICE Deportation Officers have the discretion to set parole, however, on the basis of their 
evaluations of families’ “flight risk:”  
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL] And regardless of who actually prepares document, 
who is the person that considers a successful applicant who passes the CFI? Who 
is the person that makes this consideration as to whether the person is going to be 
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released or not?  
[MOORE] It would probably be the case officer. 
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL] Is that the same as the--  
[MOORE] Deportation officer. 
[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL] --- deportation officer? And do you review these 
document decisions?  
[MOORE] Me, personally, no, ma'am. 
[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL] And where are those deportation officers located? 
[MOORE] They're located at Hutto. They are assigned dockets. Each docket 
consists of any number of individuals or families, in this case. And it is their day--
to-day responsibility to review those cases, act on the information that's changed 
in those cases and move those cases with the best efficiency through the case 
system.  (Bunikyte, et al. v. Chertoff, et al. Deposition of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement Field Office Director Marc Moore, pp. 102-105) 
Hutto’s Deportation Officers apply these evaluations differently, so that families’ (and 
now women’s) release on parole often depends on which officer they are assigned 
(Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. Compliance Review 2, 2008; Fieldnotes June 9, 2010).  
Both bond and parole require substantial financial deposits, ranging from $1,000 to 
$14,000 per person, but gaining parole requires that “arriving aliens” find a sponsor to 
take responsibility for their welfare and court appearances.  For families arriving without 
existing family or community support, raising this kind of money was impossible, 
marking the gulf between technical and real relief (White 2002).  The asylum process 
takes from six to twelve months, so prohibitively expensive parole amounts guarantee 
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long detention stays, despite a Deportation Officers’ evaluation of a families’ low flight 
risk.  
 The terminology of “relief,” the official term ascribed to detention release and 
stays of deportation, is revealing, because discretionary relief is not a right, but an 
administrative decision made by ICE or an Immigration Judge.  Because relief is 
discretionary, it is not bound by the norms of due process set out in the Constitution 
(Reno v. AADC 1999).  Federal courts have ruled, on these grounds, that constitutional 
due process norms do not apply to relief hearings.  Because noncitizens cannot appeal 
discretionary relief decisions on due process grounds, relief decisions are exempt from 
federal or appellate court review (Neuman 2005).  ICE and immigration courts retain, 
therefore, discretion over noncitizens’ pathways through the immigration system. Though 
distinct, these two forms of discretionary authority resonate and work together to limit the 
ability of noncitizens to appeal for relief from detention and deportation. 
 ICE’s discretionary authority bore down on families arriving in the US without 
prior authorization in numerous ways.  First, ICE has the discretion to initiate (or not) 
deportation proceedings against groups identified by Congress in immigration legislation, 
and the decision to withhold an order of deportation. Second, Immigration Judges have 
the discretion to grant relief to deportable noncitizens, but not “arriving aliens.”  With the 
exception of certain categories of mandatory detention, ICE’s authority to detain 
noncitizens, to transfer them between detention centers, and to release them under various 
forms of supervision rests in its administrative discretion to execute immigration law. 
Making families detainable, therefore, required policy changes within the then-new 
Department of Homeland Security, but did not require new legislation. Just as ICE began 
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detaining families by way of administrative policy-making, the agency ceased placing 
families in Expedited Removal, circumvented the mandatory detention requirements of 
ER, and thereby emptied Hutto of its families in September 2009 (Email Correspondence 
September 14, 2009).  Thus the history of family detention policy reveals much about the 
ways in which ICE maneuvers between legislative constraints like mandatory detention. 
 
DELEGATED DISCRETION: GOVERNING DETENTION CENTERS 
  IIRIRA requires ICE to detain particular noncitizens prior to deportation, and 
charges the agency with ensuring noncitizens’ compliance with admission and exclusion 
laws.  As such, the choice, location, and daily operation of detention—the entire 
detention system—falls within ICE’s policy-making prerogative. Yet contracts, previous 
legal settlements, state licenses, and performance guidelines govern detention center 
operations. To this point, the chapter has focused on ICE’s discretion over families’ 
pathways into and out of Hutto, specifically the ways in which ICE officers’ 
categorizations structure families’ legal options.  My focus has been, then, on the ways in 
which ICE officers put immigration law to work, and the ways in which categorization 
practices are applied to individual cases and noncitizen bodies, i.e. the production of 
detainability through legal discourse.  Actualizing detainability requires, however, spaces 
of confinement, so here I turn to analyze the governance of detention spaces.  I outline 
how federal and state oversight overlapped with internal ICE inspections, 
intergovernmental service agreements, and contracts. Paradoxically, multiple legal 
frameworks intersect, making Hutto hardly an extra-legal space, yet these legal 
frameworks do not found a basis for rights claims by detainees.  Rather, these different 
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legal regimes work to continually defer liability for detention conditions.   
Flores v. Meese (1997) and In re: Hutto Detention Center (2007), federal 
litigation settlements in the Ninth and Fifth Circuits respectively, created binding legal 
requirements that set family detention apart from adult detention centers. Family 
detention facilities are different from adult-only facilities (including Hutto in its current 
role as a female detention center) in that these two settlements require additional 
oversight. In particular, Flores requires that all children’s custodial facilities obtain 
childcare licenses.  State licenses are supposed to insert a layer of external oversight and 
to ensure that ICE facilities operate at a minimally accepted standard of child welfare. 
This requirement devolves certain oversight responsibilities to states, which are 
traditionally excluded from immigration policy-making and enforcement (Plyler v. Doe 
1983; see Varsanyi 2008), but also recognizes that children’s rights regimes are state-
legislated and litigated and child welfare is state-managed.   
Here, Texas and Pennsylvania diverged.  Upon discovering that Pennsylvania did 
not license secured family shelters like Berks, the county asked the state to create a 
license for their facility, rather than go unlicensed.  Texas’ Department of Family 
Protective Services, however, exempted Hutto from its child care license because parents 
were present.  As Judge Sam Sparks noted:  “A state license is qualitatively different 
from a state license exemption.  A state license subjects the facility to periodic health and 
safety evaluations by an outside regulatory body, while a state licensing exemption, by its 
very nature, removes that layer of oversight” (Bunikyte v. Chertoff, Order).  Judge Sparks 
accepted the exemption, on the grounds that his court did not have jurisdiction to 
mandate state licensing policies. In re: Hutto Detention Center Settlement also included 
161 
 
regular, unannounced visits from a federal magistrate, who oversaw compliance with its 
list of specific requirements until it expired in December 2009.  Executed in federal court, 
these stipulations went beyond the Detention Standards, the Family Residential 
Standards, and ICE’s monitoring practices that leave detained adults with “really 
nothing…no court-enforceable standards other than a constitutional claim, other than a 
substantive claim of violations of due process” (Interview April 2008).  For Berks and 
Hutto, then, child-specific rulings imposed direct judicial oversight of detention center 
conditions, where there has been little for adults.  The particularity of family detention—
made so by the presence of children—highlights the ways in which children’s rights 
serve as limits to ICE’s discretion, but in comparison, reveals the fragility of those 
protections in the broader context of immigration enforcement. 
 In line with broader Bush-era directives to privilege the private sector in 
homeland security operations, the majority of immigration-related detentions are held in 
contract facilities, both public and private.  ICE procurement officers request and award 
bids, draw up contracts, and monitor facilities, nesting an additional set of institutional 
relationships within ICE’s administrative purview.  While prisons are by no means 
transparent institutions, state-level agencies license, certify and hear complaints about 
prisons and jails in the criminal justice system.  Federal detention centers are, however, 
overseen by the same agencies that contract them, and because immigration enforcement 
issues are extra-constitutional, challenging detention conditions, practices, or policies is 
exceedingly difficult.  ICE owns and operates neither Berks nor Hutto, but subcontracts 
with Berks and Williamson Counties, respectively, through Inter-Governmental Service 
Agreements (IGSAs).  As of September 2009, ICE held noncitizen detainees in seven 
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dedicated and approximately 240 shared-use county jail facilities contracted through 
IGSAs (see Chapter 3; US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009, 10). Contracting 
between government entities escapes the competitive bid process required for private 
sector contracts, and devolves detention center operations to county governments. Here, 
the differences between Berks and Hutto reveal dynamics at work throughout ICE’s 
detention system (and the criminal justice system, as well).  Berks County owns and 
operates the Berks County Family Shelter Care Center in a facility built by the county, 
located on county land. 
 The Corrections Corporation of America, however, built the T. Don Hutto 
Correctional Facility in 1995, on land the firm purchased from the Catholic Dioceses of 
Austin.  Williamson County sub-contracted with CCA to provide the IGSA-stipulated 
family detention services.  As the ICE Field Office Director explained, “in our IGSAs, 
our contractual arrangement is with the local government, the entity, state, county or local 
entity that has the facility. The county or whoever we have that contractual arrangement 
with, it’s their choice who operates that facility for them. And that's the matter for the 
county in this case and CCA” (Bunikyte, et al. v. Chertoff, et al. Deposition of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director Marc Moore). The ICE-
CCA-Williamson County triumvirate became particularly complex during and after the 
lawsuit, as the federal court held ICE liable for its noncompliance with Flores, ICE held 
Williamson County liable for completing stipulated changes at Hutto, and Williamson 
County directed CCA to complete those changes:  
As I mentioned on the phone, I want to make sure that Williamson County 
understands the current activities occurring at T. Don Hutto Residential Facility 
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and changes required under the IGSA. More importantly, the IGSA is between the 
County and ICE, and Williamson County, TX is responsible for performance 
under the terms of the agreement. As background, Williamson County was issued 
a change order under the IGSA on 2/16/2007 to make improvements to the 
facility to bring it more in-line with a non-secure facility required for ICE 
Residential Facilities. The Contracting Officer's Technical Representative 
authorized improvements and ICE is in the process of negotiating a final price for 
these changes with CCA.However, any changes to the IGSA should be directed by 
CCA through Williamson County, and then to the ICE Contracting Officer, as 
that's who the agreement with ICE is with. … We are in the process of negotiating 
this change order and Williamson County must be at the table for these 
negotiations and changes to the agreement. (Emphasis added; Email from 
Anthony Gomez, ICE Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Acquisition 
Management, Detention and Removal Operations to Hal Hawes, Assistant 
Williamson County Attorney, April 5, 2007) 
In most cases, CCA then sub-contracted with other private firms for painting, bath fixture 
replacement, fence removal, installing new child-safe doors, social services, and 
education (Email Correspondence from Damon Hininger, CCA). This created some 
confusion, as the functional relationships between ICE, CCA, and Williamson County did 
not cohere with the legal hierarchy of contracted responsibilities.  Ultimately, Williamson 
County Commissioners’ Court agreed to delegate authority to CCA, allowing ICE and 
CCA to negotiate Hutto’s changes directly (Email Correspondence between Ashley 
Lewis, ICE Head of Contracting Activity and Gary Mead, Assistant Director of ICE 
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Detention and Removal Operations, June 8, 2007).  This web of sub-contracted authority 
over detention demonstrates, however, the gulf that can develop between the legal and 
practical control of detention centers.    
 The Hutto Settlement required ICE to develop Family Residential Standards 
(FRS), a 26-part document meant to set a baseline standard for family detention 
operations (analyzed in Chapter 8).  In its form, content, and references, the FRS mimics 
the Performance-Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS) for adult facilities, which 
is based on the American Correctional Association (ACA) standards for jails and prisons 
in the criminal justice system.  ICE enforces these standards through periodic audits by 
the Nakamoto Group, Inc., a private firm specializing in prison oversight.  These 
monitoring reports contain both qualitative descriptions and “box-checking.”  Unlike the 
federal magistrate’s Compliance Reports filed with Judge Sparks, the FRS and its 
compliance reports are not legally enforceable.  That is, they serve as internal ICE reports 
that rank detention center conditions ICE sets for itself.   
  Berks is governed by Pennsylvania shelter licensing procedures, non-binding 
Family Residential Standards, Flores stipulations (but not In re: Hutto), and Berks 
County’s IGSA with ICE, while Hutto’s family detention operations were governed by 
the Family Residential Standards, the In re: Hutto Settlement, a contract between 
Williamson County and CCA, an IGSA between Williamson County and ICE, and 
Flores. In both facilities, ICE contracts out its authority to detain noncitizens, and in 
many cases this authority is re-contracted to various service providers. Thus, employees 
of the State of Pennsylvania and the Corrections Corporation of America have more 
control over the everyday spatial ordering of family detention facilities.  This situation 
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became particularly salient when CCA fired a guard for having “consensual” sexual 
relations with a mother held at Hutto in 2007, and Williamson County charged a CCA 
guard with five counts of sexual assault in 2010.  In both cases, ICE’s delegated authority 
over detention created the possibilities for CCA guards to engage in illegal behavior.⁠7
 
 
Administrative and prosecutorial discretion define only the official scope of formally 
delegated powers, but this devolution of detention creates opportunities for a wider range 
of nominally “nongovernmental” actors to assume the prestige and authority afforded the 
state in immigration proceedings.  Technically and practically, it becomes difficult to 
delineate the limits, legal and material, of state power over noncitizens in immigration 
proceedings. 
DISCRETION AND THE PLENARY DOCTRINE 
 Adjudication, services, and enforcement are formally separated in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), so that any of these three components may be 
delegated to different agencies.  When the Homeland Security Act (HAS) amended the 
INA in 2003, it allocated enforcement and administrative services to Secretary of 
Homeland Security, while adjudication authority was shared by the Secretary and the 
Attorney General (AG).  The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and the 
Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA), responsible for adjudicating immigration cases, 
remain in the Department of Justice under the AG’s leadership. Prior to the 2003 
reorganization, the INS managed both enforcement and administration, while EOIR and 
                                                 
7 The Prison Rape Commission considers all sexual relations between detainees/prisoners and guards 
nonconsensual, due to the severely uneven power relations between guards and prisoners. See National 
Prison Rape Elimination Commission 2010. 
166 
 
the BIA managed adjudication, as they do now. The HSA reorganized immigration 
functions in operational terms: “. . . a Federal official to whom a function is transferred . . 
. may, for purposes of performing the function, exercise all authorities under any other 
provision of law that were available with respect to the performance of that function to 
the official responsible for the performance of the function immediately before [transfer]” 
(P.L. 107-296, §456 in Viña 2003, 2).  The delegation of enforcement-related activities 
dictates the distribution of immigration-related authority, while adjudication—the 
categorization, review, and release decisions above—falls to both the AG and DHS 
Secretary. Discretion over detention spaces and immigration cases are, therefore, 
separated and distributed over two DHS agencies and the Department of Justice.  The 
relationship between noncitizens’ bodies—before, during, and after detention—and the 
federal government is mediated by these delegated powers, rule-making, and 
administrative privileges.   
 Coleman (2008a) has delineated how the deportation power applies to citizens 
already living in the US, and production of immigration enforcement’s “postentry 
landscape.” The threat of deportation works to discipline transboundary migrants, De 
Genova (2002) argues, and produce a docile labor force.  The point of immigration 
enforcement is not, De Genova points out, to actually “deport all deportable aliens,” as 
DRO’s Operation Endgame projects, but that “some are deported in order that most may 
remain (un–deported) as workers, this particular migrant status may thus be rendered 
‘illegal’” (De Genova 2002, 39).  For Coleman (2008a) and Kanstroom (2000b), the US 
immigration enforcement regime serves post-entry social control functions. This chapter 
supplements this work by focusing on ICE’s under-examined power to detain noncitizens 
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in the services of immigration law.  
 If the legal exception has been understood as a legal suspension (Agamben 2005), 
and immigration law as particularly exceptional within the American legal domain 
(Coleman 2007a), how do we understand the cordoning off of banal, executive decision-
making?  Is it immigration law’s particularity, or does the removal of judicial oversight 
characterize a broader range of governmental practices? If the latter is true, might 
immigration law’s discretionary elements point towards more pervasive patterns of 
“exceptional” decision-making throughout federal bureaucracies? Does administrative 
law’s banality undermine the exceptionality of immigration law? What kinds of spatial 
practices are these categorizations, and these decisions to release or expel? Specifying the 
authorization of ICE’s power to detain has important implications for our understanding 
of how spatialities of law, sovereign power, and, more broadly, biopolitical governance 
are interlaced. 
 The dialogue with which I opened the chapter illustrates the material 
ramifications of these seemingly arcane legal distinctions.  “Deliberative privilege” 
protects executive decision-making from judicial review, though the product of specific 
decisions may be subjected to review.  Immigration law’s foreign policy status converges, 
therefore, with administrative discretion, giving ICE wide berth to determine (1) 
noncitizens’ pathways into and out of detention centers, and (2) the location, form, and 
ordering of detention centers. In other words, the plenary doctrine shields deportation 
decisions and relief applications from judicial review, while the Chevron deference 
shields ICE policy-making and enforcement practices from judicial review. Analyses of 
rescaling nor the respatialization of the border do not completely explain how, where, or 
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who manages detention and deportation proceedings.  It is in the constitutional “juridical 
void” or “grey area,” however, that ICE and DRO officials make daily decisions about 
who to detain, who to release from detention, where to detain them, how many beds they 
need, etc.  The plenary power doctrine denominates immigration a foreign policy issue, 
but a host of administrative rule-making, regulations, guidance, and delegation of 
authority govern the everyday practices of ICE and DRO officers, just as in other 
Executive Branch agencies.  Nor does plenary power inherently prevent oversight of ICE 
activities, as federal administrative functions are subject to judicial oversight in most 
cases. 
 Analyzing the intersections of administrative discretion and the plenary doctrine 
makes three specific contributions to the growing geographical and interdisciplinary 
literatures on immigration enforcement. First, tracing how the HSA and INA 
differentiated between immigration adjudication and detention center operations allows 
me to analyze ICE’s authority detain noncitizens, independently of its ability to deport 
them.  Most scholarly work on immigration enforcement focuses on surveillance, 
policing and deportation, the first and final points of contact between noncitizens and 
state immigration officials.  Second, administrative law intersects with—and extends—
the discretionary authority enshrined in the plenary doctrine.  Focusing on the power to 
deport, geographic research on immigration enforcement has explained immigration 
enforcement actions through “the plenary doctrine” of immigration.  While ICE’s 
discretionary authority works to close detention off from external oversight, on the one 
hand, and legal contestation, on the other, it is important to conceptualize how ICE’s 
administrative privileges are critical to the materialization of executive power more 
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broadly.  That is, immigration enforcement policy and practice shares much with more 
mundane agencies. Understood as “efficient decision-making,” ICE’s administrative 
privilege resulted from Congress’ concerns that the appeals process allowed noncitizens 
to forestall their deportation for years.  The 1996 laws and changes to INS prosecution 
policies “streamlined” INS decision-making, allowing the agency to deport noncitizens 
more quickly.   
 Third, prying apart intersecting legal regimes reveals a more complex legal 
geography of US noncitizen detention. Immigration detention has often been 
characterized as a “space of exception,” a specific spatio-temporal location in which legal 
norms are suspended for noncitizens.   I argue, however, that the suspension of 
constitutional norms should not be confused with the suspension of “the law.” Rather, as 
Basaran (2008) argues, the selective suspension of constitutional norms for noncitizens 
constitutes liberal security; in other words, illiberal border zones are required to 
constitutes zones of liberal, “normal” law. From this perspective, a critique of detention’s 
exceptionalism relies upon a liberal universalism that fails to address the ways in which 
the Constitution requires its own suspension in order to work. 
 Following Agamben, analyses of detention have focused on the relationship 
between “the sovereign” and the detained body on opening the depoliticized body up to 
sovereign power directly. But how do detention centers come to be?  Who detains 
noncitizens, and with what authority? Who makes the decision to open a new detention 
center?  Who decides who should be detained there? Who manages detainees within the 
det,ention center?  Do detention center managers have the same kind of authority as 
deportation officers or immigration judges?  How do we understand the distribution of 
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“sovereign power” throughout the administrative complex of immigration enforcement? 
Can we understand these bureaucracies as “petty sovereigns,” through whom sovereign 
power flows (ala Butler 2003)?  By rolling back constitutional protections for noncitizens 
in the US, the ‘96 laws and their post-9/11 extensions effectively erased the traditionally 
recognized distinction between noncitizens within and outside the US.  Documented 
permanent residents can find themselves in the same detention center, with little more 
grounds for relief than arriving aliens, even if ICE grants them bond and releases them 
from detention.  As Neuman argues, “Discretionary elements of deportation policy may 
serve important purposes, but they also have the potential to reduce the legal status of 
lawfully admitted aliens to their insecure constitutional status, and to blur the distinction 
between admitted and not admitted aliens” (2005, 655).  Whether living in the US, or 
arriving for the first time, noncitizens are much like Franz Kafka’s peasant, perpetually 
waiting at law’s gate, held there by the promise of lawful entry, materialized in the 
presence of the gate itself and the gatekeepers incessant vigil (Kafka 1995). 
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CHAPTER 8: DOMESTICATING DETENTION: IMAGINING FAMILY 
SPACES IN US IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Family unity occupies a privileged and highly politicized role in US immigration 
policy. Family sponsorship remains the primary mode of state-sanctioned immigration, 
and “family unity” a dominant discourse in immigration politics more broadly (US 
Department of Homeland Security 2008; Lubheid 2002). Immigration law’s “family 
unity” is defined by heterosexual marriage and consanguinity, privileging biological 
relatedness and state-recognized kin ties over extended and “fictive” kin networks. What 
counts as a family has, however, expanded and contracted over time, at times excluding 
all but the nuclear family and at other times including extended biological relatives 
(Inniss 2004).  Family sponsorship requires that the sponsor provide proof of financial 
support, and Citizenship and Immigration Services, the department charged with 
administrating immigration procedures, subjects families to state surveillance and 
questioning.  So while admissions policies privilege certain forms of “family unity,” for 
noncitizen and mixed-status families, immigration status and kinship intersect in complex 
and unpredictable ways. For example, noncitizen’s homes have also become sites of ICE 
intervention.  Between 2003 and 2009, when “home raids” became a common practice of 
ICE’s Fugitive Operations Team (FOT). Migrant “illegality” transects “family unity” in 
complex, problematic, and unpredictable ways.  
Detention policies have targeted parents traveling with minor children in new 
ways, as well. In 2005, US Department of Homeland Security expanded its Expedited 
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Removal Program from ports of entry to all borderlands within 100 miles of the border, 
and to migrants arrested within 14 days of arrival.  “Sympathetic humanitarian cases” 
previously released from detention (such as families with children, the elderly, seriously 
ill, and seeking asylum) became subject to mandatory detention, and Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement’s detention system expanded to accommodate new populations.  
For ICE, the need for family detention arose from a contradiction between mandatory 
detention and humanitarian release categories, and between parents’ and children’s legal 
protections during the immigration enforcement process (as discussed in Chapter 5).  For 
ICE, automatically releasing families represented a “procedural loophole,” one that 
presumably allowed “illegal” workers or smugglers to enter the country. ICE also sought 
to “deter future illegal family immigration,” a more diffuse policy goal (US Department 
of Homeland Security 2006a). The specter of “rented children” exploits an “American 
value” at the heart of both social and immigration policy-making.  Framed in a period of 
immigration and border enforcement still defined by the attacks of September 11, 
sympathetic and vulnerable groups, like children, could provide a means for “the enemy 
in our midst.” Refracted through a highly securitized lens, privileging “the family” 
became understood as a vulnerability in US border and immigration enforcement.     
Since the 1980s, the figure of the “bogus asylum-seeker” framed increasingly 
penal approaches to asylum processing in the US, Canada, and elsewhere (Mountz 2010; 
Garcia 2006).  Large simultaneous influxes of Cuban and Haitian refugees in the early 
1980’s, and Central American refugees in throughout the 1980s and 1990s heightened 
fears that the American way of life was being exploited for economic migration purposes. 
While these arguments presupposed a problematic distinction between economic and 
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political strife in civil war-torn countries, these discourses worked to reproduce a 
distinction between economic choice and political necessity. The underlying assumption 
of human rights law is that political persecution threatened the right to life in ways that 
shrinking economic opportunities did not.  Framing non-political refuge as choice also 
worked to criminalize migrants, as their “choice” to cross the Mexico-US boundary and 
break US immigration law became the dominant logic of enforcement-led immigration 
policy in the 1990s.  Penalizing migrants responsible for their migration choices 
resonated with broader discourses heaping harsher punishments on drug offenders, 
removing voting rights from felons, and withdrawing welfare benefits from single parents 
who did not marry or become economically productive. Across the field of 
neoconservative and neoliberal reform, “vulnerable populations” have become 
understood as threats to “the population and the way of life,” as vectors of illegality, risk, 
racial difference, and cultural dissolution.  
A similar logic justified family detention, but in this case, it was the fraudulent 
biological relationship between parent and child that immigration officials find 
threatening, signaling a deeper interest in immigrant reproduction. Notions of care, 
biological descent, and conjugal relationships permeate ICE detention and deportation 
policy-making. These relationships temper enforcement-led immigration policy at times, 
but, in the home raids described above, domestic cohabitation can serve as a medium of 
apprehension. Suspicious in terms of both conjugal and descent relations (in 
anthropological kinship terms), “the immigrant family” becomes an object of state 
interrogation, surveillance, and intervention. The securitization of “vulnerable 
populations” reveals tensions between logics of territorial control and population 
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management. In this chapter, I show how these tensions played out in ICE’s proposed 
family detention center design. 
Scholars examining the relationship between sexual citizenship and immigration 
law, in the US and abroad, focus on the ways in which marriage requirements for family 
reunification (Simmons 2008), the exclusion of recognized same sex relationships 
(Elman 2000), and the gendered differentiation of citizenship transfer through marriage 
(de Hart 2006) privilege not only heteronormative but patriarchal family forms to gain 
access to legal immigration status, social service benefits, and family unity (see also 
Binnie 1997; Stychin 2001). Fears of marriage fraud have, however, permeated 
immigration discourses for decades (Jones 1997), so that the privileging of heterosexual 
nuclear families has, in the context of neoconservative pro-marriage social policy-
making, become recast as a vulnerability in the immigration system. Similarly, recent 
preoccupation with “terrorist” and “anchor” babies reveal significant political 
ambivalence about who is having children, and what kinds of citizens those children will 
become (e.g., Federation for American Immigration Reform 2010).    
Much of the sexual citizenship literature begins and ends analysis at the hetero-
homo boundary, failing to take seriously the intersectionality of race, gender, class, and 
sexuality at the border.  As Jasbir Puar (2007) notes, however, the expansion of gay rights 
through rights to private space (e.g. Lawrence v. Texas 2003) has unfolded alongside 
increased state intervention for poor, noncitizen, and non-white families.  Welfare reform 
laws excluded all documented and undocumented noncitizen families, and placed steeper 
responsibilities on citizen families, while immigration law linked criminal and 
immigration policing in new ways (Fischer 1993; Gedalof 2007;  Leiter et al. 2006; 
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McLaren and Dyck 2004). As Amy Brandzel (2005) argues,  
Gays, homosexuals, and queers are certainly not the only ‘deviants,’ and gay 
rights do not take place in a vacuum; they are inextricably linked to negotiations 
over ‘terrorism,’ immigration, welfare reform, and abortion rights, to name a few. 
A properly angled queer lens, then, analyzes how heteronormativity functions 
through the production and taxonomy of racialized, gendered, sexualized, and 
classed behaviors and practices (Brandzel 2005, 172).  
US citizenship is defined, therefore, by myriad overlapping exclusions, and these 
registers of exclusion are deployed in different ways across space and time (Lubheid 
2002; Somerville 2005).   
  This chapter asks: what, then, is the state’s abiding interest in immigrant families 
and children? That material form does that interest take? And what are the relations of 
power undergirding family custody, within and without detention centers? This chapter 
explores how the noncitizen border-crossing family became a site of intervention, state 
control, and public contest over the meaning of custody, or the authority to feed, care for, 
and supervise noncitizen bodies.   Here I analyze how ICE's custody of families, and 
parents' custody of children came into conflict with each other, and how these conflicts 
revolved around competing norms security, safety, and autonomy.  In particular, I trace 
how the bi-polar “home-like” and “prison-like” formulation was put to work and explore 
how these struggles over the spatial ordering of “residential facilities” unfolded through 
orderings of parent-child relationships, private space, state-family relationships, visibility, 
and mobility.  I argue that the regulation of familial relatedness—in and through the 
spaces of state custody—is critical to the reproduction of certain forms of state power and 
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citizenship. 
To do this, I draw on my analysis of semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation, and documents collected from governmental and non-governmental sources. 
While other chapters focused on specific aspects of family detention policy, this chapter 
traces a textual, but highly politicized conversation between ICE employees, advocates, 
and attorneys. This exchange unfolded in the press and in closed NGO Working Group 
meetings between ICE and a select group of Washington-DC-based advocacy 
organizations.  The Bush Administration set itself apart from previous administrations in 
its refusal to engage with immigrants, advocates, and service providers, and this 
antagonism bled into mundane interactions between pro bono attorneys and ICE officers.  
High profile reports, such as the Women’s Refugee Commission’s Locking up Family 
Values and the Hutto lawsuit, made Berks and Hutto staff wary or inimical to interviews, 
inquiries, or visits (Women’s Commission 2007).  In the rare instances where advocates 
were granted visits, advocates remarked ICE employees were openly hostile to their 
presence. Throughout this research, I worked with Texas and DC-based organizations on 
research and media responses to the lawsuit, the Request for Proposals (RFP), family 
residential standards (FRS), and detention reforms. I provided an analysis of the RFP to 
the Women’s Refugee Commission, and organized academic “experts” to provide 
comments to ICE on the FRS. I was, therefore, directly involved in producing some of 
the categories analyzed here, and had occasion to observe and participate in the 
conversation’s unfolding.  My participation focused, however, on the pragmatic 
campaign demands, whose timelines and conceptual demands depart from the analytic 
work presented in this chapter. This analysis is, therefore, an effort to interrogate the 
177 
 
received categories of this conflictual terrain, and to problematize state’s under-examined 
relationship to reproduction, kinship, and domesticity. 
 
DETAINING FAMILIES 
The vast majority of detained families (and now women, at Hutto), pass Credible 
Fear Interviews (CFIs) and eventually gain asylum. As such, these families are not 
“illegal immigrants,” if we accept, for a moment, immigration law’s highly constrained 
terms.  Not only are families usually considered “low flight risk,” and therefore ideal 
candidates for bond or parole, but families usually fall into a number of “vulnerable 
populations” categories. Deportation Officers and Immigration Judges are supposed to 
consider these factors and, in the past, have released families based on these criteria. ICE, 
and the INS before it, retain “prosecutorial discretion” over immigration cases.  That is, 
immigration legislation affords the executive branch the discretion to decide which cases 
warrant prosecution and which do not. In the past, prosecutorial discretion memos (the 
medium through which INS/ICE legal guidance is communicated) have stipulated that 
“vulnerable populations” deserve to be reviewed for release from detention and for a 
broader range of extenuating circumstances, such as mothers nursing: 
 Field agents and officers are not only authorized by law to exercise discretion 
within the authority of the agency, but are expected to do so in a judicious manner 
at all stages of the enforcement process. For example, in situations where officers 
are considering taking a nursing mother into custody, the senior ICE field 
managers should consider: 
 • Absent any statutory detention requirement or concerns such as national 
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security, threats to public safety or other investigative interests, the nursing 
mother should be released on an Order of Recognizance or Order of Supervision 
and the Alternatives to Detention programs should be considered as an additional 
enforcement tool… (Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion Memo, Julie Meyers, 
Assistant Secretary  of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, November 7, 
2007) 
These memos prioritize the exclusion of some noncitizen groups, such as “criminal 
aliens,” over those who pose relatively less threat to public safety or public coffers. 
Families migrating with minor children have traditionally demonstrate “sympathetic 
humanitarian factors:” 
Deferred action should be considered when the situation involves symphathetic 
humanitarian circumstances that rise to such as level as to cry for an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. Examples of this include where the alien has a citizen 
child with a serious medical condition or disability or where the alien or a close 
family member is undergoing treatment for a potentially life threatening disease. 
(Emphasis added’ Prosecutorial Discretion Memo, William J. Howard, Principle 
Legal Advisor, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, October 24, 2005.) 
The same memo advises less aggressive prosecution for family members of Armed 
Forces personnel, confidential informants, and those involved in smuggling 
investigations. In other words, familial care and service to the state are the most 
significant circumstances warranting relief from detention and exclusion proceedings. 
These memos offer guidance only, however, and do not stipulate the discretionary actions 
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of individual ICE attorneys, and do not confer noncitizens in custody rights; the right to 
release remains solely with ICE.   
In 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union, University of Texas Immigration 
Law Clinic and a private law firm sued the Department of Homeland Security for holding 
families in “prison-like” conditions at the T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Taylor, 
Texas. As described in Chapter 6, the plaintiffs charged that Hutto violated the conditions 
of Flores v. Meese, a 1997 lawsuit that creates certain norms for children’s treatment in 
INS custody. Flores requires ICE to hold children in “the least restrictive” conditions 
available while options for release are evaluated. Where release was impossible, Flores 
required that INS/ICE custody gain a state license for a family shelter. Hutto violated 
Flores on this and nearly every other count, and the case came to revolve around Hutto’s 
architectural design, disciplinary control, and the psychological effects of this spatial 
ordering on children. The plaintiffs’ case turned on proving that Hutto, a former medium-
security prison, was a restrictive facility.  While the plaintiffs sought to invalidate the 
legal grounds for family detention through the cases of 26 child plaintiffs, the judge ruled 
the psychological harm caused by Hutto could not be separated from the psychological 
trauma of migration. The plaintiffs were largely asylum-seekers fleeing political 
persecution and domestic abuse.  The ruling effectively exploited their status as 
“vulnerable populations” and victims of abuse to solidify the legal grounds for family 
detention.     
 
PRISON VS. HOME 
 The Hutto lawsuit dominated media attention, and Flores’ categories of “least 
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restrictive” facilities and “presumption of release” for children influenced local activism 
and policy advocacy around family detention. Within this milieu, critiques of Berks’ and 
Hutto’s physical conditions settled along a polarized axis of “prison-like” and “home-
like” environments, articulated through children’s freedom, parental authority, and 
autonomy.  Throughout the lawsuit and the subsequent years of public contest of family 
detention at Hutto, critics contrasted the facility’s “look and feel,” disciplinary ordering, 
and carceral architectural design with normatively imagined, but rarely described “home-
like facilities” (ACLU 2007a,b,c; Women’s Commission 2007). Advocates primarily 
criticized Hutto for what it lacked, and “home-like facilities” served as an undescribed, 
abstractly desirable negative space that was irreconcilable with prison spaces in its very 
essence. It was inconceivable to most to imagine a possibility for home-like custody 
overlain with carceral spatial ordering. When the lawsuit was successful, and ICE, CCA, 
and Williamson County made changes at Hutto, the facility’s built purpose served as 
evidence of its lasting inadequacy. Thus, critiques of Hutto rested on a spatial 
essentialism that marked clear poles between home-like and prison-like spaces. 
 The image of “children in prison,” in particular, formed a rather spectacular 
backdrop against which a range of arguments unfolded.  For example, Free the Children 
organizers stated: “ICE, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrests innocent 
children and their mothers and turns them over to a private ‘for profit’ prison which, as of 
today, receives some $20,000 per child...per month...to keep an innocent child in an 8' x 
12' prison cell” (Moses 2007).  Yet, focusing on children created certain frictions 
between advocacy and activist organizations.  The Texans United for Families coalition, 
for example, was disturbed by the ways in which “children in prison” demarcated an age-
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based exceptionalism, and implied that adult immigrants were, first, criminals and, 
second, justifiably detained. Prison’s sharp edges, automatically closing doors, barbed 
wire, and uniformed guards clashed with normative imaginings of safe childhood spaces, 
even while these imagined “home-like” spaces remained implicit.    
Figure 8.1: America's Family Prison (Film) Blog Banner 
 
(Source: Gossage and Keber 2007; tdonhutto.blogspot.com) 
 In addition, some worried that focusing on “children in prison” weakened 
arguments against family detention policy as a whole, and the Berks facility in particular 
(Porter et al., n.d.). Because Berks is a former nursing home, not a former prison, 
criticisms of family detention became discursively attached to Hutto’s prison-like 
architecture. For example, in its 2007 report, the Women’s Refugee Commission’s 
repeatedly asserted that “both facilities place families in settings modeled on the criminal 
justice system” (Women’s Commission 2007, 2). In media coverage of the Bunikyte et al 
v. Chertoff et al, however, Berks’ compliance with Flores and its nonpenal architectural 
design provided a seemingly innocuous counterexample to Hutto.  Even while advocates 
fought to position release as the preferable alternative, Berks’ less penal exterior and 
residential purpose seemed to set it aside as a suitable alternative. 
 For others, ICE’s intervention in family life undermined the “architecture of the 
family unit,” particularly parents’ ability to comfort and protect their children.  
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Participant: I think one of the things to keep in mind also about the facility also is 
that parents are deprived of their parental authority. I think that must be, you 
know I'm not a psychologist, but I think that's probably distressing for a child. 
Somebody else is making the decisions at Hutto. And it's not the parents. 
LM: Did a lot of the parents express that that was a problem? 
Participant: Yeah, they did. Yeah, and the inability to -to protect, to be able to 
remedy the situation, where children turn to their parents as their protectors and as 
the people that are going to protect them, and they [the parents] weren't able to do 
that. (Interview April 2008) 
Parental authority was, in addition, linked to families’ constrained mobility within and 
beyond Berks and Hutto, as parents at Berks still relied upon facility staff for the 
provision of basic care.  At Hutto, one mother resorted to hiding blankets in her 
pillowcases, and lying to CCA employees about not having enough, to keep her children 
warm at night (Gossage and Keber 2007). Critiques of children’s (lack of) freedom and 
parental (lack of) authority crystallized, therefore, around the problem of autonomy. 
Constrained mobility within Berks and Hutto, families’ inability to leave the detention 
center, and their inability to choose how, when, and in what way to carry out daily 
activities epitomized the “unhomeliness” of family detention facilities:    
It's still, you know, it is a former prison.  You know, because the children aren't 
free to walk out the door.  They're not going to public school.  Their parents are 
not making decisions daily about how they want to spend their day, what time 
they want to eat.  I mean so, it goes back to the fact that it is still detention. It is 
still detention of children.  (Interview April 2008) 
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Even while Hutto’s early conditions represented the starkest physical constraints, as 
headcounts confined families to their cells for up to 11 hours per day.  Not only was 
personal mobility constrained, at first to living areas, and later to residential areas, but 
detained families did not have a choices about how they organized their day. 
 ICE, for its part, appeared to draw its detention policies from adult detention and 
corrections fields. In 2008, the agency released “Family Residential Standards,” (FRS 
hereafter) as required in the Hutto Settlement.  Consisting of 26 standards, each section 
cites an intertextual field of state and federal laws, ICE policies, and supporting 
documents. The majority of the standards cite American Corrections Association (ACA) 
standards for jails and prisons and detention standards for adult facilities. Stipulating 
protocols for contraband, physical constraints, disciplinary procedures, escape attempts, 
security, and other components associated with “prison-like” facilities, the FRS indicated, 
to advocates, that despite the Hutto Settlement, ICE intended to retain a carceral model 
for family detention: 
 The standards that ICE has drafted are fundamentally misguided and 
inappropriate, as they are an adaptation of standards from the American 
Correctional Association (ACA) for the incarceration of adult criminals. The 
parents and small children ICE holds in immigration detention are in civil 
administrative detention related to their immigration proceedings.  As ICE has 
previously recognized, they are not criminals serving penal sentences. (Emphasis 
added, ICE NGO Working Group, Letter to ICE Re: NGO Response to Family 
Residential Standards 2009) 
The reliance on correctional expertise rather than more appropriate experts, such as child 
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advocates, social workers, psychologists, and counselors was a key problem for 
advocates. Seeking to offer a new paradigm of custody, advocates critiqued ICE’s penal 
disciplinary regime through norms of child welfare:  
Even if it's good that the families have better conditions, it's still a prison-like 
environment which is inappropriate for a family. Congress has told ICE to 
implement more humane, less-costly alternatives to family detention. ICE should 
be implementing home-like alternatives to detention that allow children and their 
families to lead normal lives, [we’re] not talking about more Hutto-like detention 
centers. (Emphasis added; Fieldnotes 4-23-08) 
 
…[Th]e only acceptable place for a family is in a non-penal, homelike residence 
that is bound by standards based upon child-welfare/family service principles, not 
guided by standards appropriate only for adult prisons.  The standards developed 
by ICE should reflect this strong preference against detention of families. For 
those few families who may not be immediately released and who may remain in 
ICE custody for any period of time, we encourage ICE to rely upon policies, 
procedures and guidance for shelters, hospitals, children’s homes or other civil 
facilities.  While these sources will need to be modified to address the needs of 
families in ICE custody, they would provide a more appropriate framework to 
adequately address the physical, social, emotional, educational and recreational 
needs of accompanied children and their parents.  Using these policies as a 
reference, families should be housed in residential shelters that replicate homelike 
environments. (Emphasis added; ICE NGO Working Group, Letter to ICE Re: 
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NGO Response to Family Residential Standards 2009) 
“Normal family life” would serve to, advocates presumed, decriminalize detained 
families, and to flesh out the “home-like spaces” ICE failed to produce.  Basing 
arguments implicitly on children’s inherent un-criminality, these strategies emphasized 
the family as a site of care, child development, and reproduction.  They work from both 
family and child policy, which are developed at subnational, state jurisdictions, and 
children’s human rights frameworks, which require signatories to offer a “thicker” set of 
institutional entitlements than offered in (adult-focused) human rights frameworks. The 
struggle over family detention reveals a deeper tension, therefore, between disciplinary 
regimes of incarceration and social welfare. Here, children’s welfare, a key site for the 
normalization of child behavior, became a vehicle through which to challenge “the 
severity revolution” (Miller 2002-2003) in the corrections and immigration enforcement 
fields.   
 While this strategy appealed (begrudgingly and a bit cynically) to neoconservative 
“family values,” the majority of Hutto’s families were single, asylum-seeking mothers.  
As the judge’s comments in the Hutto lawsuit demonstrate, this appeal is far more fragile 
than advocates may have expected, as Hutto’s families were poor, of color, and fleeing 
domestic and geopolitical violence. Seeking to appeal to a heteronormative citizenship 
for strategic purposes, these discourses also recall previous exclusions of women “likely 
to become a public charge,” namely unmarried and pregnant women (Lubheid 2002).  So 
while some activists sought to “free the children,” this freedom was couched within 
hegemonic social policy terms that relied on norms of child behavior and development. In 
the current moment, as feminist scholars have pointed out, US family policies are more 
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likely to justify state intervention in poor and immigrant households than to protect them 
from state intervention.  
 As ICE and CCA brought Hutto’s physical plant into compliance with the 
settlement, focus shifted from critiques of detention management, that implied that family 
detention was excusable under certain conditions, to a broader critique of family 
detention policy and its connections with the private prison industry, the criminalization 
of immigration, and human rights discourses. Anti-family detention activism and 
advocacy was, therefore, hardly a settled discursive field, as individuals and groups 
reacted to new developments in immigration enforcement, pursued a diversity of issues 
via anti-detention organizing, and worked with new national and international groups.  
These discourses settled around a constellation of nodal points: children’s innocence and 
dependence, prison-like spaces, home-like spaces, and familial exceptionality. How, then, 
were “home-like facilities” imagined? How were the embodied and spatial relationships 
between parents, children, and ICE ordered and enclosed in opposition to detention 
centers? 
 
IMAGINING “HOME-LIKE SPACES”   
 Early anti-family detention advocacy promoted the use of “alternatives to 
detention” over detention in carceral facilities, as these typically allowed noncitizen 
adults to stay at home.  ICE ran (and has since expanded) two versions of its Intensive 
Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP): phone or in-person reporting and electronic 
monitoring with an ankle bracelet.  The former required noncitizens to call ICE at regular 
intervals and/or to be home to receive calls or visits from ICE officers. Electronic 
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monitoring required noncitizens to wear a thick plastic band (often called an “ankle 
bracelet” by newsmedia) that recorded their movements outside of a certain range of their 
homes.  If permitted to work, the band notified ICE of curfew infractions.  The ankle 
bands required daily charging, and were heavy enough to cut into a person’s ankle, 
causing distress for pregnant women in particular.  Between curfews and charging the 
device, participants in both ISAP programs complained that these alternatives restricted 
their everyday mobility, extending detention rather than offering a serious alternative to 
it. According to critical participants, ISAP’s mobility restrictions transformed the home 
into a detention center, opened their families to disruptions and surveillance from ICE, 
stigmatized noncitizens in their neighborhoods, and isolated them from others in the same 
situation (Fieldnotes September 2008).  ISAP came to be seen as an alternative form of 
detention, as its spatial control mimicked detention and moved its panopticism to the 
private sphere. In addition, advocates began to notice that these “alternatives” were not 
used to decrease the detained population, but were used to surveil asylum-seekers, for 
example, who would previously have avoided any ICE supervision. Thus, some 
advocates accused ICE of using these strategies of spatial control as an extension of the 
detention system and a way of bringing more, not fewer, noncitizens into ICE custody. 
Still others accepted ISAP as an improvement on detention, but sought to employ it only 
for those subject to mandatory detention, rather than detaining new groups. 
 As anti-detention advocates rejected existing “alternatives to detention,” ICE 
began to demand that advocates provide concrete models for their vision of alternatives 
(Fieldnotes May 6, 2009).  In addition, the change in administration brought new staff to 
ICE, including those more sympathetic to critiques of detention. Two models dominated 
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advocates’ proposals: a service provision model and a shelter model.  In 1996, the INS 
contracted with the VERA Institute of Justice to pilot an “Appearance Assistance 
Program,” (AAP) which provided low-flight-risk noncitizens in INS custody with access 
to legal counsel, social workers, and other services (VERA Institute of Justice 1998).  
The pilot program’s goal was to increase immigration court appearances for noncitizens 
released from detention and to test the efficacy of different levels of supervision.  
Program officers screened noncitizens for “strong community ties,” a permanent address, 
and threat to public safety.  Under “intensive supervision,” AAP participants reported 
regularly to AAP field officers and worked with “community sponsors” who 
communicated with both the AAP field officer and the noncitizen in question. Under 
“regular supervision,” noncitizens receive an orientation, reminders about court dates, 
and access to resources to fight their case. In this model, AAP officers monitored and 
supervised noncitizens in addition to providing legal services, assisting with court 
appearances, and resolving case issues with INS. Where noncitizens failed to appear for a 
court date or notify VERA case workers of an address change, AAP officers reported 
their non-compliance to INS. Here, a contracted NGO both supports and mediates 
noncitizens’ relationship to immigration enforcement agencies. 
 The shelter model focuses on housing provision, and builds on experiences of 
shelters housing undocumented noncitizens.  Where the AAP required “strong 
community ties,” lack of housing or contacts is common among newly arriving migrants 
and prevents them from being released where they would otherwise be considered low 
risk.  A few shelters serving immigrant populations around the US work informally with 
ICE to provide housing to those without family or friend networks to sponsor them.  The 
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shelters usually have relationships with local social service agencies, pro bono attorneys, 
and work placement services.  In the case of Casa Marianella, held up as an exemplar by 
Austin-based advocates, the shelter itself provided housing alone, and provided phone 
numbers for local services.  The shelter organizers repeatedly stated, “we are not a 
detention center” (Interview 2008). Besides a curfew, the shelter does not restrict 
residents’ comings and goings or supervise them beyond the facilities’ ground rules. In 
this model, the shelter serves as a verifiable address for detainees seeking release, and 
connects noncitizens to network of organizations. But shelter organizers were adamant 
about remaining neutral with respect to their residents’ immigration cases and citizenship 
status.  Those released to shelters like Casa Marianella gained freedom of movement and 
autonomy over daily decision-making, but the shelter itself refused to mediate 
noncitizens’ relationship to ICE. 
 In either case, advocates sought to buffer noncitizens’ relationships to ICE with 
non-governmental and social service organizations, to mediate what was almost 
universally understood to be violent state power.  Differences emerged, however, over 
the extent to which NGOs should do ICE’s work for them (including the development of 
alternatives).  Shelters worried that cooperating with ICE beyond their current role would 
rupture trust relationships with residents.  NGOs worried that taking ICE funding for 
alternative custody programs would tarnish their reputations and prevent them from 
doing other work with immigrant communities.  And for those that questioned the 
validity of national borders or the right of the federal government to police and detain 
noncitizens, these programs only served to make noncitizens more open to ICE 
intervention.  These differences over ICE-NGO-noncitizen relationships reveal diverse 
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on-the-ground theories of state power and the state’s proper relationship to noncitizens’ 
bodies and homes amongst advocates. 
 
RE-DESIGNING FAMILY DETENTION  
As advocates offered a range of models and alternative institutions for family 
custody, ICE continued to hone its family detention policies. The 2007 Hutto Settlement 
and the cost of refitting Hutto’s physical infrastructure and institutional culture revealed 
shortcomings in the agency’s strategy. Internal memos listed Hutto’s non-compliance 
with Flores before and during the lawsuit (contradicting ICE’s own legal strategy), and 
the federal magistrate’s final reports revealed resistance to the paradigm shift from 
medium-security prison to family residential center.  In the spring of 2008, ICE issued a 
Request for Proposals (RFP) from the private sector for three new family detention 
centers.  ICE and other state agencies issue RFPs for a wide range of governmental tasks, 
and any federal procurements must be open to a competitive bidding process. RFPs are 
published on the Federal Business Opportunities website (www.fbo.gov) Contracts 
between federal and county entities are not, however, subject to this process, allowing 
counties to serve as intermediaries for private companies seeking federal contracts.  
ICE’s contract at Hutto is, for example, between ICE and Williamson County, Texas, and 
the county subcontracts to the Corrections Corporation of America.  RFPs are required, 
however, for federal-private relationships, and are the primary mechanism by which 
specific federal functions are privatized.  They are also one medium through which 
advocates, activists, and journalists discover detention plans, as ICE does not publicize 
detention expansions until after procurement awards are made.  RFPs are not open to 
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public comment or input, and because proposals are considered intellectual property, 
proposals are not open to public scrutiny.  The privatization of detention unfolds, 
therefore, through legal instruments meant to protect private property and profitability, 
but not public access to information.  
While the RFP signaled an expansion of the family detention program, I examine 
it here because it reveals much about ICE’s response to critiques of Hutto’s “prison-like” 
spatial order and its obligations under Flores and the Hutto settlements.  In particular, the 
RFP included a Family Residential Facility Design Standards manual (FRFDS) with 
visual schematics of an urban single-building unit and a rural campus, illustrations of the 
movement of detainees, visitors, and staff into, within, and out of the facility, and the 
spatial organization of different various detention center tasks.  (The development of the 
FRFDS was, itself, subcontracted to a private firm that exists exclusively on federal 
corrections-related contracts.) The RFP also included a “Monitoring Tool” by which the 
contractors would be audited for compliance with the Family Residential Standards 
described above, and ICE responses to contractor questions. Altogether the RFP’s 
component parts reveal how ICE re-imagined family detention spaces to address the 
Hutto settlement, increased attention to family detention policy, and activists’ critiques. 
Here I focus on the FRFDS, in particular, as it illustrates the ways in which ICE 
conceived of a spatial order that balanced security, surveillance, and population 
management.    
 
Figure 8.2: Rural Campus Master Plan 
192 
 
 
(Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Family Residential Facility Design 
Standards 2008b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Single-building (Urban) Campus Master Plan 
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(Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Family Residential Facility Design 
Standards 2008b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Building-As-A-Whole Relationship Diagram 
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(Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Family Residential Facility Design 
Standards 2008b) 
 
The bulk of the FRFDS is spent outlining the spatial arrangement of operational 
components: Office, Living, Court, Service, and Support.  The spatial arrangement of the 
component zones reflects, for ICE, the relations of authority within the facility, as well.  
ICE staff, who oversee conditions, health and operational staff, and government agency 
personnel, are located towards the front of the facility.  Visitors are confined to the public 
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lobby and monitored visitation room, which is located near the front door. Moving 
downward and rightward on the Organizational Chart (Figure 8.5), one also moves 
farther back into the facility, as detainee services and upkeep are located towards the 
back of the facility. Each of these Operational Components have slightly different 
security requirements, depending on the extent to which detainees interact with external 
visitors, staff, dangerous materials, or tools.  Central Control sits between the public 
lobby, for example, and the living unit, while the Support Zone (maintenance, deliveries, 
and supplies) is closed off to detainees altogether, but is functionally connected to the 
kitchen.  For both the rural and the urban plans, the FRFDS stipulates secured (fenced 
and patroled) premises, but within this secured boundary, semi-secure and non-secure 
zones are organized to enable families’ mobility within living areas, to facilitate 
surveillance and “positive behavior management,” and to mediate the relationship 
between detained family populations and the non-detained population.  As ICE grants 
detainees greater freedom of, high staff-detainee ratios maintain behavior management, 
and divide families into “manageable groups of no more than 50 residences per living 
unit and 25 residents per pod.” Zones of relative mobility are nested within zones of 
semi-security and security, while preserving the contractor’s (theoretical) surveillance 
and monitoring of the detained population. 
The FRFDS includes a dedicated section on design criteria, requiring that “the 
design should consider the use of architectural roofing to give a residential family 
housing appearance, either through sloped roofing, roofing break lines and facility  
 
Figure 8.5: Generic Organizational Chart for Family Residential Facility 
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(Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Family Residential Facility Design 
Standards 2008) 
 
exterior design” and that “roof design shall be conducive to a residential feeling” (US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2008b, 4.2, 4.3).  Generally, the facility “should 
take on a more residential appearance, less institutional or correctional…to give a 
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residential family housing appearance,” and the public.lobby should display “a non-
institutional appearance and welcoming/non-intimidating interior environment” (ibid., 
4.3).  The rest of the design requirements concerned detainees’ movement through the 
intake process, and the division of the space into manageable units, the provision of 
living areas, and the regulation of access to entrances.  For ICE, then, “security” is 
defined by detainees’ personal mobility, spatial segregation, and relationship to authority. 
Secure, semi-secure, and non-secure spaces are defined by the contractor’s direct control 
over detainees’ bodies, activities, movement, and location.  “Residential feel” becomes a 
matter of roofing angle, a performance to the public with no direct relevance to detainees’ 
experiences of detention. 
While families move freely within their living areas, these zones of relative 
mobility are sequestered from the facility’s entrances, so that family residential facilities’ 
surveillance and mobility constraints are designed into the facility rather than visually 
and aesthetically salient.  In the Campus Plan, for example, “structures can be dispersed 
on the site to allow for visual observation as well as to provide open green spaces” (US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2008b, 4.2). The “residential aesthetic” became a 
means of “designing in” surveillance, balancing security with the appearance of free 
movement within the facility. ICE’s concern for security is particularly salient in the 
“Monitoring Tool” distributed to potential contractors. The FRFDS’ authors combined 
spatial partitioning and categorization, aesthetic design, and surveillance as nested zones 
of security clearance.  The plans allocate Visitors, contracted staff, ICE, and residents 
task-specific spaces, so that detainees may circulate with little direct intervention in the 
innermost spaces.  Enclosing detainee-denominated space is a buffer zone government 
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officials with different levels of security clearance.  The building is, in turn, enclosed by a 
patrolled perimeter and a fence.  The Family Residential Standards contain—and the RFP 
required—specific escape scenario plans (which were withheld from my FOIA requests 
“for security purposes”).   
As a response to criticism and legal challenges launched at Hutto, the RFP 
tempers the carceral model initially used at Hutto by “designing in” surveillance, 
mobility management, and “residential feel.”  The problem of family detention revolved 
around, for ICE, security, surveillance, and enclosure, where advocates had worked for 
remote supervision—at most—and a buffer zone of non-governmental representatives, at 
best. The privacy, autonomy, and time management that defined families’ and advocates 
conceptions of “child” and “family-appropriate” spaces were mediated, in ICE’s version, 
by a “hard perimeter” of fencing, and highly surveilled pathway into and out of the 
detention center. Defined as accompanied minor children, families are alternatively 
understood as limits to federal intervention or special populations requiring dedicated 
facilities. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For ICE and the range of organizations criticizing family detention practices, the 
protection of spatial enclosure defined the different imaginings of family custody. Few 
advocates or activists were willing to proscribe what a “proper” or “ideal” family looked 
like, but were more interested in securing spaces in which families retained autonomy 
over daily social reproduction.  For example, advocates sought to ensure that families 
resided in places where they felt safe and secure, and this required privacy from 
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surveillance and monitoring built into prison architecture. ICE, on the other hand, sought 
to nest spaces of open mobility within rigid authoritative hierarchies, which were 
spatialized in the fencing of the facility, the control of visitation, and the arrangement of 
administrative offices.  That is, the struggle over prison-like and home-like spaces 
revolved around competing axes of autonomy/parental authority/privacy and 
security/surveillance/residential aesthetic. The spatial ordering of Berks and Hutto were 
critical to the problematization of family detention as a policy, focusing ICE’s attention 
on the aesthetic presentation of “family residential facilities” and the balance of mobility 
and security within them.  
“The immigrant family” is a site of struggle over mobility rights, human rights, 
inclusion and exclusion, belonging, and citizenship.  While the procreative and 
consanguinity of US immigration policy produces clear lines of demarcation between 
“deserving” heterosexual immigrants and “undeserving” sexual deviants, the 
heteronormativity of US immigration policy operates within a more complex matrix of 
exclusion than the hetero/homo dichotomy can capture.  Efforts to protect “vulnerable 
populations,” like families, often rely upon and reproduce the heteronormativity of 
immigration law in ways that undercut more fundamental critiques of American 
citizenship and the exclusions on which it has relied.  In the same way that queer theorists 
call upon same-sex marriage proponents to remain conscious of the boundaries required 
for such claims, immigrant rights advocacy need to consider how our discourses redeploy 
mechanisms of exclusion.  A more productive analytic frame would consider how states 
continue to “govern through the family” (Donzelot 1979). In the case of immigration 
enforcement, consanguinity, marriage, care, and reproduction become sites of anxiety, 
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intervention, and securitization.  As debates over family detention demonstrate, ICE 
mediates territorial presence and political membership in and through its interventions in 
home, private, and family spaces.  Kinship and sexual regimes are, therefore, important 
modalities through which ICE performs its control over borders, territoriality and 
citizenship. Debates over family detention spaces are, therefore, proxy struggles over the 
futurity of the state, and the conditions of possibility for making life. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In researching and writing this dissertation, my objectives have been (1) to 
delineate and critique the textual, legal, and embodied practices that produce “immigrant 
families” as detainable subjects; (2) to analyze the discursive suturing of children’s and 
family law to immigration detention to the private corrections industry to border security; 
(3) to conceptualize detention in relation to a broader topography of border enforcement; 
and (4) to critical engage with contemporary anti-detention and pro-immigrant 
movements in the US. In this final chapter, I draw together the empirical contributions, 
analysis, and theories explored in the chapters above, and distill the points of intersection 
between them. As imprisonment becomes the social policy of choice over education, 
rehabilitation, or welfare, and as detention becomes to domestic and wars on 
terror/drugs/crime, these new institutional alignments are reconfiguring the relationship 
between law, space, and life. 
 
THE CURRENT STATE OF FAMILY DETENTION POLICY 
 As of this writing, ICE detains noncitizen families at the Berks County Family 
Shelter Care Center in Pennsylvania. Hutto’s last families were released in September 
2009.  Even before Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement John 
Morton issued new prosecutorial guidance that deprioritized detention for families and 
caretakers, ICE instructed its field officers to classify apprehended families as “illegal” 
instead of “arriving families.” This categorizational change allowed ICE and arriving 
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families to circumvent IIRIRA’s mandatory detention clause, in the absence of legislative 
changes to admission and enforcement policies. Barack Obama’s presidential campaign 
promised immigration reform, and 2009 and 2010 saw immigration rights rallies, lobby 
days, and a massive “Reform Immigration for American” campaign. The “comprehensive 
immigration reform” agenda traded away, however, border militarization for a “path to 
citizenship,” a move that angered pro-immigrant coalitions in border states, who would 
receive the bulk of these “border security” efforts. To demonstrate its commitment to 
enforcement, ICE deported over 400,000 noncitizens in FY2010, outstripping the Bush 
administration’s immigration crackdowns (Vedantam 2010). The Secure Communities 
program, which allows local law enforcement to check immigration status of anyone 
coming through its jails, now operates in every Texas county and will be in place in every 
US jurisdiction by 2013 (Associated Press 2010). In addition, the Democratic Congress 
passed the $600 million 2010 Southern Border Security Act in August of 2010 in the 
hopes of bartering with Republicans for a comprehensive overhaul. In December 2010, 
however, Republicans successfully prevented a vote on the Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, widely considered the most palatable of 
immigration reform initiatives. The current “post-entry landscape” is, unfortunately, one 
of expanding illegalization, detainability, and deportability for noncitizens. 
 In the absence of Congressional action on immigration reform, family detention 
policy continues to evolve under ICE’s discretionary authority. Berks continues to 
undergo regular audits from the state of Pennsylvania and ICE’s subcontracted overseers, 
and its contract stipulates compliance with the Family Residential Standards.  Family 
detention is no longer central to ICE discussions of immigration enforcement and border 
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security, as the Obama Administration’s emphasis has shifted towards “civil detention.” 
Hutto continues to hold around 500 noncitizen women, and current members of the Hutto 
Visitation Program in Austin, Texas, report detention stays of 1 month to years. In a 
number of cases, women have refused to sign their own deportation orders, leaving them 
caught between “Final Order of Removal” and repatriation without opportunities to 
appeal for release.  Because detained noncitizens’ civil rights are limited, possibilities for 
contesting detention and immigration policies remain limited. This has not stopped, 
however, multiple hunger strikes, “noncompliance,” or civil disobedience outside 
detention centers (Bernstein 2010; del Bosque 2010). Rehabilitated from its “prison-like” 
past, Hutto now stands as ICE’s “model civil detention facility.”  The In re: Hutto 
Detention Center Settlement served, in the end, to improve “conditions of confinement” 
for “low security” noncitizens. In short, family detention “civilized” the prison, reformed 
its penal character, and rehabilitated its spatial ordering.  Family detention policy follows 
therefore the contours of a broader terrain of sovereign and governmental power, as the 
powers to categorize and banish remain intimately bound.  
 
THE ETHICS OF PRECARITY 
Within both real and imagined family detention centers, at the territorial boundary 
and within it, ICE polices the juridical boundaries of the US nation-state. In Chapter 4, I 
argued that border construction projects and detention centers work as a series of 
connected, but distinct spatial strategies that form a border assemblage.  The walls, 
lights, cameras, patrol vehicles, interview rooms, staging areas and detention centers 
produce the conditions of possibility for noncitizen’s banishment, both symbolically and 
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materially. Thus, while IIRIRA expanded detainability, brick-and-mortar capacity was 
required to raise deportation rates.  The T. Don Hutto Detention Center, transformed from 
medium-security prison to family detention center to “model civil detention facility” 
exemplifies the ways in which infrastructure lends symbolic and textual constructions a 
certain durability.  But as Chapter 5 showed, detention’s disciplinarity is not defined by 
the prison’s spatial ordering. Rather, detention is itself an assemblage of spatial strategies 
and knowledge practices—deterrence, isolation, criminalization, and forced mobility—
that produce both subjects and populations. In the context of risk-based security 
ontologies and preemptive politics, detention works, in part, by displacing vulnerability 
from the US onto a population of transnational potential migrants. The geostrategic 
imaginaries of threatening outside/safe inside permeated the Hutto litigation, as I showed 
in Chapter 6, allowing the judge to argue that family detention worked in both children’s 
and the public’s best interests.  
Distributed through individualized legal decisions and reverberating through 
networks of care, detained families’ traumas were borne both individually and 
collectively.  The domestic and political violence fled by Berks’ and Hutto’s parents does 
not dissolve upon approval of their asylum claim, but endures in both memory and for 
those left behind. For DHS, achieving security requires a hardening of territorial borders 
and the externalization of insecurity. So while transboundary migrants and US security 
professionals think and act in starkly different terms, they do work upon each other. 
Spectacularly banal, detention’s disciplinarity works through a heterogeneous assemblage 
of spatial practices. As Sexton and Lee write, the prison “participates in a reconfiguration 
and redeployment of repressive state powers, displacing while retaining spectacles of 
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corporal punishment and public execution” (Sexton and Lee 2006, 1008). Detention’s 
disciplinarity does not reverberate seamlessly between registers, does not scale up or 
down in a coherent fashion, nor produce singular subjects. Rather, as Mountz argues, 
detention’s panopticism “straddle[s] scales, including transnational individual, family, 
and community, each asserting the possibility that ‘the local’ and ‘the global’ or separate 
yet intimately intertwined” (Mountz 2010, 156). Emerging alongside the “society of 
control” described by Deleuze (1988) and Rose (1999), the prison has been emptied out, 
released from its moral function, and redeployed as risk containment. Diffused 
throughout state and non-state institutions, public spaces, and transactional databases, the 
prison’s panopticism is a generalized “diagram of power,” and its gaze works far beyond 
the prison walls. Yet the detention center has become a central component of border 
security in the US and elsewhere, repositioning spatial confinement within a wider set of 
modulated disciplinary technologies.  
For noncitizens entering the US and other countries of the global north without 
proper documentation, detention has become a condition of both admission and 
exclusion, a “long tunnel” towards uncertain destinations (Mountz 2010); for noncitizens 
residing in increasingly securitized global north countries, detention and deportability 
work as a form of social control (Coleman 2008a; de Genova 2002; Kanstroom 2000b). 
In the context of this assemblage of spatial strategies and legal machinations, what is the 
law and what does it mean to suspend it? Is immigration law “extra-legal law,” as 
Mathew Coleman (2007a) argues? Throughout this dissertation, I have maintained that 
law is a site of struggle over space and political recognition, and have outlined the ways 
in which different legal regimes overlap, resonate, and come into conflict with each other.  
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As Chapter 6 described, the Hutto lawsuit concluded with a specific distribution of liberal 
rights and obligations between parents and children.  The hyper-responsible migrant-
subject and the innocent child-object are not extra-legal subjects; they are inscribed in 
and through the law.  Rather, these legal subjects are produced through illiberal legal 
norms.  Hutto and Berks are not extra-legal spaces, either.  A series of different legal 
instruments delegate the various elements of detention and deportation to county, federal, 
and private institutions.  The contract discussed in Chapter 7 is not, however, a social 
contract between citizen and state, but a neoliberal contract devolving state functions to 
the private sector.  
This arrangement reveals a certain neoliberalization of border policing itself, 
through which the state becomes the source and the guarantor of capitalist accumulation.  
Others have noted a neoliberalization of citizenship, a differentiation of mobility rights 
distributed according to economic productivity (Ong 1999, 2006). Warehousing bodies 
and profiting from “bedspace” amounts to, for Gordon (2006) and Sexton and Lee (2006) 
and other prison abolitionists, a reinscription of racialized exclusion at the heart of 
“liberal” governance. The transgressions of the war prison and the detention center find 
their source in the US prison system, where torture and arbitrary power are “the norm.” 
Rather angrily, these authors point to the (white) privilege underlying dominant 
narratives of detention’s exceptionality.  If, as Benjamin argues, “the tradition of the 
oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception 
but the rule,” then scholars’ indignation at law’s suspension reveals a deep naivete about 
for what, exactly, the law is used (Benjamin 2003 [1940], 392).  Focusing on the material 
infrastructure of detention, its political and economic relationships, belies dominant free-
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trade-versus-security narratives and reveals, instead, a relationship of convenience 
between border and economic security.  
For Tugba Basaran (2008), illiberal border zones constitute liberal, normal, law.  
“Included through exclusion,” noncitizens in detention and deportation proceedings 
create the conditions of possibility for liberal peace.  As Achille Mbembe argues, 
biopolitical security relies upon a certain necropolitics, here revealed in the DHS’ 
displacement of vulnerability onto noncitizen families (Mbembe 2003). As detention 
functions are devolved and outsourced, detained and imprisoned bodies become a sort of 
raw material, capitalizable and exchangeable commodities caught up in circuits of forced 
mobility. In our current moment, federal outsourcing devolves necropolitical functions to 
private entities, and these governmental arrangements suture detention to a range of non-
state relationships. We face, therefore, a geopolitical and geoeconomic milieu in which a 
diverse array of actors have vested interests in the continued normalization—if not 
expansion—of the material, political, and legal production of exclusion.  As legalistic and 
human rights-based arguments continue to dominate immigrant rights organizing and 
challenges to US wartime detention practices, the historical, metaphysical, and material 
limits of US liberalism and law must be taken seriously. 
“At stake,” Judith Butler writes, “are communities that are not quite constituted as 
such, subjects who are living but not yet regarded as lives” (Butler 2009, 32). These non-
lives are not natural, unqualified, nor “bare life” but “bound and constrained by power 
relations in a situation of forcible exposure” (ibid., 29). Amplifying precarity for detained 
noncitizens, presuming that this diminishes vulnerability, detention-as-deterrence 
operates as what Lauren Berlant calls “slow death:” “… the physical wearing out of a 
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population and a deterioration of people in that population…. The phenomenon of mass 
physical attenuation under global/national regimes of capitalist structural subordination 
and governmentality” (Berlant 2007, 754). This points to, she argues, “something 
important about the space of slow death that shapes our particular biopolitical phase; 
mainly, people do live in it, just not very well” (ibid.). While we have seen a rise in 
deaths along the border, immigration policing, detention, and deportation has also simply 
made life harder for noncitizens in the United States, and as Nancy Hiemstra has shown, 
at home (Hiemstra forthcoming). This has important implications for the revitalization of 
sovereign power. If sovereign power is, according to Foucault (2003), the ability to “take 
life and let live,” what if we need not die, physiologically, in order to be killed? If 
detention works on networks, it is to wear thin the relationships on which life depends, to 
make life in the United States not worth living. These tactics exploit the interdependency 
inherent and necessary to human life, using the recognition of our relationality against us.   
 In her recent book Frames of War, Butler attempts to think ethics beyond liberal 
norms by rethinking what it means to be human:  
We have to ask about the conditions under which it becomes possible to 
apprehend a life or set of lives as precarious, and those that make it possible, or 
indeed impossible. …If we are to make broader social and political claims about 
rights of protection and entitlements to persistence and flourishing, we will have 
to be supported by a new bodily ontology, one that implies the rethinking of 
precariousness, vulnerability, injurability, interdependency, exposure, bodily 
persistence, desire, work, and the claims of language and social belonging. 
(emphasis added; Butler 2009, 2)  
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Analyzing the structures of dehumanization, through which we might understand life 
without recognizing its worth as a rights-bearing subject, Butler recenters politics on 
collective humanness, rather than identity, nationality, citizenship, and so forth. From this 
perspective, she argues, U.S. geopolitics produces precarity, has used the inherent 
interdependency of life against particular groups. For Butler, precarity’s universality 
provides onotological grounds on which to build a coalitional politics around the struggle 
to thrive.  Intriguingly, her approach resonates with the political ontology of circulation, 
connection, and contingency.  But rather than entering into political groupings to avoid 
chaotic states of natures (following Hobbes) and to order the distribution of property 
(following Locke), building a political ethic around precarity works through struggles 
over the material conditions of being human: housing, healthcare, sustenance, space for 
the performance of different lifeways, and political inclusion.  Butler’s is a normative 
experiment, an effort to address embodied and categorical difference as an ontological 
universal.  More to the point, she seeks to reinscribe liberalism’s universal individualism 
around precarity and interdependence, to recast the political around a feminist and queer 
ethic of care.  As a political ontology, precarity reorients possibilities for recognizing 
“enduring ties” of queer relatedness, the relationality of parenthood (through birth or 
adoption), transnational families (heterosexual and otherwise), and our own relationships 
to strangers. In effect, Butler seeks to reconstruct a leftist agenda not around the 
antagonisms of class, gender, racial or other identity positions, but around a biopolitical 
universal: we will die with out each other—not because of each other—and this is why 
we belong to each other. Refocusing politics from inclusion/exclusion to precarity 
privileges relational subjects, interdependence, and a biopolitics of mutual aid.  
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Beyond family detention, “the family” remains central to immigration geopolitics, 
as admission, relief, and risk categories privilege consanguinity over other forms of 
belonging. Spectacular public debates over immigrants' birthright citizenship, "anchor" or 
"terrorist babies," healthcare, and "bogus" asylum claims polarize immigration politics, 
yet family, gender and the home remain important metaphors for nation and territory 
(McClintock 1993; Stevens 1999; Walby 1996; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989). In many 
countries, family unification remains a dominant avenue for legal entry, but as this 
dissertation makes plain, exclusion practices--immigration policing, detention, and 
deportation--privilege familial relatedness and private space as sites of state intervention 
rather than pathways to political membership. As described above, detention and 
deportation practices revolve around legal and spatial conceptions of the home and the 
family in previously unexamined ways.  This dissertation has focused on the legal and 
material infrastructures of detainability, but what comes into view when we focus on care 
practices, home spaces, and social reproduction?   How do we understand the state’s 
enduring interest in immigrant reproduction, both biological and social? Analyzing 
immigration and border enforcement practices from this perspective brought deterrence’s 
reverberating impacts (Chapter 5), parents’ relational rights claims (Chapter 6), and 
family detention’s spatial ordering (Chapter 8) into sharper view.   
 Unpacking the state’s interest in foreign familiarity  requires that working across 
sites and state programs and ask different kinds of questions about immigration 
enforcement. What is the state’s enduring interest in immigrant reproduction, family 
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unity, and care networks? How do these relationships, spaces, and circulations come to be 
apprehended—understood and confined—by immigration and security professionals?  
How does the US regulate political membership in and through care, consanguinity, and 
“family unity”? And how does “the family” regulate political membership for citizens 
and noncitizens alike?  Heeding Butler (2002, 2009), Puar (2007), and Brandzel (2005), 
asking these questions elicits common political and theoretical ground between 
disenfranchised felons, queer communities, and noncitizens, allowing us to explore the 
topographies and topologies of exclusion.  In future research, I plan to expand my 
empirical focus from family detention to a series of flashpoints that distill key 
contradictions between immigration, family, reproduction, and privacy regimes.   
Home Raids  
 Since 2005, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Fugitive Operations 
Teams have performed “home raids,” sweeping up “collateral” residents unable to prove 
legal status. Noncitizens detained in their homes can appeal to the Constitution’s Fourth 
Amendment protections from illegal search and seizure to avoid detention and 
deportation.  Thus, private homes endow noncitizens with constitutional protections 
unavailable to those caught up in workplace raids, traffic stops, or profiling in public 
places.  Intriguingly, the protection of private space has also served as the basis for 
constitutional challenges to anti-sodomy laws. As critics of gay marriage have pointed 
out, sexual citizenship has become the price of assimilation to the nuclear, single-family 
home-owner ideal.  In addition, to analyzing the ways in which the legal geographies of 
public and private space intersect with immigration enforcement, this project will allow 
me to trace the co-constitutive character of il/liberalism and il/legality.     
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Family Custody  
 Family courts and social service agencies have ruled that parents’ undocumented 
status constitutes a risk to their children and justifies removing custody rights (Thronson 
2007-8). For example, the Mississippi Department of Human Services deemed an 
indigenous Mexican woman unfit to mother her newborn, pathologizing immigration 
status as a threat to family life. As described above, there are no clear rulings on the 
relevance of parents’ immigration status to child custody rulings, and parents’ 
undocumented status has been cited as grounds to deny custody.  In these cases, federal 
immigration law operates as de facto child custody law (Thronson 2007-8). Conversely, 
granting custody to unauthorized parents can bar children from filing immigration claims, 
so that custody decisions often have dramatic implications for children’s immigration 
status.  This project would allow me to expand my analysis of parents’, children’s, and 
families’ legal status, and to explore how theories of state and family custody cohere and 
conflict.  Focusing on the bodily inscription of legal categories, this research serves as an 
important counterpart to my analysis of public and private space.      
Borderland Births  
 US immigration officials have challenged birth certificates of American citizens 
birthed by midwives. These challenges target specific (Mexican-American) populations 
in and through their reproductive practices. For undocumented migrants more used to 
consulting curaderas than doctors, home births are a common reproductive practice.  
Hospitals issue birth certificates on site, however, so that home-birthed citizens do not 
gain documented citizenship at the moment of birth. In addition, border midwives are not 
necessarily certified by state or national midwifery associations. These cases demonstrate 
213 
 
not only how immigration enforcement is raced and classed, but how medical 
certification can become a medium of illegalization.  This project explores the biopolitics 
of citizenship at its most intimate and provides a unique perspective on the imbrication of 
medical knowledge, intimacy, and citizenship.  
Private Contracting  
 My dissertation research raised important questions about the role of non-state 
actors in immigration enforcement, and I am developing a project will explore these 
relationships in more detail. As described in Chapter 3, ICE contracts with private firms 
and non-governmental organizations to provide key immigration enforcement services, 
e.g. detention, family shelters, and security services. Under intellectual property law, this 
"immigration industrial complex" (Golash-Boza 2009) is exempt from public information 
laws and prison boards' oversight. Focusing on non-state corrections and security 
organizations, this project will ask how borders, citizenship, and migration are managed 
by new sets of actors in the context of globalized, privatized service-provision. The 
Corrections Corporation of America, for example, owns and operates detention centers 
internationally, and U.S. security and military personnel frequently offer consultation to 
foreign governments and global corporations on “mobility management” issues.  In 
addition, non-profit NGOs provide immigration services, share strategies and expertise 
across borders, and participate in the implementation of rights-based immigration 
regimes. This project will (1) question the boundaries of the state in the context of 
transnational service-provision; (2) contribute to research on the political economy of the 
security industry; and (3) allow me to build a novel conceptual framework for grappling 
with neoliberal governance, capital, and state power. This research will be a 
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collaborative, multi-year project that will contribute to geographical and interdisciplinary 
research on international governance, immigration, and security. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Expanding on themes explored in this dissertation, my future research will trace 
the logics that make family custody, homes, births, and privacy  objects of both special 
legal protection and exceptional state intervention. Others have analyzed enforcement's 
psychological, economic, and social impacts and border policies, inspection technologies, 
and governmental logics, but these studies focus on either individual or state behavior. In 
contrast, my future research will analyze how subnational actors—social service 
agencies, courts, and contractors—mobilize immigration status beyond the border. 
Moving from family detention this series of flashpoints, my work illuminates the 
contradictions between foreign and social policy and the centrality of reproduction to 
immigration geopolitics.  
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
AAP  Appearance Assistance Program 
BP  Border Patrol 
CBP  Customs and Border Patrol 
CCA  Corrections Corporation of America 
CFI  Credible Fear Interview 
CIS  Citizenship and Immigration Services 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
ER  Expedited Removal 
EOIR  Executive Office for Immigration Review 
FRFDS Family Residential Facility Design Standards 
FRS  Family Residential Standards 
FOIA  Freedom of Information Act 
HSA  Homeland Security Act 
ICE   Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
IGSA  Intergovernmental Service Agreement 
IIRIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
IRCA  Immigration Reform and Control Act 
INS   Immigration and Naturalization Services 
INA  Immigration and Nationality Act 
ISAP  Intensive Supervision Appearance Program 
RFP  Request for Proposals  
SBI  Secure Border Initiative 
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